俱舍論記 6.66

6.66

「若爾何故至即所除法」者，此下通第二染污苦諦難。此引《品類足》所除中第三節文為難。未來有身見既入所除，即俱句攝，是即從過、現有身見生，能生未來有身見。既生未來有身見，明知未來有同類因。有身見望有身見非是相應、俱有、異熟因，既言有因，明知定是同類因也。

"If so, why... that which is excluded": below this, he resolves the second objection regarding the defiled truth of suffering. This cites the third clause of the excluded section in the Prakaraṇapāda to raise an objection. Since future view of individuality (satkāya-dṛṣṭi) falls under what is excluded, it is subsumed under the dual clause; that is to say, it arises from past and present view of individuality, and is able to give rise to future view of individuality. Since it gives rise to future view of individuality, it is clear that the future possesses the cause of the same type. With respect to view of individuality, view of individuality is not an associated, coexistent, or ripening cause; since it is stated to have a cause, one clearly knows it must be a cause of the same type.