俱舍論記 30.57

30.57

「此難非理至有後記知生」者，論主答。此難非理，不相屬故。謂彼天授、祠授二心展轉相望，無因果性，互不相屬故。天授心曾所見境，後祠授心不能憶念，非如一人相續身中有因果性，前後相屬故，前心曾見，後心能憶。我等不言異心見境異心能憶，前後相續是一類故。前同類心能憶，然後過去緣彼境心熏成種子，從此種子引起今時能憶念識。謂如前說，一相續、二轉變、三差別力故，生念何失？由此前憶念種子力故，有其後念記憶知生。

Regarding 'This objection is unreasonable [...] subsequent recognition arises': the author of the treatise answers. This objection is unreasonable, because they are not mutually connected. That is, the two minds of Devadatta and Yajñadatta, viewed in relation to each other, lack the nature of cause and effect and are mutually unconnected. An object once seen by Devadatta's mind cannot be remembered by Yajñadatta's mind later; unlike in the continuum of a single person, where there is the nature of cause and effect and before and after are mutually connected, so that what was once seen by the earlier mind can be remembered by the later mind. We do not say that an object seen by one mind is remembered by another mind, because the continuum before and after belongs to a single homogenous class. The earlier mind of the same class is capable of remembering, and then the past mind taking that object as cognitive object perfumes and forms a seed, and from this seed the present consciousness capable of remembering is induced. That is to say, as previously explained, by the power of (1) the continuum, (2) transformation, and (3) differentiation, what fault is there in mindfulness arising? By the force of this seed of preceding remembrance, there arises subsequent memory and recognition.