俱舍論記 16

English (machine translation) 16

Language: English

16.1

Composed by the Śramaṇa Śākyapragalbhā (Puguang)

"Moreover, the sūtra states ... what are their characteristics?": from here down is the seventh section, explaining black-black and the rest. Within this: first, explaining the names and intrinsic natures of the four actions; second, explaining the distinction of abandoning via the uncontaminated; third, relating the divergence of differing views. This is the first, explaining the names and intrinsic natures of the four actions. Raising a question based on the sūtra.

16.4

"The verse states: ... is called neither black nor white": the first two lines generally identify them; the latter four lines explain them individually. Bad is called black, form-realm wholesome is called white, desire-realm wholesome is called both. That which can exhaust them, being uncontaminated, is called neither; hence it says 'in their order.'

16.5

"The treatise states: ... speaks of the four: black-black, etc.": this explains the first two lines. The Buddha spoke of the four—black-black, etc.—as appropriate, according to differences in action, differences in fruit, distinctions in what is to be countered (pratipakṣa), and distinctions in the counteragent. Another explanation: The Buddha spoke of the first three actions based on differences in the nature and categories of ripening cause and ripening fruit, and spoke of the last one action based on the distinction between the contaminated that is to be countered and the uncontaminated counteragent. Another explanation: Based on differences in action, four kinds are established in general; based on differences in fruit, the first three kinds are stated; based on distinctions in what is to be countered, the first three kinds are stated; based on distinctions in the counteragent, the last one kind is stated.

16.6

"All unwholesome actions ... because they are disagreeable": this explains bad as named black. Unwholesome is called bad; black means black-black. All unwholesome actions are invariably called black because of their defiled nature. Their ripening is also black because it is disagreeable. All unwholesome actions should also be called disagreeable; this is understood implicitly by reflection, and is omitted without being stated. Thus fascicle 114 of the Mahāvibhāṣā states: "There are two kinds of black: first, defiled black; second, disagreeable black. Here, action is called black on account of both kinds of black; ripening is also called black solely on account of disagreeable black."

16.7

"Form-realm wholesome actions ... because they are agreeable": this explains form-realm wholesome as named white; white means white-white. Form-realm wholesome actions are invariably called white because they are unmixed with unwholesome evil actions and afflictions. Thus the Nyāyānusāra states: "Form-realm wholesome actions are invariably called white, because they are not encroached upon or mixed with any unwholesome afflictions or unwholesome actions. Their ripening is also white because it is agreeable."

16.8

"Why does it not speak of formless-realm wholesome?": a question.

16.9

"It is traditionally said that where ... in some places it is also spoken of": an answer. The Vaibhāṣika masters say by tradition: where there are two kinds of ripening—namely intermediate existence and birth existence—and fully equipped with bodily, vocal, and mental karma, it is spoken of, not elsewhere. In the formless realm, there is birth [existence], but no intermediate existence, only mental [karma] and no bodily or vocal [karma]; therefore it is not spoken of. However, in some places the sūtras also speak of formless wholesome karma as white karma with white ripening; that is said on the basis of wholesome karma having agreeable fruits. Thus the Nyāyānusāra states: "Yet the sūtras say that the dhyānas, the immeasurables, and the formless [attainments] are all called white actions with white ripening; that generally establishes the name 'white' based on purely pure, agreeable ripening."

16.10

"Desire-realm wholesome actions ... because they mutually oppose each other": this explains desire-realm wholesome as named both. 'Both' means black-and-white [action] with black-and-white [ripening]. Desire-realm wholesome actions are called black-and-white because, when wholesome actions are performed, they are encroached upon and mixed with unwholesome actions and afflictions; their ripening is also black-and-white because, at the time of experiencing the fruit, it is experienced mixed with unpleasant fruits. These names 'black' and 'white' are established on the basis of actions and ripenings arising intermittently in prior and subsequent continuity. Although in principle wholesome and bad ripenings are also experienced mixed together simultaneously, the explanation is temporarily based on prior and subsequent. Another explanation: continuity refers to the bodily person, established on the basis of a single continuum of a person. Another explanation: there are two kinds of continuity—first, prior and subsequent continuity; second, bodily continuity. Action is based on prior and subsequent continuity, while fruit is based on bodily continuity. Another explanation: action is based on prior and subsequent continuity, while fruit is based on prior and subsequent continuity as well as bodily continuity, because this body is able to experience them simultaneously. It is not spoken of on the basis of the intrinsic nature of cause and fruit. Why is this? Because there is no single action or single ripening that is both black and white; wholesome and unwholesome actions and fruits differ in nature and category and mutually oppose each other.

16.11

"Would not evil actions and fruits ... be called white-black?": a question. Would not desire-realm bad actions and fruits, also arising in continuity interspersed with wholesome actions and fruits, therefore also deserve to be called white-black? This uses evil actions and fruits to draw a parallel with wholesome actions and fruits.

