俱舍論記 16.76

16.76

Regarding "Covetousness and the like cannot ... because they have not performed the action": The author of the treatise cites another master's position as an objection. Whenever one discusses preparation, it aids that [act's] function, such as wielding a sword to perform the act of killing; covetousness and the like cannot serve as preparation. One does not accomplish preparation merely by the arising of mind without initiating bodily or vocal preparations, because at the mere arising of mind, the preparatory action has not been performed; therefore, it is said that covetousness and the like are not preparation. Thus the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 41, states: "Other masters say: Covetousness and the like cannot serve as preparation, for preparation is not accomplished merely by the arising of mind, as no action has been performed. According to this explanation: Although covetousness and the like do not have the nature of an action performed, yet when covetousness and the like arise with reference to an object, they are not without power and function; by virtue of having power and function, they obtain the name 'preparation', because they conveniently induce the various paths of action." The Nyāyānusāra takes the latter explanation as correct; this treatise raises the former master's [view] as an objection, and thus takes the former master's [view] as correct. The intentions of the treatise-writers differ: [the view that they] do not serve as preparation is based on immediate lack of power; [the view that they] can serve as preparation is based on remote possession of power.