俱舍論記 22

English (machine translation) 22

Language: English

22.2

Chapter Six: Discerning the Noble Persons, Part One

Regarding "Chapter on Discerning the Noble Persons": 'worthy' means harmonious and virtuous; 'noble' means holy and correct. Because this chapter extensively elucidates worthy and noble persons, it is named "Chapter on Discerning the Noble Persons". As for why the Chapter on Noble Persons is explained next: the preceding three chapters separately elucidated the contaminated, while the following three chapters separately elucidate the uncontaminated. Wishing to cause one to give rise to delight after becoming repulsed, the uncontaminated is explained next. Among the three chapters elucidating the uncontaminated, the Noble Persons chapter elucidates the fruition, the Knowledge chapter elucidates the cause, and the Samādhi chapter elucidates the condition. Because the characteristics of the fruition are coarse and evident, they are explained first.

22.4

Regarding "'Having thus spoken' up to 'the path of cultivation encompasses both'": within this chapter there are three major sections: first, generally elucidating the essential nature of the path; second, elucidating the truths realized by the path; third, discerning persons in relation to the noble path. This is the first: generally elucidating the essential nature of the path. The upper two lines conclude what preceded, and the lower two lines directly set forth the essential nature of the path.

22.5

Regarding "'The Śāstra says' up to 'and the path of cultivation'": this explains the upper two lines.

22.6

Regarding "'The path is solely uncontaminated' up to 'therefore it encompasses both'": this explains the lower two lines. The question and answer can be understood.

22.7

Regarding "'As stated just above' up to 'in accordance with gradual realization'": from here down is the second [section], elucidating the truths realized by the path. Within this, first, elucidating the four truths; second, elucidating the two truths. Within elucidating the four truths: first, elucidating the four truths; second, separately showing the truth of suffering. This is the first: elucidating the four truths. The upper two lines show their names, the third line shows their essence, and the lower one line explains their sequence.

22.8

Regarding "'The Śāstra says' up to 'the names have already been stated earlier'": this explains the first line.

22.9

"In what place were they stated?" is a question.

22.10

Regarding "'That is, in the first chapter' up to 'uncontaminated mental object sphere'": this is the answer.

22.11

"How did that [verse] state it?" is an inquiry.

22.12

Regarding "'That is, that verse says' up to 'here these are called the truths of suffering and origination'": this is the explanation. It quotes the verse from the preceding "Chapter on the Dhātus" in reply. Question: The verse in the "Chapter on the Dhātus" says that the uncontaminated refers to the truth of the path; why does the present quotation say "the noble path"? Explanation: "Noble path" and "truth of the path" have different names but the same meaning; citing the text according to its meaning involves no contradiction.

22.13

Regarding "'Is the sequence of the four truths as stated there?'": this explains the question of the second line: Is the sequence of the four truths as in that "Chapter on the Dhātus", first stating the truth of the path, next cessation, next suffering, and afterwards origination?

22.14

"It is not so" is the answer.

22.15

"How is it?" is an inquiry.

22.16

Regarding "'As they are listed now' up to 'four, the path'": this is the explanation.

22.17

Regarding "'Are the individual essences of the four truths also different?'": this explains the third line. This is a question.

22.18

"It is not so" is the answer.

22.19

"How is it?" is an inquiry.

22.20

Regarding "'As analyzed previously' up to 'uses the word "likewise"'": the explanatory text can be understood. Question: For what reason are space and analytical cessation not included within the truths? Answer: As the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle seventy-seven, says: "Answer: If a dharma is suffering, the cause of suffering, the cessation of suffering, or the antidote to suffering, the World-Honored One establishes it as a truth. Space and non-analytical cessation are neither suffering, nor the cause of suffering, nor the cessation of suffering, nor the antidote to suffering; therefore, the World-Honored One does not establish them as truths." It also says: "Furthermore, space and non-analytical cessation are uncontaminated, hence they are not the truths of suffering or origination; they are indeterminate, hence they are not the truth of cessation; they are unconditioned, hence they are not the truth of the path." It also says: "Furthermore, space and non-analytical cessation do not fall into the temporal periods, hence they are not the [first] three truths; they are indeterminate, hence they are not the truth of cessation." This is as extensively explained there.