16.12

Regarding "Unwholesome karma and result... because the unwholesome surpasses the wholesome": This is the answer. In the desire realm, unwholesome karma and results are not necessarily intermingled with wholesome karma and results—as when a person who has severed the roots of wholesomeness creates various evil karmas, and when one experiences purely dark vipāka results in the hells. But wholesome karma and results in the desire realm are necessarily intermingled with evil karma and results—as when one creates wholesome karma among the five destinies, and when one experiences vipāka in the four destinies. Question: For one who is not yet free from desire, creating desire-realm wholesome karma may be intermingled with evil; but for one who has already attained freedom from desire, creating desire-realm wholesome karma is definitely not intermingled with evil and should be called purely white. Why then are all desire-realm wholesome [actions] called mixed karma? Explanation: That wholesome karma and results of the desire realm are called "mixed" is stated with reference to the unsevered state. If distinguished in detail: when one who has attained freedom from desire performs desire-realm wholesome karma, it is not intermingled with evil karma; yet although it is not intermingled with evil karma at the time of the cause, at the time of experiencing the result it is necessarily intermingled with evil results. By following the result from the cause, it is generically called "mixed". Alternatively, they are called "intermingled" because their types are intermingled, since in the desire realm evil surpasses the wholesome. Evil is called dark-dark, not white-dark; the wholesome is called dark-white, not white-white. Therefore, fascicle 114 of the Mahāvibhāṣā states: "The authoritative explanation is: all unwholesome karma is called karma with dark-dark vipāka, because unwholesomeness is powerful in the desire realm and is not encroached upon or intermingled with by wholesome dharmas, since unwholesome dharmas can sever the wholesome of their own sphere. Wholesome karma is weak and is encroached upon and intermingled with by the unwholesome, because the wholesome of the desire realm cannot sever the unwholesome."

16.13

Regarding "All anāsrava karma... because their natures are contradictory": This explains the fourth line. All anāsrava karmas can sever the previous three; they are called "non-dark" because they are undefiled. They are also called "non-white" because they cannot bring about white vipāka. This expression "non-white" is based on their inability to bring about white vipāka results; relying on this single characteristic, it is a statement of the Buddha's intentional meaning, not the definitive, explicit meaning. If based on explicit teaching, it is also called "white": the sūtra states that aśaikṣa dharmas are called "white", and the treatise states that undefiled dharmas are called "white". From this it is known that all anāsrava dharmas are also called "white". As for the statement that the anāsrava has no vipāka: because it does not fall within the three realms, and because its nature is contradictory to the dharmas that fall within the three realms and transmigrate in saṃsāra, it therefore cannot produce a vipāka result.

16.14

Regarding "Do all anāsrava karmas... the previous three karmas or not?": Hereafter is the second section, clarifying the distinctions in what anāsrava severs. This is the question.

16.15

"Not so": This is the answer.

16.16

"How so?": This is the enquiry.

16.17

Regarding "The verse says: ... four bring the purely white to an end": The verse answers.

16.18

Regarding "The treatise says: ... only brings an end to the purely dark": This explains the first verse. The kṣāntis associated with the dharma-jñānas take their name from their result, and are called dharma-jñāna-kṣāntis. The unwholesome is severed separately; thus, the four of the path of seeing and the eight of the path of cultivation—twelve in all—can sever it.

16.19

Regarding "Freeing oneself from the defilements of the desire realm... bringing purely white karma to an end": This explains the second verse. Because unwholesome bodily and vocal form of the desire realm is severed through the severing of the bondage of the object, its principle is the same as that of desire-realm wholesomeness; however, at this time it additionally severs the remaining unwholesome karma of the desire realm. Based on the point where it ends together with the remaining karma, it is collectively called the ninth unwholesome. The rest of the text is clear.

16.20

Regarding "For what reason can [those of] various grounds... sever, and not others?": This is the question.

16.21

Regarding "Because all wholesome dharmas... are not yet freed from the fetters": This is the answer. If the severance of defilements is severance of their intrinsic nature, once severed they can under no circumstances manifest at present. Because sāsrava wholesome [dharmas] are not severed in their intrinsic nature but through the severing of the bondage of the object, once severed they still have the possibility of manifesting at present. Among severed wholesome dharmas they do not all arise together; hence the word "possibility" is spoken. For instance, if the wholesome mental faculty of sorrow is severed, it does not manifest at present, because it is abandoned upon freedom from desire. Other wholesome [dharmas] of the desire realm still operate after severance because they are still possessed. The explanation of severance through bondage to an object is understandable from the text. Furthermore, fascicle 109 of the Mahāvibhāṣā states: "Question: All anāsrava cetanās, whether associated or coexistent, can correctly sever the previous three kinds of karma; why is only anāsrava śaikṣa-cetanā mentioned? Answer: Cetanā can set dharmas into motion so that they sever [defilements]; hence it is specifically mentioned. Others say: Although all can sever, here karma is being distinguished, and therefore only cetanā is spoken of. Question: If so, bodily and vocal karma that follow along should also be mentioned; why is only cetanā mentioned? Answer: This śaikṣa-cetanā operates in association with anāsrava wisdom, sharing the same object, the same aspect, and the same support; mutually assisting with strength, they can sever various karmas. This is not the case for bodily and vocal karma, and therefore they are not mentioned."

