俱舍論記 7.131

7.131

「餘謂前說至唯自可得」者，餘謂前說染等心餘，謂三界三無覆無記，欲、無色善，及無學心。不說彼六心正現前位得心差別，彼唯自得，非兼得他。問：若說欲界染心但言得六非得自界無覆心者，即與《識身論》等相違。如《識身》十三云「若成就不善心，亦成就欲界繫無覆無記心耶？若成就不善心，定成就欲界繫無覆無記心。或成就欲界繫無覆無記心，非不善心，謂欲界生長已離欲界貪，或色界生長補特伽羅。」准彼論文，界退還位起欲染時，即定成就不善心。既成不善，即定成就欲無覆無記。然於欲界四無記中，但是威儀、工巧二種以勢力強有三世得，故成不善亦定成彼。所以不成餘二無記者，既成不善理無通果，異熟生心無前、後得亦非定成。准《識身》文，欲界威儀、工巧心定有三世得，是即界退還位欲染心中定成欲界無覆無記。於欲染心應言得七，何故言六？又色善心應言得二，學心應言得三，各除欲界無覆無記。初得彼二心，身定在欲界，欲界無覆無記先定成故。彼二心中不應言得。《顯宗》第十一亦同《識身》，故顯宗改頌云「三界染如次，得七、六二種。色善二學三，二無餘自得。」言二無者，《顯宗》云「二謂欲、色無覆無記，此二心中都無所得。」此亦大意同《俱舍》，然別摽二無記為異。《正理》二十雖不改頌，長行意同《識身》。此論既違《識身》等文，如何會釋？解云：欲界威儀、工巧二無記心，以實多分無三世得，但生欲界起自在者說名成就，起不得者名不成就，非要有得方說成就。難云：若爾，無色異熟無記心不現在前，應名成就，起自在故。又難：此既自在說名成就，餘復何因知有別物？故說有過。又解云：二無記心有三世得。然從上界退還下時，必要現行方始起得。中有初起既是染心，爾時未名得於無記。後因現起，三世得生已後相續，當名成就。初心未得，不違此論。後復定成，初小不說。約此義邊，亦不違彼《識身論》文。難云：若爾，色善及有學心，不應言得欲界無覆，先定成故。故亦有過。今略作三解通釋彼文。第一解云：論意各別，無勞會釋。豈以本文破我《俱舍》？論主非以本論為量。若《識身論》意，以威儀、工巧雖是無記，勢力強故定成三世。若此論等意，威儀如佛、馬勝苾芻及餘善習者，工巧如毘濕縛羯磨天及餘善習者，即定成就。若非串習殊勝者，即不成就。第二解云：彼此二論亦不相違。多有情中威儀、工巧，有串習者、有不串習者。《識身》等論據串習勝者說，故言定成欲界無覆。此論據不串習者說，或從多分說，故言不成就欲界無覆。各據一邊，竝無違害。若具說者，或成、不成，若串習者即成，不串習者不成。若作斯解，以《識身》文會同《俱舍》。第三解云：二論亦不相違。一一有情各有眾多威儀、工巧，於眾多中若串習者即成就，不串習者不成就。《識身足》文據串習者，故言定成欲界無覆。此論據不串習者，故言不成欲界無覆。盡理而言，若據串習，此論亦有定成；若據不串習者，《識身足》文亦有不成。若作此解，以此《俱舍》會同《識身》。若作此解，《顯宗》無勞改頌。雖作此解，恐聖意難知，仍冀高明詳茲拙見，必有異釋幸願申焉。

