俱舍論記 30.96

30.96

「若謂由待至別住失故」者，牒計別破。汝若謂我由待實句義色意合差別，方有異識生，及不定次第。破云：理定不然。我與色意合非極成故，以佛法宗不許有我、色意合故。又以理破。夫二物合必有分限，非無分故。謂彼勝論外道自類釋合相言，非至為先，彼後至名合。破云：若我、意合，意有分限，故我應有分限；勝論計我周遍法界無分限故。又我、意合，意移轉故我應移轉。或我與意相就和合，我應與意俱有壞滅；然彼宗計我、意俱常。又汝若謂我體遍滿不可遍合，色意俱與一分我合者。破云：理定不然。我體是一，於一我體中無別分故，何得說言與一分合、不與餘分合？假設許有合，我體既常，意無別異，還是一常。合寧有異生別識耶？又汝若救言：我待德句義中別覺慧故方生異識。破云：為難亦與待意義同。我既遍滿無有差別，謂覺因何得有差別生異識耶？又汝若言：待德句中行別，我方意合生異識者。破云：則應但心待行差別能生異識，何用我為？又總非：我於識生都無有用，而勝論言識皆我生。如藥事成能除痼疾已，誑醫矯說普莎訶言。普莎訶，此云吉祥。今此痼疾由我故除。此中亦爾，行足生心，何須此我？又汝若謂此心、行二由我故有。破云：此但有言，無理為證由我故有。又汝若謂此心、行二，我為所依。徵云：如誰與誰為所依義？非心與行如畫、如果；我為能持，如壁持畫、如器持果。若如彼喻，如是便有我與心行更相礙失，同色法故。若如彼喻，及有或時別住失故，以畫色果與彼壁、器有時別故。然計我體無有障礙，望彼心、行無障礙失。我遍法界，望彼心、行無別住失。

"If you say that it is due to depending on [...] because there would be the fault of existing apart": here [the author] cites their tenet and refutes it point by point. If you claim that the self—by depending on the differences in the contact between color/matter and the mind, which belong to the category of substance (dravya)—only then produces different cognitions and does not produce them in a fixed order, the refutation states: this is definitely illogical. For the contact of the self with matter and the mind is not universally accepted (aprasiddha), because the Buddhist tradition does not accept that there is a self, nor contact between matter and mind. Furthermore, [the author] refutes it through logic. When two things are in contact, they must have spatial limits (sāvayava), for they cannot be partless. The Vaiśeṣika outsiders themselves define the characteristics of contact by saying: 'Being non-arrived coming first, their subsequent arrival is called contact.' The refutation states: if the self and the mind are in contact, since the mind has spatial limits, the self should also have spatial limits; yet the Vaiśeṣika posits that the self is all-pervading throughout the realm of phenomena and is without spatial limits. Furthermore, if the self and the mind are in contact, because the mind moves, the self should also move. Or, if the self and the mind approach each other and unite, the self should perish along with the mind; yet their school posits that both the self and the mind are permanent. Furthermore, if you claim that because the self's substance is all-pervasive it cannot come into contact in its entirety, so that matter and mind both come into contact with only a single part of the self, the refutation states: this is definitely illogical. The substance of the self is one, and within a single substance of the self there are no distinct parts; how can one say that it comes into contact with one part and not with other parts? Even if one tentatively grants that there is contact, since the substance of the self is permanent and the mind is without distinction, it is still a single permanent [entity]. How could contact have distinctions so as to produce different cognitions? Furthermore, if you rescue [your position] by saying: 'Because the self depends on distinct cognitions and intellects within the category of quality (guṇa), only then do different cognitions arise,' the refutation states: the difficulty raised here is identical in meaning with [the refutation of] depending on the mind. Since the self is all-pervading and without distinctions, through what cause could intellect have distinctions so as to produce different cognitions? Furthermore, if you say: 'Depending on the distinctions of mental formations (saṃskāra) within the category of quality, the self only then comes into contact with the mind and produces different cognitions,' the refutation states: then it should simply be the mind depending on the distinctions of mental formations that can produce different cognitions; what use is the self? Moreover, to reject it generally: the self has no utility whatsoever in the arising of cognition, yet the Vaiśeṣikas claim that all cognitions are produced by the self. It is like when medicine has succeeded in curing a chronic illness, a deceitful physician pretends to utter 'puṣāha' (meaning 'auspicious' here) [and says:] 'Now this chronic illness was cured because of me.' Here it is just the same: mental formations are sufficient to produce the mind; what need is there for this self? Furthermore, if you claim that these two, the mind and the mental formations, exist because of the self, the refutation states: this is mere talk, with no logical principle to prove that they exist because of the self. Furthermore, if you claim that for these two, the mind and the mental formations, the self is the locus/support (āśraya), [the author] inquires: what serves as a support for what, in this sense? The mind and mental formations are not like a painting or fruit, and the self is not a holder like a wall holding a painting or a bowl holding fruit. If it were like those examples, there would be the fault of the self, mind, and mental formations mutually obstructing one another, because they would equally be material phenomena. If it were like those examples, there would also be the fault of sometimes existing apart, because painted colors and fruit are at times separated from the wall and the bowl. Yet you posit that the substance of the self is without obstruction; viewed in relation to the mind and mental formations, it would lack this fault of obstruction. And since the self pervades the realm of phenomena, viewed in relation to the mind and mental formations, it would lack this fault of existing apart.