俱舍論記 29.104

29.104

「若依此理至理不成立」者，論主破。若依此理，火則異薪，後火前薪時各別故。又汝計我如火依薪，依諸蘊者，則定應說緣蘊我生，體異諸蘊，成無常性。如何汝言我非異蘊，而非無常。又牒轉計破：汝若謂即於炎熾木等八事之中煖觸名火，餘七事名薪。破云：則是火、薪俱時而起、應成異體、相有異故。又破云：應說依義。此既俱生，如牛兩角，如何可言依薪立火？謂非此火用薪為因。所以者何？火之與薪，各從過去自同類因俱時生故。亦非此火名因薪立，以立火名因煗觸故，非依彼薪。又牒轉計破：汝若謂所說火依薪言，為顯俱生，或依止義者。破云：是則應許補特伽羅與蘊俱生。或依止蘊已分明許體與蘊異。此即約喻難法。又理則應許若諸蘊無，我亦非有。如薪非有，火體亦無。而不許然，彼部不許蘊無、我無。以入無餘，蘊無、我有。彼宗所計；我在生死，與蘊不一不異。若入無餘，與涅槃不一不異。既違己宗，故釋非理。然彼犢子於此不異，前文之中自設難言：若火異薪，薪應不熱。明知不異。論主徵云：彼應定說熱體謂何？若彼釋云：熱謂煗觸，餘七名薪。破云：則薪非熱，體相異故。何得設難薪應不熱？若復釋言：薪名熱，與煗合故薪名熱。破云：則應七事異於煗體亦得熱名。以實道理，火名唯目煗觸，餘七事與煗合皆得熱名，是則分明許七事薪亦名為熱。雖薪、火異，而過不成，如何此中舉以為難？若火異薪，薪應不熱，然薪異火薪亦名熱。又汝轉計：若謂水等遍炎熾時，說名為薪亦名為火，一體義說。破云：既薪火一，是則應說依義謂何？我與色等蘊定應是一，無理能遮。故彼所言如依薪立火，如是依蘊立補特伽羅。進退推徵，理不成立。

As for '[The refutation against the assertion that] if based on this principle... the principle cannot be established': The Author of the Treatise refutes it. If based on this principle, then fire would be distinct from fuel, because the subsequent fire and the preceding fuel occur at different times. Moreover, since you posit that the self relies on the aggregates just as fire relies on fuel, you must definitely assert that the self arises conditioned by the aggregates, that its substance is distinct from the aggregates, and that it has an impermanent nature. How can you claim that the self is not distinct from the aggregates, and yet is not impermanent? Furthermore, citing and refuting an alternative thesis: If you say that within the eight substances of blazing wood and so forth, the tangible of warmth is called fire, while the other seven substances are called fuel, the refutation states: Then fire and fuel arise simultaneously and must have distinct substances, because their characteristics are distinct. Moreover, the refutation states: You must explain the meaning of 'reliance'. Since these arise simultaneously like two horns of an ox, how can one say that fire is established relying on fuel? That is, this fire does not take fuel as its cause. Why is this? Because fire and fuel each arise simultaneously from their own past homogeneous causes. Nor is this fire designated relying on fuel, because the designation 'fire' is established based on the tangible of warmth, not relying on that fuel. Furthermore, citing and refuting an alternative thesis: If you say that the statement 'fire relies on fuel' is meant to indicate simultaneous arising, or the meaning of resting upon [it], the refutation states: Then you must accept that the pudgala arises simultaneously with the aggregates. Or, [if it means] resting upon the aggregates, you have clearly admitted that its substance is distinct from the aggregates. This uses the simile to challenge the doctrine. Moreover, by reason, you should accept that if the aggregates are absent, the self also does not exist, just as when fuel does not exist, the substance of fire also does not exist. Yet [your school] does not accept this; that school does not accept that when the aggregates are absent, the self is absent. For upon entering [nirvāṇa] without remainder, the aggregates are absent but the self exists. What that school posits is that while the self is in saṃsāra, it is neither identical to nor distinct from the aggregates; and if it enters [nirvāṇa] without remainder, it is neither identical to nor distinct from nirvāṇa. Since this contradicts their own doctrine, their explanation is unreasonable. However, regarding this non-difference, the Vātsīputrīya themselves previously raised the objection: 'If fire were distinct from fuel, fuel would not be hot. Thus it is clearly known that they are not distinct.' The Author of the Treatise questions them: 'They must definitively specify what the substance of heat is.' If they explain: 'Heat refers to the tangible of warmth, while the other seven are called fuel,' the refutation states: 'Then fuel is not hot, because their substances and characteristics are distinct. How can you raise the objection that fuel would not be hot?' If they further explain: 'Fuel is called hot because it is joined with warmth, so fuel is called hot,' the refutation states: 'Then the seven substances, though distinct from the substance of warmth, also receive the name "hot". According to true principles, the name "fire" designates only the tangible of warmth, while the other seven substances, being joined with warmth, all receive the name "hot"; this then clearly admits that fuel as the seven substances is also called hot. Although fuel and fire are distinct, the alleged fault does not apply. Why raise it here as an objection?' If fire were distinct from fuel, fuel would not be hot; yet fuel is distinct from fire, and fuel is also called hot. Furthermore, your alternative thesis: If you say that when water and so forth are completely ablaze, it is called fuel and also called fire, being spoken of in the sense of a single substance, the refutation states: Since fuel and fire are one, you must explain what the meaning of 'reliance' is. The self and the aggregates of form and so forth must definitively be one, and there is no reason that can prevent this. Therefore, their assertion that just as fire is established relying on fuel, so the pudgala is established relying on the aggregates—upon examining it forward and backward, the principle cannot be established.