Regarding [the text stating], "'The others' refers to what remains of the previously discussed [defiled and other minds] up to 'can only be acquired by themselves'": "The others" refers to what remains beyond the defiled and other minds mentioned earlier, namely the three non-obscuring and indeterminate minds of the three realms, the wholesome minds of the desire and immaterial realms, and the mind of the aśaikṣa. It does not state the distinctions among the minds acquired at the time when those six minds are directly manifest; those are only acquired by themselves, not concurrently acquiring others. Question: If one states that with a defiled mind in the desire realm one only acquires six and does not acquire the non-obscuring mind of its own realm, then this conflicts with texts such as the Vijñānakāya. As Vijñānakāya fascicle thirteen says: "If one possesses an unwholesome mind, does one also possess a non-obscuring indeterminate mind bound to the desire realm? If one possesses an unwholesome mind, one definitely possesses a non-obscuring indeterminate mind bound to the desire realm. Or one may possess a non-obscuring indeterminate mind bound to the desire realm, but not an unwholesome mind—namely, a person born in the desire realm who has already abandoned desire for the desire realm, or a person born in the form realm." According to that textual passage, at the stage of falling back from a higher realm when one produces desire-realm defilement, one definitely possesses an unwholesome mind. Since one possesses the unwholesome, one definitely possesses the desire-realm non-obscuring indeterminate mind. However, among the four indeterminate minds of the desire realm, it is only the two kinds—deportment and technical craft—that, having strong force, possess possession (prāpti) throughout the three times; therefore, when one possesses an unwholesome mind, one also definitely possesses them. The reason one does not possess the remaining two indeterminate minds is that, once an unwholesome mind is possessed, logically there is no mind born of supernormal power, and the mind born of fruition has no prior or subsequent possession, so it is also not definitely possessed. Following the text of the Vijñānakāya, the minds of deportment and craft in the desire realm definitely possess possession across the three times; thus, at the stage of falling back between realms, in the midst of a desire-realm defiled mind, one definitely possesses the desire-realm non-obscuring indeterminate mind. For a defiled mind in the desire realm, one should say seven are acquired; why does it say six? Furthermore, for a wholesome mind in the form realm one should say two are acquired, and for a śaikṣa mind one should say three are acquired, in each case excluding the desire-realm non-obscuring indeterminate mind. When first acquiring those two minds, the bodily basis is definitely in the desire realm, and because the desire-realm non-obscuring indeterminate mind was already definitely possessed beforehand, one should not say it is acquired within those two minds. Samayapradīpikā fascicle eleven also agrees with the Vijñānakāya; hence the Samayapradīpikā alters the verse to say: "The defilements of the three realms respectively / Acquire seven, six, and two kinds. / The wholesome of the form realm acquires two; the śaikṣa, three. / Two lack [acquisition]; the rest are acquired by themselves." Where it says "two lack [acquisition]," the Samayapradīpikā explains: "'Two' refers to the non-obscuring indeterminate minds of the desire and form realms; within these two minds, nothing whatsoever is acquired." This also broadly agrees in intention with the Kośa, but singles out the two indeterminate minds as a difference. Although Nyāyānusāra fascicle twenty does not alter the verse, the intention of the prose commentary agrees with the Vijñānakāya. Since this treatise conflicts with passages such as the Vijñānakāya, how is it to be reconciled? One explanation says: As a matter of fact, the two indeterminate minds of deportment and craft in the desire realm for the most part lack possession across the three times; it is only said to be possessed when someone born in the desire realm can arouse them with mastery, whereas when one cannot arouse them it is called non-possession—it is not that one must have possession for it to be called possessed. An objection says: If so, then when the fruition indeterminate mind of the immaterial realm is not directly present, it should be called possessed, because it can be aroused with mastery. Another objection: If mastery is what is called possession, on what other ground would one know that a distinct entity [of possession] exists? Therefore, this explanation is flawed. Another explanation says: The two indeterminate minds do have possession across the three times. However, when falling back from a higher realm to a lower realm, it is necessary for actual manifestation to occur before acquisition arises. When the intermediate existence first arises, it is a defiled mind; at that time one has not yet acquired the indeterminate. Later, due to actual manifestation, once the possession of the three times has arisen, from then on in the continuum it should be called possessed. Because it is not acquired at the initial mind, it does not conflict with this treatise. Because it is later definitely possessed, this is omitted from the initial brief statement. In terms of this meaning, it does not conflict with the text of that Vijñānakāya either. An objection says: If so, for the form-realm wholesome mind and the śaikṣa mind, one should not say that the desire-realm non-obscuring mind is acquired, because it was already definitely possessed beforehand. Therefore this also has flaws. Now we briefly offer three explanations to reconcile that text. The first explanation says: The treatises have distinct intentions, so there is no need for reconciliation. How could the root treatise be used to refute our Kośa? The author of the treatise does not take the root treatises as authoritative. If we take the intention of the Vijñānakāya, although deportment and craft are indeterminate, because their force is strong, they definitely possess [possession across] the three times. If we take the intention of this treatise and others: with respect to deportment, like the Buddha, the monk Aśvajit, and others who are well-practiced; and with respect to craft, like the deva Viśvakarman and others who are well-practiced—these definitely possess them. If one is not someone of superior repeated practice, then one does not possess them. The second explanation says: These two treatises do not conflict either. Among many sentient beings, with respect to deportment and craft, there are those who have repeated practice and those who do not have repeated practice. Treatises such as the Vijñānakāya speak based on those with superior repeated practice, and therefore say that one definitely possesses the desire-realm non-obscuring indeterminate mind. This treatise speaks based on those without repeated practice, or speaks from the majority; therefore it says one does not possess the desire-realm non-obscuring indeterminate mind. Each relies on one side, and neither contradicts the other. If one were to speak comprehensively: they are either possessed or not possessed; if one has repeated practice, one possesses them, and if one lacks repeated practice, one does not possess them. If this explanation is adopted, it reconciles the text of the Vijñānakāya with the Kośa. The third explanation says: The two treatises do not conflict either. Each sentient being has numerous varieties of deportment and craft; among these numerous varieties, if one has repeatedly practiced it, one possesses it, and if one has not repeatedly practiced it, one does not possess it. The text of the Vijñānakāyapāda relies on what has been repeatedly practiced, and therefore says that one definitely possesses the desire-realm non-obscuring indeterminate mind. This treatise relies on what has not been repeatedly practiced, and therefore says that one does not possess the desire-realm non-obscuring indeterminate mind. To follow the principle completely: if based on repeated practice, this treatise also admits definite possession; if based on non-repeated practice, the text of the Vijñānakāyapāda also admits non-possession. If this explanation is adopted, it reconciles this Kośa with the Vijñānakāya. If this explanation is adopted, the Samayapradīpikā had no need to alter the verse. Although these explanations have been made, fearing that the holy intention is difficult to fathom, I still hope that the discerning will examine these clumsy views, and if there are different explanations, I gladly welcome their expression.