22.21

Regarding "'For what reason are the four truths in such a sequence?'": this explains the fourth line. This is a question.

22.22

Regarding "'In accordance with the stages of comprehension' up to 'the sequence of earlier and later'": this is the answer. Following the direct realization of the truths, what is contemplated first is stated first. If it were otherwise, one should first state the causes—origination and path—and afterwards state the fruits—suffering and cessation. In general, there are briefly three kinds of sequential order for stating dharmas: First, some dharmas have a sequence of statement following their arising, such as the four applications of mindfulness: the application of mindfulness to the body arises first and is stated first, up to the application of mindfulness to dharmas, which arises later and is stated later. 'Etc.' includes the various dhyānas and so forth. Second, some dharmas have a sequence of statement following convenience [of expression], such as the four right exertions. That is, here there is no fixed logical sequence for generating vigorous effort to give rise to such aspiration; it is merely that: first, abandoning already arisen bad dharmas; second, preventing unarisen bad dharmas; third, cultivating unarisen wholesome dharmas; fourth, increasing already arisen wholesome dharmas. The sequence of the four is stated merely following convenience of expression. The text here is brief and speaks only of bad dharmas, or it raises the former to indicate the latter. Therefore the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle seventy-eight, says: "Although the four right exertions occur simultaneously, yet because it is easier to say, one first speaks of abandoning evil and later speaks of cultivating good. Within abandoning evil, one first speaks of abandoning already arisen evil, and later speaks of preventing unarisen evil. Within cultivating good, one first speaks of giving rise to unarisen good, and later speaks of increasing already arisen good. If one explains it in this way, the phrasing is facile (the above is the śāstra text)." 'Etc.' includes the four bases of supernatural power and so forth. Third, some dharmas follow the sequence of direct realization, as when stating the four truths. Among the three sequences, the present statement of the four truths is the third: following the sequence of earlier and later in the stage of the practitioner's direct realization.

22.23

"For what reason is the sequence of direct realization necessarily like this?" is a question.

22.24

Regarding "'Because in the stage of preparatory effort one contemplates in this way'": this is the answer. It is because one contemplates in this way during the preparatory stage of the aids to penetration.

22.25

"For what reason does the preparatory effort necessarily contemplate in this way?" is an inquiry.

22.26

Regarding "'That is, if there is a dharma' up to 'letting a horse gallop freely'": this is the answer. It sets forth the doctrine, illustrates with a simile, adduces proof, and concludes in summary; this can be understood from the text.

22.27

"What meaning does this name 'direct realization' signify?" is a question.

22.28

Regarding "'It should be known that this signifies correct realization before one's eyes'": this is the answer. It should be known that this signifies the meaning of directly and fully awakening to the cognitive object before one's eyes.

22.29

"For what reason is this said to be solely uncontaminated?" is a question.

22.30

Regarding "'Oriented toward nirvāṇa' up to 'therefore it obtains the name "correct"'": this is the answer. This uncontaminated wisdom is oriented toward the fruit of nirvāṇa and correctly awakens to the cognitive object of the truths; therefore it is solely uncontaminated. This awakening is true and pure, hence it obtains the name 'correct'.

22.31

Regarding "'It should be known that herein' up to 'their entities are also distinct'": this sets forth the essence of the four truths. Question: If the four truths were based on real entities, there should only be three, because suffering and origination are a single entity. If based on cause and fruit, there should be five kinds, because there are also cause and fruit within the truth of the path. If based on direct realization, there should be eight kinds, because there are eight higher and lower truths. Answer: As the Mahāvibhāṣā says: "Furthermore, the four truths are established on the basis of direct realization. Question: If so, there should be eight noble truths, not four. Answer: Because the aspects of the truths are the same, there are four and not eight." This is as extensively explained there.

22.32

"In what sense are they called 'noble truths' in the sūtras?" is a question.

22.33

Regarding "'Because they are the truths of the noble ones, they obtain the name "noble"'": this is the answer.

