俱舍論記 29.112

29.112

「又彼所說至徵難亦然」者，論主又牒徵破。又彼所說若於一時眼識識色，因茲知我。此言何義？兩關徵定。若說諸色是了此我因，然不可言此我異色者，牒先初關。破云：是則諸色，以眼及明、作意等緣為了色因，故應不可說色異眼等。若了色時此我亦可了者，牒後關。又作兩關徵定：為色能了識，即了此我耶？為於此中別有能了識，若言色能了，即能了此我者？破云：則應許此我體即是色，以了色時亦了我故。或唯於色假立此我，以無別有能了別故。或不應有如是分別，如是類是色、如是類是此我，無別體故。若無如是色、我分別，如何可立有色有我？有性必由分別立故。若於此中別有能了了此我者，破云：色、我二了既不並生，了時別故，此我應異色，如黃異青。別有能了體各不同，前異後等，能了亦別，體亦不同。如色即爾，乃至於法徵難亦然。

As for 'Furthermore, what they say... the critical cross-examination is also the same': The Author of the Treatise again cites and challenges to refute it. Furthermore, what they say: 'If at one time eye-consciousness cognizes form, and based on this one knows the self'—what does this statement mean? A two-pronged dilemma is posed. If you say that forms are the cause for cognizing this self, yet this self cannot be said to be distinct from form—citing the first prong, the refutation states: Then forms take the eye, illumination, attention, and other conditions as causes for cognizing form, so forms should not be expressible as distinct from the eye and so forth. If you say that when form is cognized, this self can also be cognized—citing the second prong, again a two-pronged dilemma is posed: Does the very consciousness that cognizes form cognize this self? Or is there a separate cognizing consciousness in this? If you say that the cognition of form can itself cognize this self, the refutation states: Then you must accept that the substance of this self is precisely form, because when form is cognized, the self is also cognized; or this self is merely nominally established upon form, because there is no separate cognizing [consciousness]; or there should not be such a distinction as 'this kind is form' and 'this kind is this self', because they have no distinct substances. If there were no such distinction between form and the self, how could one establish that form exists and the self exists? For the existence of an entity is necessarily established through conceptual distinction. If in this there were a separate cognizing [consciousness] that cognizes this self, the refutation states: Since the two cognitions of form and the self do not arise together, their times of cognition being different, this self should be distinct from form, just as yellow is distinct from blue. There being separate cognizing [consciousnesses] whose substances are mutually distinct, the earlier distinct from the later and so on, their cognitions are also separate and their substances are also distinct. Just as with form, so it is, and up to mental objects, the critical cross-examination is also the same.