俱舍論記 5.8

5.8

「復有法同分謂隨蘊處界」者，此明法同分。於同分中復有法同分，隨蘊、處、界。此舉所依法，顯能依同分。由此同分，能令蘊、處、界法展轉同故。准有情同分，於法同分亦應說有二種，而不說者略故不論。於法同分一體多體，准前應知。問：有情同分與法同分，為體各別？為一體義分？解云：體性各別。能令有情相似名有情同分，能令法門相似名法同分。有情、法門義異，所以兩同分不同，故諸論文皆說兩種。雖復離法無別有情，約義有殊、同分各別，亦有古德立二同分體性各別。又解：有情離法無別體性，而於法上建立有情。以此准知，法同分上立有情同分，一體義分說二同分，非體各別。若攬法成有情即不說法同分，若廢有情論法即不說有情同分，若法、有情竝論即雙說二種同分。由此義故，所以諸論或唯說一、或兩種俱論。各據一義，竝不相違。問：何故頌文但說有情？解云：略故不說法同分也。或可頌文亦攝法同分，言有情者簡異非情。

"Furthermore, there is the commonality of phenomena, which corresponds to the aggregates, bases, and elements": this explains the commonality of phenomena. Within commonality there is furthermore the commonality of phenomena, corresponding to the aggregates, bases, and elements. This adduces the supported phenomena to reveal the supporting commonality, because through this commonality the phenomena of the aggregates, bases, and elements are caused to be reciprocally identical. Following the model of the commonality of sentient beings, the commonality of phenomena should also be spoken of as having two kinds; that it is not spoken of is because it is omitted for brevity. Whether the commonality of phenomena has a single substance or multiple substances should be understood by following what precedes. Question: As for the commonality of sentient beings and the commonality of phenomena, are their substances distinct, or are they different conceptual aspects of a single substance? Explanation: Their intrinsic substances are distinct. That which causes sentient beings to be similar is called the commonality of sentient beings; that which causes the gateways of phenomena to be similar is called the commonality of phenomena. Because the meanings of sentient beings and gateways of phenomena are different, the two commonalities are not identical; therefore, the treatises all speak of two kinds. Although apart from phenomena there are no distinct sentient beings, with respect to meaning there is a difference, and the commonalities are distinct; former masters also established that the intrinsic substances of the two commonalities are distinct. Another explanation: Apart from phenomena, sentient beings have no distinct intrinsic substance, but sentient beings are established upon phenomena. Knowing by this analogy, upon the commonality of phenomena the commonality of sentient beings is established; they are two commonalities spoken of as conceptual aspects of a single substance, not distinct substances. If gathering phenomena to form sentient beings, then one does not speak of the commonality of phenomena; if setting aside sentient beings to discuss phenomena, then one does not speak of the commonality of sentient beings; if discussing phenomena and sentient beings together, then both kinds of commonality are spoken of simultaneously. For this reason, various treatises either speak of only one, or discuss both kinds together; each relies on one meaning, and they do not contradict each other. Question: Why does the text of the verse only speak of sentient beings? Explanation: For brevity, it does not speak of the commonality of phenomena. Or it may be that the text of the verse also subsumes the commonality of phenomena, and speaking of sentient beings is to exclude non-sentient things.