俱舍論記 29.118

29.118

「又若許為至有違宗過」者，論主又引第五經破。將顯違經，先立量言：我異六境。又若許我六識所識，汝所執我應異聲，眼識識故，猶如色。汝所執我應異色等，耳識識故，譬如聲。餘識所識，一一比量為難准此。此即難令我異六境，如何乃言我與六境非定一、異？定訖顯違。又立此我六識所識，便違經說。經言；梵志！五根行處各別、境界各別，各唯受用自所行處，及自境界。或前約處明，後約界辨。非有異色根亦能受用異根行處及異境界。意兼受用五根行處及彼境界，以彼五識亦依意故，所以意根正能受用十三界，兼能受用五根行處及彼境界。又解：以彼意識依意根故，所以意根與能依識同緣諸法。正緣十三，兼緣五根行處、五根境界。前解為勝。汝意一我六識同取，是則五根亦能兼取異根行處、異根境界。此經復言五根行處、境界各別，豈不違經？既違經過，或不應執我是五根境。若非五根境，如是便非五識所識。若非五識所識，雖不違經，又違宗過，以汝宗說我五識所識故。

Regarding "Furthermore, if you accept that it is ... there is the fault of contradicting your own tenet": the author of the treatise cites a fifth sūtra to refute [them]. Intending to reveal the contradiction with the sūtra, he first establishes an inference, saying: the self is different from the six sense-objects. Furthermore, if you accept that the self is cognized by the six consciousnesses, then the self posited by you should be different from sound, because it is cognized by eye-consciousness, just like visible form. The self posited by you should be different from visible form, etc., because it is cognized by ear-consciousness, just like sound. The syllogisms refuting it as cognized by each of the remaining consciousnesses should be modeled on this. This presents the difficulty compelling the self to be different from the six sense-objects; how then can you say that the self and the six sense-objects are neither definitively identical nor different? Having established [its difference], he shows the contradiction. Furthermore, positing that this self is cognized by the six consciousnesses directly contradicts what the sūtra says. The sūtra states: "Brāhmaṇa! The scopes of the five sense-faculties are each distinct, and their objective fields are each distinct; each experiences only its own scope and its own objective field." Alternatively, the former is explained in terms of places of activity (gocara) and the latter in terms of objective fields (viṣaya). There is no distinct physical faculty that can also experience the scope and objective field of another faculty. The mind also experiences the scopes and objective fields of the five faculties, because those five consciousnesses also rely on the mind; therefore the mental faculty directly experiences thirteen dhātus, and also experiences the scopes and objective fields of the five faculties. Another explanation is: because that mental consciousness relies on the mental faculty, the mental faculty and the consciousness that relies on it cognize all dharmas together; they directly cognize thirteen [dhātus] and also cognize the scopes and objective fields of the five faculties. The former explanation is superior. In your view, a single self is grasped by all six consciousnesses together; if so, then the five faculties could also grasp the scopes and objective fields of other faculties. This sūtra again states that the scopes and objective fields of the five faculties are distinct; how is this not a contradiction of the sūtra? Since there is the fault of contradicting the sūtra, one should not hold that the self is an object of the five faculties. If it is not an object of the five faculties, then it is not cognized by the five consciousnesses. If it is not cognized by the five consciousnesses, though this does not contradict the sūtra, there is again the fault of contradicting your own tenet, because your tenet asserts that the self is cognized by the five consciousnesses.