22.34

"For non-noble ones, could these somehow be false?" is an objection.

22.35

Regarding "To everyone it is a truth... the non-noble speak of it as pleasure": this is the explanation. The principle of these four truths is true to everyone, both ordinary beings and nobles, because its nature is non-erroneous. However, only the nobles truly see it, not ordinary beings; therefore, in the sūtras they are only called noble truths (āryasatya), not non-noble truths. Although ordinary beings observe the truths, it is not definitive, and they may later harbor inverted views. As a verse states: "The noble ones say nirvāṇa is pleasure; the non-noble say nirvāṇa is suffering." As the non-Buddhists say: "I see that having only one eye in the world is still considered suffering; how much more so in that nirvāṇa where all sense faculties are completely extinguished could there be any pleasure?" Thus they consider it suffering. The nobles speak of sāsrava phenomena as suffering; the non-noble mistakenly speak of pleasant feeling within them as solely pleasurable, and thus it becomes an inversion.

22.36

Regarding "Other masters say... noble and non-noble truths": this relates a different view. Other Sautrāntika masters, or perhaps Sthavira masters, say: The two [truths of] cessation and the path are solely noble truths because they are accomplished only by the noble, not by ordinary beings. Ordinary beings merely suppress defilements and cannot genuinely sever them; therefore they cannot accomplish the truth of cessation. The remaining two, suffering and origin, are both noble and non-noble truths because both the noble and ordinary beings accomplish them. This master explains in terms of attainment. Another explanation: The two truths of cessation and the path are solely anāsrava and are contemplated only by the noble; therefore they are solely noble truths. The two truths of suffering and origin are also contemplated by the noble, and are thus called noble truths; being solely sāsrava and also contemplated by ordinary beings, they are called non-noble truths.

22.37

Regarding "Only one part of feeling... the remaining conditioned sāsrava phenomena": this is the second part, specifically elucidating the truth of suffering. Question: Among the three feelings, only one portion—painful feeling—is the intrinsic nature of suffering; the remaining sāsrava [phenomena] are completely not painful feelings. How can it be said that all sāsrava conditioned phenomena are the truth of suffering? This is the question and the verse answer.

22.38

Regarding "The treatise says... there is no error": this explains the first two lines. Because they are conjoined with the three sufferings, calling them suffering is without error.

22.39

Regarding "Here, the agreeable... therefore called suffering": this explains the lower two lines. Among these sāsrava phenomena, if they are agreeable conditioned sāsrava phenomena, because they are conjoined with the suffering of change (vipariṇāma-duḥkhatā), they are collectively called the suffering of change. Conditoned sāsrava phenomena that are disagreeable, because they are conjoined with the suffering of pain (duḥkha-duḥkhatā), are collectively called the suffering of pain. Conditioned sāsrava phenomena other than these two, because they are conjoined with the suffering of conditioned existence (saṃskāra-duḥkhatā), are collectively called the suffering of conditioned existence.

22.40

Regarding "What is called agreeable, disagreeable, and the rest?": this is a question.

22.41

Regarding "It refers to the three feelings, pleasure and the rest... acquire the designation agreeable and the rest": this is the answer. It means that the three feelings of pleasure and the rest, in their respective order: by the power of pleasant feeling, the conditioned sāsrava phenomena that are concordant with pleasant feeling—conjoined, coexistent, and so forth—acquire the designation 'agreeable'. By the power of painful feeling, the conditioned sāsrava phenomena that are concordant with painful feeling—conjoined, coexistent, and so forth—acquire the designation 'disagreeable'. By the power of neutral feeling, the conditioned sāsrava phenomena that are concordant with neutral feeling—conjoined, coexistent, and so forth—acquire the designation 'neither agreeable nor disagreeable'.

22.42

Regarding "Why is that?": this is an inquiry.

