俱舍論記 5.8

5.8

"Furthermore, there is the commonality of phenomena, which corresponds to the aggregates, bases, and elements": this explains the commonality of phenomena. Within commonality there is furthermore the commonality of phenomena, corresponding to the aggregates, bases, and elements. This adduces the supported phenomena to reveal the supporting commonality, because through this commonality the phenomena of the aggregates, bases, and elements are caused to be reciprocally identical. Following the model of the commonality of sentient beings, the commonality of phenomena should also be spoken of as having two kinds; that it is not spoken of is because it is omitted for brevity. Whether the commonality of phenomena has a single substance or multiple substances should be understood by following what precedes. Question: As for the commonality of sentient beings and the commonality of phenomena, are their substances distinct, or are they different conceptual aspects of a single substance? Explanation: Their intrinsic substances are distinct. That which causes sentient beings to be similar is called the commonality of sentient beings; that which causes the gateways of phenomena to be similar is called the commonality of phenomena. Because the meanings of sentient beings and gateways of phenomena are different, the two commonalities are not identical; therefore, the treatises all speak of two kinds. Although apart from phenomena there are no distinct sentient beings, with respect to meaning there is a difference, and the commonalities are distinct; former masters also established that the intrinsic substances of the two commonalities are distinct. Another explanation: Apart from phenomena, sentient beings have no distinct intrinsic substance, but sentient beings are established upon phenomena. Knowing by this analogy, upon the commonality of phenomena the commonality of sentient beings is established; they are two commonalities spoken of as conceptual aspects of a single substance, not distinct substances. If gathering phenomena to form sentient beings, then one does not speak of the commonality of phenomena; if setting aside sentient beings to discuss phenomena, then one does not speak of the commonality of sentient beings; if discussing phenomena and sentient beings together, then both kinds of commonality are spoken of simultaneously. For this reason, various treatises either speak of only one, or discuss both kinds together; each relies on one meaning, and they do not contradict each other. Question: Why does the text of the verse only speak of sentient beings? Explanation: For brevity, it does not speak of the commonality of phenomena. Or it may be that the text of the verse also subsumes the commonality of phenomena, and speaking of sentient beings is to exclude non-sentient things.