16.22

Regarding "The verse says: ... hence it is called mixed karma": This is the third section, narrating alternative opinions. The former master explains in terms of the five destinies, while the latter master explains in terms of the five severances; neither is the orthodox view. The opinion of the Mahāvibhāṣā's evaluators is: in the desire realm, evil is predominant and the wholesome is weak; all evil karma whatsoever is called dark-dark, because evil is predominant and is not encroached upon by the wholesome. All wholesome karma whatsoever is called dark-white, because the wholesome is weak and is encroached upon by evil. The intention of the Nyāyānusāra's refutation also agrees with the Mahāvibhāṣā.

16.23

Regarding "Furthermore, it is said in the sūtra: ... are precisely the three subtle actions": Here is the eighth section, clarifying muni and purity. The upper two lines clarify the three munis, and the lower two lines clarify the three purities. 'Muni' is translated here as 'silence' [jìmò].

16.24

Regarding "The treatise says: ... hence they are called muni": This explains the upper two lines: the aśaikṣa bodily and vocal karmas and the mind are called the three munis. It is not that mental karma constitutes the essence of muni. Why is this? The ultimate muni has only the mind as its essence; its characteristics are difficult to manifest, but because bodily and vocal karmas are free from various evils, it can be known through inference. Because they have inferential utility, bodily and vocal karmas are also said to be called muni. Mental cetanā, being neither ultimate nor possessing inferential utility, is not called muni. Thus the Nyāyānusāra says: 'This mental muni, because bodily and vocal karmas are free from various evils, can be known through inference. Mental karma has no inferential utility therein; only the combination of what is inferred and the means of inference is established as muni' (end of treatise passage). Furthermore, bodily and vocal karma are the essence of the morality of renunciation, capable of avoiding various evils; morality is termed renunciation. Mental karma is not so: lacking avijñapti, it is not the essence of renunciation. Since muni is established on the basis of renouncing evil, the mind, by means of bodily and vocal karma, can effect renunciation and is therefore called muni.

16.25

Regarding "Why does muni exist only in an aśaikṣa?": This is the question.

16.26

Regarding "Because an arhat... is eternally tranquil": This is the answer. Because an arhat is a real muni, and the speech of defilements is eternally tranquil—not so for the śaikṣa and others. Defilements are noisy and clamorous like speech; hence they are called "the speech of defilements". Another explanation: defilements resemble speech; "speech" refers to verbal disputes, and "defilement" refers to defilement disputes, hence called "the speech of defilements". Another explanation: defilements arise conditioned by speech; hence they are called "the speech of defilements". Although there are defilements that do not take speech as their condition, here it is stated provisionally based on those that arise conditioned by speech.

16.27

Regarding "All bodily, vocal, and mental... wrong purity": This explains the lower two lines. The three good actions are called the three purities, spanning both sāsrava and anāsrava. If sāsrava wholesomeness, it temporarily departs from evil conduct and defilements, and is called pure. If anāsrava wholesomeness, it departs forever from evil conduct and defilements, and is called pure. Thus fascicle 41 of the Nyāyānusāra states: "Anāsrava good conduct is called pure because it forever departs from the defilement of bad conduct and afflictions. How can sāsrava good conduct be pure when it is still defiled by bad conduct and afflictions? This too is named pure because it can temporarily depart from the defilement of bad conduct and afflictions. Stating these two is to pacify two false notions." Furthermore, fascicle 114 of the Mahāvibhāṣā states: "Question: Do the three subtle actions subsume the three silences? Or do the three silences subsume the three subtle actions? Answer: A fourfold tetralemma should be made. There is subtle action that is not silence: except for aśaikṣa bodily and vocal subtle action, the remaining bodily and vocal subtle actions and all mental subtle actions. There is silence that is not subtle action: the aśaikṣa mind. There is subtle action that is also silence: aśaikṣa bodily and vocal subtle action. There is that which is neither subtle action nor silence: except for the aforementioned characteristics. Do the three subtle actions subsume the three purities? Or do the three purities subsume the three subtle actions? Answer: They mutually subsume one another according to the matter. Do the three purities subsume the three silences? Or do the three silences subsume the three purities? Answer: A fourfold tetralemma should be made. There is purity that is not silence: except for aśaikṣa bodily and vocal purity, the remaining bodily and vocal purities and all mental purities. What is this again? Namely, the bodily and vocal purity of śaikṣas and non-śaikṣa-non-aśaikṣas, and the three kinds of mental purity, because mental silence is exclusively the aśaikṣa mind. There is silence that is not purity: the aśaikṣa mind, because it is not of the nature of karma. There is purity that is also silence: aśaikṣa bodily and vocal purity. There is that which is neither purity nor silence: except for the aforementioned characteristics." Explanation: Since it says that bodily and vocal purity of śaikṣas and non-śaikṣa-non-aśaikṣas is not silence, we know that within the person of an aśaikṣa, sāsrava wholesome bodily and vocal vijñapti and avijñapti are merely pure and not subsumed under silence, because they are non-śaikṣa-non-aśaikṣa. Bodily and vocal silence only takes the anāsrava discipline born of the path; aśaikṣa bodily and vocal [karmas] and the anāsrava mental consciousness constitute the essence of the three silences. Another explanation: the three silences also include sāsrava wholesomeness, and the statement that bodily and vocal purity of non-śaikṣa-non-aśaikṣas is not silence is made with reference to the bodily and vocal purity of ordinary worldlings.

