俱舍論記 29.115

29.115

「又彼既許至由二緣故」者，論主又引第二經牒計徵破。又既許我眼識所得，如是眼識，於色境、於此我，於色、我、俱此三中為緣何起？若緣色起，則不應說眼識了我，此我非眼識緣，如聲處等故。汝所執我非眼識緣，非色處故，如聲處等。謂若救云：有一類識，泛緣此青等境起，即用此青等境為所緣緣。破云：補特伽羅非眼識緣者，如何前說我為眼識所緣？由此定非眼識所了。或者已上總是牒救。若眼識起，唯緣此我。或緣色、我、俱，便違經說識二緣生。若唯緣我，便闕色緣。若緣色、我，應由三緣，以經唯說二緣生故。

As for 'Furthermore, since they accept... due to two conditions': The Author of the Treatise further cites a second sūtra to examine and refute their thesis. Furthermore, since you accept that the self is perceived by eye-consciousness, does such an eye-consciousness arise conditioned by the object of form, by this self, or by both form and self together among these three? If it arises conditioned by form, then you should not say that eye-consciousness cognizes the self, for this self is not a condition for eye-consciousness, just like the auditory sense-sphere and so forth. The self held by you is not a condition for eye-consciousness because it is not the visual sense-sphere, just like the auditory sense-sphere and so forth. That is, if they rescue by saying: 'There is a type of consciousness that generally arises conditioned by blue and other objects, taking these blue and other objects as its object-condition,' the refutation states: 'If the pudgala is not a condition for eye-consciousness, how could you say earlier that the self is the object of eye-consciousness? Hence it is definitively not cognized by eye-consciousness.' Or the above is entirely citing the rescue. If eye-consciousness arises conditioned solely by this self, or conditioned by both form and self together, it contradicts the sūtra which states that consciousness arises from two conditions. If it is conditioned solely by the self, it lacks the condition of form. If it is conditioned by both form and the self, it would arise from three conditions, whereas the sūtra states that it arises from only two conditions.