俱舍論記 4.13

4.13

「於彼聚中至與麵合味」者，此下第二答。總有三師，此即第一說一切有部師，約用增以釋。於彼聚中，體雖俱有、用有勝劣，勢用增者隨其所應明了可得，餘體非無。如針與籌齊觸身時，針強先覺，籌劣難知。如鹽[麩-夫+少]末俱時甞味，鹽勢先覺，麵用難知。《正理》第五取四大體增為正，廣破用增。故彼論云「如酢和水、良藥和毒、鹽和水等。雖兩數同而用者有異，如何言色就體說增？」此不相違。以酢與水觸微雖等，而味不同，酢味微多、水味微少，故酢微勝，還此體增。於諸聚中，有味等物體增強故謂是用增。良藥毒等，緣起理門有差別故，體類如是，由此雖少而能伏多，非異體類有別用生，故執用增是為邪計。又彼論云「或如類別，品別亦爾。故《唯心》等就用說增、就體說增，謂諸色法，譬如依多、依一成故。」解云：顯彼色、心差別。如色、心性類別，勝劣品亦應別。謂色即約體有勝劣，心即約用有勝劣。如色依一成，謂但依色；心依多成，謂通依色、心故。彼不應以心例色，言唯用增。若作俱舍師救：且如一合酢和一升水，但覺酢味、不覺水淡味，明知用增。又不可言水中淡味有處有、無處無，成相離過。今說用增，甚為正計。又難云：正理論師以世親論主造勝義諦論中敘用增家破，遂不認此解。然《婆沙》一百三十一說：四大種或說體增、或說用增，然無評家。《俱舍》同用增，《正理》同體增，是即用增是自宗義，豈不能救，便破自宗。

Regarding "In that aggregation [...] together with flour produces taste": below is the second part, the answers. In total there are three teachers. This is the first, a Sarvāstivāda master, who explains it in terms of an increase in function. In that aggregation, although the substantial entities [of all four] are simultaneously present, their functions have superiority and inferiority. Whichever has superior force and function is distinctly apprehensible in accordance with what is appropriate, while the remaining entities are not absent. Just as when a needle and a counter touch the body at the same time, the needle, being strong, is felt first, whereas the counter, being inferior, is difficult to perceive; and just as when the tastes of salt and parched flour powder are sampled at the same time, the force of the salt is felt first, whereas the function of the flour is difficult to perceive. In fascicle 5 of the Nyāyānusāra, [Saṃghabhadra] takes an increase in substantial entities among the four great elements as the correct view, extensively refuting an increase in function. Thus that text states: "Just as when vinegar is mixed with water, good medicine is mixed with poison, or salt is mixed with water, etc.: although both are equal in number, their functions differ. How can it be said that for form [increase] is spoken of in terms of substantial entities?" [To this we say:] This is not contradictory. Because although the tactile atoms of vinegar and water are equal, their tastes differ—the vinegar taste atoms are many and the water taste atoms are few; therefore, vinegar is subtly superior, and this still constitutes an increase in substantial entities. In various aggregations, because objects such as taste are stronger in terms of an increase in substantial entities, people take it to be an increase in function. With respect to good medicine, poison, and the like, because there are differences in the principles of dependent origination, their substantive categories are such that although small [in amount] they can overcome what is large; it is not that a distinct function arises apart from their substantive category. Hence to cling to an increase in function is an erroneous view. Furthermore, that treatise says: "Or, just as there are differences in kinds, there are likewise differences in grades. Therefore, the Cittamatra and so forth speak of increase in terms of function, whereas with respect to all material dharmas, increase is spoken of in terms of substantial entities, just as they are established based on many or based on one." The explanation is: This reveals the distinction between matter and mind. Just as the natures and categories of matter and mind differ, their superior and inferior grades must also differ. That is, for matter, superiority and inferiority are in terms of substance; for mind, superiority and inferiority are in terms of function. Just as matter is established based on one—meaning based solely on matter—mind is established based on many—meaning generally based on both matter and mind. He should not draw an analogy from mind to matter, asserting that it is merely an increase in function. If we make a defense on behalf of the Kośa master: take, for instance, one gō of vinegar mixed with one shō of water: one perceives only the taste of vinegar and does not perceive the bland taste of water; thus we clearly know there is an increase in function. Furthermore, one cannot say that the bland taste in the water is present in some places and absent in others, which would incur the fault of separation. Now to assert an increase in function is exceedingly correct doctrine. A further objection states: The Nyāyānusāra master [Saṃghabhadra] did not acknowledge this explanation because the author of the treatise, Vasubandhu, had set forth and refuted the proponent of the increase in function in his treatise on the ultimate truth. However, fascicle 131 of the Mahāvibhāṣā states: "With respect to the four great elements, some speak of an increase in substance and some speak of an increase in function," yet there is no arbitrating judgment. The Kośa aligns with an increase in function, while the Nyāyānusāra aligns with an increase in substance. Thus an increase in function is an internal doctrine of our own school. Why would one be unable to defend it, and instead refute one's own school?