16.28

Regarding "Furthermore, it is said in the sūtra: ... the three subtle actions are the reverse of these": Here is the ninth section, clarifying evil conduct and subtle action. The upper three lines clarify evil conduct, and the lower line clarifies subtle action.

16.29

Regarding "The treatise says: ... having distinct essences": This explains the upper three lines. Greed, malice, and wrong view are also called evil conduct; because they exist distinct from cetanā, three more are opened up. Since they have no distinct essence apart from bodily and vocal karma, they cannot be spoken of with respect to body and speech. Alternatively, these three are called evil conduct because they are associated with evil conduct.

16.30

Regarding "The Dārṣṭāntikas say: ... constitute mental karma": The Sautrāntikas and Dārṣṭāntikas say: the three starting with greed are precisely mental cetanā, having no essence apart from cetanā. The cited proof is clear.

16.31

Regarding "If so, then it would follow that... merge into a single essence": The Sarvāstivāda objects: If you say that greed and the rest are precisely mental cetanā, then karma and defilement would merge into a single essence.

16.32

Regarding "We accept that defilement... what flaw is there in this?": The Dārṣṭāntikas answer: We accept that greed and the rest are precisely mental karma; what flaw is there in this?

16.33

Regarding "The Vaibhāṣikas... operates taking them as its portal": The Vaibhāṣikas reject this entirely. If one accepted it, one would contradict many reasonings and scriptural teachings, resulting in a great fault. Thus the Nyāyānusāra says: "On account of Āgama and sound reasoning. As for Āgama: the sūtras say that greed, malice, and wrong view are conditions and collections for karma. Therefore we know that greed and the rest are not themselves of the nature of karma (widely cited, etc.). What is sound reasoning? If defilements were themselves karma, the distinctions in the twelve links of dependent origination and the three obstacles would not exist. Through this it is proven that greed and the rest are not karma (end of treatise passage)." However, when the sūtras say that greed, malice, and wrong view are mental karma, it is to reveal that cetanā operates by taking those—greed, malice, and wrong view—as its gateway.

16.34

Regarding "Because it can produce... it is therefore called evil conduct": This explains the name 'evil conduct'. It produces undesirable results and is condemned and deplored by wisdom; hence it is called "evil". Its movement is swift and sharp; hence it is called "conduct". This conduct is itself evil, hence called "evil conduct"—a karmadhāraya compound.

16.35

Regarding "The three subtle actions... non-malice, and right view": This explains the fourth line. These three subtle actions are the reverse of the three evil actions: there are three that are karma, and three that are non-karma. As for the term "subtle action" [carita/socarita]: because it correctly produces desirable results and is praised by wisdom, it is called "subtle"; because its movement is swift and sharp, it is called "conduct". This conduct is itself subtle, hence called "subtle action".

16.36

[On the question,] "Right view and wrong view [...] how do they constitute good and bad?": This is an inquiry. In the case of bodily and vocal actions, if one abstains from killing and so forth, one can benefit others, so they may be called good actions; if one kills living beings and so forth, one can harm and afflict others, so they may be called bad actions. Right view and wrong view are by nature deliberation and reside solely in the mental consciousness; since they lack intentional contemplation desiring in actual situations to benefit or harm others, how do they constitute good and bad?

16.37

[On the reply,] "Because they serve as the root for harm and benefit": By giving rise to right view, one does not kill living beings, etc.; by giving rise to wrong view, one engages in killing living beings, etc. Although right view and wrong view do not directly benefit or harm others at the very moment they arise, because they can serve as the root for all bodily and vocal karmas of harm and benefit, they also constitute good and bad. Question: Among the three mental factors, why are the other two not mentioned in the question and answer? Explanation: The reason they are not mentioned is that they are omitted for brevity. Another explanation: The other two factors can directly harm others in actual situations, unlike wrong view; and they can directly benefit others in actual situations, unlike right view; hence the question was not framed in terms of them. Another question: Among mental bad actions, conceit and the like are also bad actions; why are only the three—greed, hatred, and so forth—mentioned? Among mental good actions, faith and the like are also good actions; why are only the three—non-greed and so forth—mentioned? Explanation: Because these three are subsumed under the coarse grade and are subsumed under the ten paths of karma, they are specifically mentioned.

16.38

[On the text,] "Furthermore, in the sūtras it is said [...] as appropriate, they constitute good and bad": Below, this is the tenth section, explaining the ten paths of karma. Herein: first, explaining the essential nature of the paths of karma; second, explaining the literal meaning of "paths of karma"; third, by extension, explaining the severance of the roots of good; fourth, explaining the co-arising of paths of karma; fifth, establishing the paths of karma with reference to their locus; sixth, explaining the three fruits of the paths of karma. Under explaining the essential nature of the paths of karma: first, directly explaining the essence of the paths of karma; second, explaining the distinctions among the paths of karma. This part directly explains the essence of the paths of karma.

16.39

[On the commentary,] "The treatise says [...] they subsume the preceding bad actions": Among bad and excellent actions, those that are coarse, manifest, and easily recognized constitute the bad and good paths of karma.

