俱舍論記 5.199

5.199

「豈諸有法至隨其所應」者，說一切有部釋。豈諸有體性法皆汝經部所知？法性幽微甚難知故。微細之法雖現有體，汝等經部而不可知。此即嘆法深也。生相若無，應無生覺；既有生覺，明知有生。第六轉聲異體相屬，如王之臣。若有生體第六轉成。若無生相，此第六轉言不應成。謂色之生等，若言生即是色，如不應說色之色言。既說色之生言，明知離色別有生也。如責無生，有斯過失。乃至無滅，准之可知。

"How could all existing entities [...] according to what is appropriate?" Here the Sarvāstivāda explains: How could all entities that possess intrinsic nature be known by you Sautrāntikas? Because the nature of dharmas is subtle and extremely difficult to know. Even though subtle dharmas presently have intrinsic nature, you Sautrāntikas cannot know them. This is praising the profundity of dharmas. If the characteristic of arising did not exist, there should be no cognition of arising; since there is the cognition of arising, one clearly knows that arising exists. The sixth-case ending (genitive) relates different entities, just like 'the king's minister.' If the entity of arising exists, the sixth case is established. If the characteristic of arising did not exist, this expression with the sixth case would not be established. That is, in the case of 'the arising of form' and so forth, if one were to say that arising is just form, it would be as if one should not say 'the form of form.' Since one does say 'the arising of form,' one clearly knows that there is an arising distinct from form. If one objects that arising does not exist, there is this fallacy. Up to the nonexistence of cessation, it may be understood by analogy.