俱舍論記 5.12

5.12

「又非世間至亦何所用」者，此即第二非見無用難。又非世間現量證見此同分體，以非色故。亦非覺慧比量道理所能了別，無別用故。世間之人雖亦不了有情同分別有實體，而於有情謂無差別起覺言說，故設有體亦何所用？第二《正理》救云「同分非色，如何得知有用能生無別事類？由見彼果知有彼故。如見現在業所得果，知有前生曾所作業。又觀行者現證知故。」解云：同分非色至無別事類，敘俱舍難意。由見彼果下，正理釋通。第三俱舍師破云：若因緣不能生彼同類果，可須同分生。因緣自能生彼果，何須同分生？外道觀行亦言證我，豈得信彼有我實體？

Regarding the passage "Moreover, neither does the world... of what use is it?": this is the second objection, that it is imperceptible and useless. Furthermore, neither does worldly direct perception empirically observe the substance of this commonality, because it is not matter (rūpa); nor can the reasoning of discerning inferential cognition comprehend it, because it has no distinct function. Although worldly people also do not understand that the commonality of sentient beings has a distinct real substance, they still generate discernment and verbal expression of non-differentiation regarding sentient beings; therefore, even if it had a substance, of what use would it be? Second, the rescue by the *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Since commonality is not matter, how is it known to have the function of producing non-differentiated categories of things? Because through observing its effect, one knows that it exists. Just as observing the effect obtained from present karma, one knows that there was karma previously performed in past lives. Moreover, practitioners of contemplation directly realize and know it." Explanation: from "Since commonality is not matter" to "non-differentiated categories of things" recounts the intention of the objection in the *Kośa*. From "Because through observing its effect" downward is the explanation and resolution in the *Nyāyānusāra*. Third, the refutation by the master of the *Kośa* says: If causes and conditions could not produce an effect of that same kind, it might be necessary for commonality to produce it. Since causes and conditions can of themselves produce that effect, why is it necessary for commonality to produce it? Non-Buddhist practitioners of contemplation also say they have directly realized a self; how could one believe that they possess an actual substantial self?