16.40

[On the question,] "Which bad and excellent actions are not subsumed?": This is an inquiry.

16.41

[On the reply,] "First, among the unwholesome [...] in order that one might keep far away from them": Here follows the answer. First, among the unwholesome, bodily bad paths of karma do not subsume preparatory actions, subsequent actions, or other unwholesome bodily actions under bodily bad conduct—namely drinking alcohol, seizing, beating, or binding others, and the like; or undertaking killing and so forth where, lacking requisite conditions, the act is not accomplished. Because preparatory actions and the like are not coarse and manifest, they are not named paths of karma. If bodily bad conduct causes another sentient being to lose their life, it becomes the path of karma of killing; if to lose their wealth, it becomes the path of karma of theft; if to lose a wife or concubine, it becomes the path of karma of sexual misconduct. Because the loss of life and the like are coarse and manifest, they are spoken of as paths of karma; [and] the World-Honoured One [taught them] in order that one might keep far away from them.

16.42

[On the text,] "The vocal bad paths of karma [...] subsequent and light": Vocal bad paths of karma do not subsume, under vocal bad conduct, preparatory actions, subsequent actions, singing with a defiled mind under a wheel-turning king or in the northern continent, and the like. Frivolous talk is light; the three bodily paths of karma harm others and are heavy. In the northern continent and under a wheel-turning king, [the heavy ones] are never produced at all, so bodily actions and the like are not said to be light. Alternatively, drinking alcohol and the like are light bodily actions; or engaging in deception and the like that fail to be accomplished due to a lack of conditions are also called light vocal actions. Because preparatory actions and the like are not coarse and manifest, they are not named paths of karma. Only when vocal badness is coarse, manifest, and easily known is it named a path of karma.

16.43

[On the text,] "Mental bad paths of karma [...] and light greed and the like": Mental bad paths of karma do not subsume bad volition under mental bad conduct. Because they serve as the path for volition, they are called paths of karma; this volition cannot in turn serve as its own path, hence bad volition is excluded. Furthermore, the light greed and the like that arise at the time of a wheel-turning king or among people of the northern continent are not coarse and manifest, and thus are not named paths of karma. Question: Why are preparatory and subsequent actions not mentioned? Explanation: When the coarse grade presents itself, it immediately constitutes the fundamental [path of karma], so preparatory and subsequent actions are not separately mentioned. This will be explained below.

16.44

[On the text,] "Among the good paths of karma [...] giving, making offerings, etc.": Below, the good paths of karma are explained. Among good paths of karma, bodily good paths of karma do not subsume, under bodily excellent conduct, preparatory actions, subsequent actions, and other good bodily actions—namely abstaining from alcohol, practicing giving, or making offerings, etc.; because they are not coarse and manifest, they are not named paths of karma.

16.45

[On the text,] "Vocal good paths of karma [...] meaning endearing speech, etc.": Vocal good paths of karma do not subsume a portion of vocal excellent conduct, meaning endearing speech, conciliatory speech, truthful speech, etc.; because they are not coarse and manifest, they are not paths of karma. Question: Why do vocal good paths of karma not mention preparatory and subsequent actions? Explanation: In principle, preparatory and subsequent actions should also be mentioned; the reason they are not mentioned is that their presence can be understood by implication, or they are made evident within the word "etc.", or because endearing speech and the like are light and are not even paths of karma, much less the preparatory and subsequent actions. This is raising the heavy to make evident the light, and omitting them for brevity.

16.46

[On the text,] "Mental good paths of karma [...] meaning wholesome volitions": Mental good paths of karma do not subsume wholesome volition under mental excellent conduct. Serving as the path for volition is why they are called paths of karma; this volition does not serve as the path for volition, and therefore does not subsume volition. Question: Why is it not said that light non-greed and the like are not paths of karma? Explanation: By analogy with the previous bad karma, in good karma light non-greed and the like should also be fully mentioned; the reason they are not mentioned is that they are omitted for brevity. Alternatively, light greed and the like were mentioned previously in the bad, and by not mentioning them in the good, their presence is understood by implication. Alternatively, good dharmas arise with difficulty, and once arisen they immediately constitute a path of karma, hence "light" is not mentioned; bad dharmas arise easily, so they are divided into two kinds: the heavy are paths of karma, the light are not paths of karma. Although there are three explanations, the first two are superior. Question: Why are preparatory and subsequent actions not mentioned? Explanation: When the coarse grade presents itself, it is immediately fundamental, so there are no preparatory and subsequent actions. This is also as explained below.

16.47

[On the question,] "Among the ten paths of karma [...] vijñapti or avijñapti?": Below is the second section, explaining the distinctions among the paths of karma. Herein: first, explaining in terms of vijñapti and avijñapti; second, distinguishing in terms of the three roots; third, explaining the bases of the paths of karma; fourth, questions and answers with distinctions; fifth, explaining the characteristics of the paths of karma. Under explaining in terms of vijñapti and avijñapti: first, explaining in terms of the fundamental; second, distinguishing in terms of the preceding and subsequent. This is the first, explaining in terms of the fundamental, and is the opening question.

16.48

[On the reply,] "Not so": This is the answer.

16.49

[On the query,] "How so?": This is the prompt.

