俱舍論記 30.95

30.95

「前之二難至如芽莖葉等」者，此下第二正破。論主以前數論二難難彼勝論。前之數論所說二難，於彼勝論為難最切。若諸心生皆從於我者，我一自在，何緣後識不恒似前，及不定次第生如芽莖葉等。

Regarding "The preceding two objections... like the sprout, stem, leaf, and so forth": from here below is the second part, the direct refutation. The author of the treatise uses the previous two objections against the Sāṃkhya to challenge the Vaiśeṣika. The two objections previously stated against the Sāṃkhya are most incisive as objections against the Vaiśeṣika. If all minds arise proceeding from the self, since the self is single and sovereign, for what reason would the subsequent consciousness not constantly resemble the prior one, and not arise in an invariable sequence like the sprout, stem, leaf, and so forth?