俱舍論記 5.11

5.11

「若別有實物至別有人性故」者，此下第二問答徵定，文總有六。此下第一述經部五難：一無異生性難；二非見無用難；三非情同分難；四別有同分難；五應同勝論難。此即第一無異生性難。就中，一依文述難、二正理論救、三俱舍師破。餘難准此，皆作三門。言「依文述難」者，異生同分是與聖別，何用別立異生性耶？如人同分外不別立人性，何故異生同分外別立異生性？第二《正理論》救云「豈不異生性即異生同分。此不應然，所作異故。謂彼身形、業用、樂欲互相似因名為同分。若與聖道成就相違，是異生因，名異生性。入離生時，於眾同分亦捨亦得，於異生性捨而不得。」《正理》意說：異生性、異生同分所作異故，異生同分外別立異生性。人同分外無別人性，所作同故，人同分外不立人性。又入聖時於同分，捨異生同分，得聖者同分；於異生性，但捨異生性，不得異生性，不應言不得聖性，以即聖法名聖性故。第三俱舍師破云：入聖不捨於同分，可須別立異生性。入聖既捨於同分，何須別立異生性？若言所作各異故須別立人同分，人性所作亦各異，何不別立自類相似名人同分，違於非人名為人性？

Regarding the passage from "If there were a distinct real entity" to "because there is no distinct human-nature": below this is the second part, questioning and answering to determine [the doctrine], which has six sections in total. Below this is the first, stating the five objections of the Sautrāntikas: first, the objection regarding the non-existence of ordinary-worldling nature; second, the objection regarding it being imperceptible and useless; third, the objection regarding commonality of non-sentient things; fourth, the objection regarding a distinct commonality; fifth, the objection regarding similarity to the Vaiśeṣikas. This is the first objection, concerning the non-existence of ordinary-worldling nature. Therein: first, stating the objection according to the text; second, the rescue by the *Nyāyānusāra*; third, the refutation by the master of the *Kośa*. The other objections are analogous to this, all forming three sections. As for 'stating the objection according to the text': the commonality of ordinary worldlings is distinct from that of the noble ones; what use is there in separately establishing an ordinary-worldling nature? Just as outside the commonality of humans one does not separately establish a human-nature, why should one separately establish an ordinary-worldling nature outside the commonality of ordinary worldlings? Second, the rescue by the *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Is it not that the nature of an ordinary worldling is just the commonality of ordinary worldlings? This is not correct, because their functions are different. That is to say, the cause of their mutual similarity in physical form, activities, and desires is called commonality. That which is incompatible with the acquisition of the noble path and is the cause of being an ordinary worldling is called ordinary-worldling nature. When entering the realization [of correctness], one both abandons and acquires with respect to generic commonality; with respect to ordinary-worldling nature, one only abandons it and does not acquire [an ordinary-worldling nature]." The meaning of the *Nyāyānusāra* is: because ordinary-worldling nature and the commonality of ordinary worldlings have different functions, an ordinary-worldling nature is separately established outside the commonality of ordinary worldlings. Outside the commonality of humans there is no distinct human-nature, because their functions are identical; outside the commonality of humans, no human-nature is established. Furthermore, when entering the noble state, regarding commonality, one abandons the commonality of ordinary worldlings and acquires the commonality of noble ones; regarding ordinary-worldling nature, one merely abandons ordinary-worldling nature and does not acquire ordinary-worldling nature; one should not say one does not acquire noble nature, because noble dharmas themselves are called noble nature. Third, the refutation by the master of the *Kośa* says: If one did not abandon commonality upon entering the noble state, it might indeed be necessary to separately establish an ordinary-worldling nature. Since one does abandon commonality upon entering the noble state, why is it necessary to separately establish an ordinary-worldling nature? If you say that because their functions are distinct one must separately establish the commonality of humans, then since the functions of human-nature would also be distinct, why not separately establish self-similar likeness called the commonality of humans, and incompatibility with non-humans called human-nature?