16.50

[On the verse,] "The verse says: [...] that born of concentration is only avijñapti": The first two lines explain unwholesome paths of karma; the lower two lines explain wholesome paths of karma.

16.51

[On the commentary,] "The treatise says [...] because they are only avijñapti": This explains the first line. For these six paths of karma, avijñapti is definite, while vijñapti is indefinite. This is clear from the text.

16.52

[On the text,] "Only sexual misconduct [...] as in finding joy oneself": This explains the second line. For the path of karma of sexual misconduct, both vijñapti and avijñapti are definite.

16.53

[On the text,] "The seven good paths of karma [...] because it necessarily relies on vijñapti": This explains the third line. For the seven good paths of karma, if the prātimokṣa vows are taken and arise from another, they necessarily possess both—namely vijñapti and avijñapti—because śīla that arises through taking [vows] necessarily relies on vijñapti. Question: If taking and arising necessarily possess both, why does the earlier text say that prātimokṣa discipline does not necessarily arise by relying on vijñapti-karma? Explanation: Since it says "arises from taking [vows]", it is clear this is not spontaneous. This passage is based on śīla that arises from taking vows, hence it says they possess both. The earlier text comprehensively covers obtaining precepts spontaneously or via the path of seeing, hence it says it does not necessarily arise relying on vijñapti-karma. Question: If it is said that avijñapti can arise apart from vijñapti, why does the text below state that in the desire realm there is no avijñapti that arises apart from vijñapti? Explanation: The text below is the treatise master citing an objection from another teacher's position; or it comprehensively covers preparatory and fundamental [stages], hence stating that in the desire realm there is no avijñapti that arises apart from vijñapti. Were it not so, when one dispatches an emissary to kill and the fundamental act is accomplished, what vijñapti would there be? Another explanation: For the Buddha, pratyekabuddhas, the five bhikṣus, and so on, because they take vows with firm resolve and because it falls under the category of receiving and arising, it is also called "arising from taking [vows]". Under this explanation, all ten ways of obtaining precepts arise relying on vijñapti. Question: Why did the earlier text say it does not necessarily arise by relying on vijñapti-karma? Explanation: The earlier text recounted the view of other masters. Or perhaps avijñapti does not necessarily arise relying on a vijñapti of its own category, which shows reciprocal generation, as explained before. If this explanation is adopted, it accords well with the subsequent text that in the desire realm there is no avijñapti that arises apart from vijñapti. These two explanations are briefly stated; their full distinctions are as described above in the ten ways of obtaining precepts. Question: Just as is the number of avijñaptis, so too is the number of vijñaptis, hence it is said they "possess both"; or is it said they possess both simply because there must be vijñapti? Explanation: Just as in taking the full precepts, based on seven bodily vijñapti-karmas one generates seven avijñaptis. The good of restraint is subtle and its characteristics are hard to discern; although there is vocal vijñapti, it is not made audible to others, just as the speech of pretas is not heard by human beings. Since it says they necessarily possess both, it is clear that the numbers of vijñapti and avijñapti karmas are equal. The full precepts being so, the other precepts are analogous. Another explanation: If precepts are taken through formal karman, based on the three bodily vijñaptis one directly generates three bodily avijñaptis, and concurrently generates four vocal avijñaptis. If there were vocal vijñapti, how could it not be heard? Since no sound is heard, it is clear that there are no four vocal vijñaptis. If full ordination is taken through the three refuges, based on the four vocal vijñaptis one directly generates four vocal avijñaptis, and concurrently generates three bodily avijñaptis, because the precepts arise by repeating after the master's words. Although the seven limbs of avijñapti may arise reciprocally, they necessarily arise relying on vijñapti-karma; therefore it is said they necessarily possess both, not that each one individually arises from a distinct vijñapti. For other upasakas and so forth taking precepts through the three refuges, a single vocal vijñapti generates four avijñaptis. Another explanation: If precepts are taken through formal karman, it is as in the second explanation. If full ordination is taken through the three refuges, due to uttering speech there are four vocal vijñaptis, and due to bodily respect there are three bodily vijñaptis; thus the seven limbs of vijñapti generate seven avijñaptis. For other upasakas taking precepts through the three refuges, all possess four vijñaptis and four avijñaptis.

16.54

[On the text,] "Those born of concentration and the uncontaminated [...] because they can arise": This explains the fourth line. Avijñapti born of concentration does not arise relying on vijñapti, because it arises relying on the mind.

16.55

[On the question,] "Are preparatory and subsequent actions like the fundamental?": Below is the second section, distinguishing in terms of the preceding and subsequent. Question: Do preparatory and subsequent actions have vijñapti and avijñapti just like the fundamental path of karma?

16.56

[On the reply,] "Not so": This is the answer.

16.57

[On the query,] "How so?": This is the prompt.

16.58

[On the verse,] "The verse says: [...] the subsequent is the opposite of this": The first two lines explain the preparatory actions, and the lower line explains the subsequent actions.

16.59

[On the commentary,] "The treatise says [...] otherwise there would be none": Merely producing the mental ground does not constitute a preparatory action; only after initiating bodily or vocal action does it constitute a preparatory action; therefore, in preparatory actions there must be vijñapti. The rest of the text is clear.

