俱舍論疏 29.149

29.149

論「若色能了至必由分別立故」，破能了同也。文中有三重破：一體同破，若色能了即能了我，即應許我體即是色。二即色假立破，或唯於色假立於我。三無二分別破，若即能了色了於我者，或不應有如是分別如是類是色、如是類是我。若無如是二種分別，如何立有色有我？有性必由分別立故。

On the Śāstra's statement: "If the cogniser of form […] must necessarily be established through conceptual discrimination": Refuting that the cogniser is identical. Within the text there is a three-tiered refutation: First, refuting through identity of entity: if the cogniser of form is the cogniser of the self, then you must admit that the entity of the self is form. Second, refuting through nominal establishment upon form: or the self is merely nominally established upon form. Third, refuting through the absence of the two conceptual discriminations: if it is through the cogniser of form that one cognises the self, there should not be such conceptual discriminations as 'such a kind is form' and 'such a kind is the self'. If there are not these two kinds of conceptual discrimination, how could form and the self be established to exist? For an existing nature must necessarily be established through conceptual discrimination.