16.60

[On the question,] "In this sense [...] the stage of subsequent action?": This is an inquiry. In the meaning of these paths of karma, how are the distinctions among the three stages established?

16.61

[On the reply,] "First, among the unwholesome [...] the subsequent action of killing": This is the answer. It explains the three stages of killing. "Preparatory action" refers to the preceding preparation; "fruition completion" refers to the culmination of killing. The rest of the text is clear.

16.62

[On the text,] "The remaining six paths of karma [...] should be stated by analogy": This is an explanation by analogy. It is explained in full as in the *Nyāyānusāra*.

16.63

Regarding "covetousness, malice, and wrong view ... [have no] distinction of preparatory and subsequent [stages]": arising mild covetousness and the like is merely isolated [defilement]; mild covetousness, malice, and so forth are not the preparations or the subsequent acts of a path of action. When it comes to the fundamental [act], its arising is itself the path of action. Fascicle 41 of the Nyāyānusāra gives two explanations. The first explanation agrees with this treatise. The second explanation states: "According to this explanation, they also possess the three divisions. There is unwholesome volition that can serve as the prior and subsequent auxiliary matter for covetousness, malice, and so forth (Gloss: Unwholesome volition associated with unshared ignorance, the four views, doubt, arrogance, and the like serves as preparation and subsequent act for covetousness, malice, and wrong view. The Nyāyānusāra's intention favours this explanation)." Furthermore, the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 113, states: "As for the other three mental paths of action—covetousness, malice, and wrong view—their arising is itself the fundamental [act]; they have no distinction of preparatory and subsequent [stages]. Some say: They also have preparation and subsequent act, namely unwholesome volition." This treatise takes the former master's [view] as correct, whereas the Nyāyānusāra takes the latter master's [view] as correct. Since the Mahāvibhāṣā has no evaluating authority on this, it follows what the respective treatise-master prefers.

16.64

Regarding "Here, it should be explained ... or after death?": This asks about the time of accomplishing the path of action.

16.65

Regarding "If so, what fault is there?": This is the answer.

16.66

Regarding "Both have faults ... the fundamental path of action": This is a dilemma-based interrogation. If the living being being killed is right in the present state of dying (maraṇa-bhava), and the killer's path of action is accomplished at that very moment, then if the killer, encountering a condition for death, dies at the same time as the living being being killed, the path of action ought to be accomplished. But our school does not accept that dying at the same time can accomplish the path of action. Therefore, the treatise below says: "If the killer dies at the same time as the living being being killed, or dies before it, they definitely do not obtain the fundamental path of action." If only after the living being being killed has just died, in the very first moment, the killer's path of action is accomplished, then one should not have previously explained the path of action by stating: "At the moment when, following this vijñapti-karma, that [being] is just dying, the vijñapti and avijñapti-karma of this instant is called the fundamental path of action of killing living beings."

16.67

Regarding "Furthermore, it would contradict ... because the fundamental [act] has not ceased": If one says that the path of action is accomplished after death, it would also contradict the Vaibhāṣika master's interpretation of the root treatise regarding the preparation not having ceased. Namely, the root treatise of the Jñānaprasthāna states: "Is there a case where a living being has been harmed, yet the killing has not ceased? Answer: There is. For example, when life has been terminated, but the preparation for it has not ceased." The Vaibhāṣika master explains this passage saying: "Here, the designation 'preparation' is used for what is subsequent to that path of action, as when, having killed an enemy, one suspects he is not yet dead and continues to beat him with a stick." If one says that the path of action is accomplished only after death, why did the Vaibhāṣika master explain that the designation 'preparation' is used for the subsequent stage? He should have said that the designation 'preparation' is used for the fundamental [act], since it is accepted that after the termination of life the fundamental [act] has not ceased.

16.68

Regarding "As there is no fault, so here it should be explained": The author of the treatise evaluates: as is faultless, so here one should explain the text of the root treatise.

16.69

Regarding "What is explained here that is called faultless?": This is a question.

16.70

Regarding "That is, using the term 'preparation' for the fundamental [act]": The author of the treatise answers. That is, using the term 'preparation' to refer to the fundamental [act] to explain the text of the root treatise is free of fault, because the school accepts that only after the termination of life is the path of action accomplished. As for the previous text stating that when that [being] is just dying the path of action is accomplished, it applies the present tense to a past event, or figuratively applies the name of the result—the path of action—to the preparatory cause. Thus the Nyāyānusāra says: "It is definitively after death that the path of action is accomplished. As for what was previously said about 'just dying', it is merely applying the present tense to what has already passed. Just as when a great king has arrived from afar, one asks, 'From where do you come now?' Or this is figuratively speaking of the cause as the result (end of treatise passage)." Question: Why is the path of action accomplished only after death? Gloss: Whenever one discusses killing living beings, it is causing life not to continue; hence only upon its non-continuation is the path of action accomplished. While present life still exists, how could the path of action be accomplished? The Nyāyānusāra's intention agrees with this explanation. However, in rescuing the Vaibhāṣika master's interpretation of the root treatise, it says: "Is it not that both the fundamental and the subsequent acts arise after the dying-state of the one killed, and thus both may be called subsequent to killing? Therefore one should believe that the Vaibhāṣika master's interpretation of the root treatise is exceedingly skillful." The master of the Kośa critiques this: If one makes this rescue, the meaning is indeed not contradicted; however, the word 'subsequent' is not clear.

16.71

Regarding "If so, at that time ... the fundamental path of action": This is an external objection. If it is only after death that the path of action is accomplished, at that time life is no longer present; how could any existing vijñapti-karma accomplish the fundamental path of action?

16.72

Regarding "Why should it not be accomplished?": This interrogates the opponent in return.

16.73

Regarding "Because it lacks function": The opponent answers. Whenever one speaks of vijñapti, it must possess activity. Since that life is already gone, because the vijñapti lacks function, it should not be a path of action.

16.74

Regarding "Avijñapti here ... the fundamental path of action": The author of the treatise interrogates in return to reveal the accomplishment of the path of action. What function does avijñapti have when this fundamental [act] is accomplished? Therefore, the accomplishment of a path of action is not due to possessing function; it is due, first, to the preparatory performance of killing and so forth, and second, to the completion of the result when the killing is consummated. At that time, it can give expression to the volition of the cause-samutthāna; both this vijñapti and avijñapti accomplish the path of action. Thus the Mahāvibhāṣā states: "The fault of killing living beings is obtained through two conditions: first, initiating the preparation; second, the consummation of the result. If one initiates the preparation but the result is not consummated, or if the result is consummated without initiating the preparation, in both cases one does not incur the fault. Only if one initiates the preparation and the result is also consummated does one incur the fault of killing."

16.75

Regarding "Furthermore, all paths of action ... should be understood accordingly": This clarifies that the ten paths of action mutually serve as preparation and subsequent acts. This can be known from the text.

16.76

Regarding "Covetousness and the like cannot ... because they have not performed the action": The author of the treatise cites another master's position as an objection. Whenever one discusses preparation, it aids that [act's] function, such as wielding a sword to perform the act of killing; covetousness and the like cannot serve as preparation. One does not accomplish preparation merely by the arising of mind without initiating bodily or vocal preparations, because at the mere arising of mind, the preparatory action has not been performed; therefore, it is said that covetousness and the like are not preparation. Thus the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 41, states: "Other masters say: Covetousness and the like cannot serve as preparation, for preparation is not accomplished merely by the arising of mind, as no action has been performed. According to this explanation: Although covetousness and the like do not have the nature of an action performed, yet when covetousness and the like arise with reference to an object, they are not without power and function; by virtue of having power and function, they obtain the name 'preparation', because they conveniently induce the various paths of action." The Nyāyānusāra takes the latter explanation as correct; this treatise raises the former master's [view] as an objection, and thus takes the former master's [view] as correct. The intentions of the treatise-writers differ: [the view that they] do not serve as preparation is based on immediate lack of power; [the view that they] can serve as preparation is based on remote possession of power.

16.77

Regarding "Furthermore, it is said in the sūtra ... the questions for the rest are also like this": Below this is the second [section], analyzing according to the three roots. Within this, first is clarifying them as unwholesome preparation; second, clarifying the three stages of generating the wholesome; third, clarifying the consummation of the paths of action. This [passage] clarifies unwholesome preparation. The question is raised based on the sūtra. Here it should be explained: what kind of killing is called born from covetousness? The questions for the rest are also like this. This is the general question.

16.78

Regarding "Not all paths of action ... are not the same as that": This is the answer. When the fundamental [paths of action] are accomplished, they are not all consummated by the three roots; however, their prior preparations are not the same as the fundamental [acts].

16.79

Regarding "How are they not the same?": This is an inquiry. It asks about the difference of the preparation regarding the three roots, not yet asking about the fundamental [acts].

16.80

Regarding "The verse states ... are born from the three roots, covetousness and the like": The verse answers.

16.81

Regarding "The commentary states ... therefore it was said thus": This explains the first line. When the preparations of the seven unwholesome paths of action arise, each one is initiated by the three unwholesome roots, based on the prior cause-samutthāna. In the Buddhist sūtras, it is said thus: they are born from the three roots.

16.82

Regarding "The preparation for killing ... all arise from delusion": This clarifies that the preparation for killing is born from the three roots. "Bolasī" refers to the country of Bolasī, formerly called Posi (Persia), which was an error. Wrong view is associated with delusion; whenever one kills living beings on account of wrong view, this preparation for killing is called arising from delusion. The rest of the text is understandable.

16.83

Regarding "The preparation for stealing ... initiates the preparation for stealing": This clarifies that the preparation for stealing arises from the three roots. That is, initiating the preparation for stealing in accordance with whatever is needed; or for the sake of other profit, desiring to steal that property, shouting little for much. Another explanation: receiving another's wealth is called other profit. Or seeking another's respect. Another explanation: desiring to steal another's property to share with others hoping for their respect; or for the sake of bravery and renown. Another explanation: desiring to steal another's property to share with others hoping they praise oneself. In this way it is called initiating the preparation for stealing induced by covetousness. Wrong view is called born of delusion, explained analogously to the previous [section on] killing. The rest of the text is understandable.

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俱舍論記 — Classical Chinese