22.43

Regarding "If pleasant feelings... are suffering when undergoing destruction": below this is the answer. It clarifies that conditioned sāsrava phenomena, each by virtue of one [type of] suffering, become suffering by nature. This reveals the intrinsic nature of the three sufferings. If they are pleasant feelings, it is because they become suffering by nature at the time of their destruction. The Nyāyānusāra, fascicle fifty-seven, explains the sūtra: "'Pleasant feelings are pleasure when arising and when abiding' because that pleasant feeling is by nature pleasurable. 'They are suffering when undergoing destruction' means that when sentient beings have not yet separated from desire, their minds constantly seek pleasure; at the stage where pleasure is destroyed, grief and sorrow arise. Therefore, pleasant feelings are said to be of the nature of the suffering of change. When pleasant feeling is destroyed, even if there is no painful feeling, its manifesting as a semblance of suffering is also called suffering." (The above is the text of the treatise).

22.44

Regarding "If painful feelings... are suffering when abiding": if they are painful feelings, they are suffering by nature through their very essence. The sūtra states: "Painful feelings are suffering when arising and suffering when abiding"; therefore they are called suffering, "because they are pleasure when undergoing destruction." The Nyāyānusāra explains the sūtra: "However, the Bhagavān said in the sūtra: 'Painful feelings are suffering when arising and when abiding' because that painful feeling is by nature suffering. 'They are pleasure when undergoing destruction' means that when painful feeling is destroyed, even if there is no pleasant feeling, its manifesting as a semblance of pleasure through the cessation of painful feeling is therefore also called pleasure. At the stage when the continuum ceases, the designation 'destruction' is established; therefore, when painful feeling ceases, it is called the destruction of painful feeling."

22.45

Regarding "Neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling... that is suffering": neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling becomes suffering by nature through the aspect of impermanence in arising and ceasing. Produced by multiple conditions, its nature is unstable, arising and ceasing from moment to moment. As the sūtra says: "What is impermanent is suffering." Therefore the Nyāyānusāra says: "Neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling is neither suffering nor pleasure when arising and when abiding, because its nature is such. When it undergoes destruction, since either suffering or pleasure may manifest, it can be said to be coexist with both. When suffering or pleasure is destroyed, there is no possibility of having both; therefore the Buddha made a different statement regarding this."

22.46

Regarding "As with feeling, the conditioned phenomena concordant with feeling are also like this": just as these three feelings obtain the name of the three sufferings, the conditioned phenomena concordant with feeling—conjoined, coexistent, and so forth—should be known to be likewise spoken of as the three sufferings. Therefore the Nyāyānusāra says: "What is the essence of these three natures of suffering? It should be decisively determined that the three feelings are the essence, because of the three feelings. Phenomena concordant with the three feelings, as appropriate, also obtain the name of the three natures of suffering."

22.47

Regarding "Other masters explain... is called the nature of the suffering of conditioned existence": this explains the names of the three sufferings. Other masters explain: Pain is itself the nature of suffering, hence named the nature of the suffering of pain. Change is itself the nature of suffering, hence named the nature of the suffering of change. Conditioned existence is itself the nature of suffering, hence named the nature of the suffering of conditioned existence. These are all explained according to karmadhāraya compounds.

22.48

Regarding "It should be known here that... is suffering because of the suffering of conditioned existence": this clarifies the breadth and narrowness of the three sufferings. It should be known that here, speaking of the agreeable as the suffering of change and the disagreeable as the suffering of pain is because these are specific sufferings that are not shared with the rest, and their names are established from the specific. In truth, all conditioned sāsrava phenomena are suffering because of the suffering of conditioned existence. According to this text, the agreeable has two: namely, the suffering of change and the suffering of conditioned existence; because their essence is not painful feeling, they are not called the suffering of pain. The disagreeable has two: namely, the suffering of pain and the suffering of conditioned existence; because they are pleasure when undergoing destruction, they are not called the suffering of change. The remaining conditioned sāsrava phenomena are solely called the suffering of conditioned existence; their essence is not painful feeling, so they are not called the suffering of pain, and their destruction may give rise to pleasure, so they are not called the suffering of change.

22.49

Regarding "This, only the noble ones... up to the aggregates of the pinnacle of existence": this reveals the subtlety of the suffering of conditioned existence. This nature of the suffering of conditioned existence can only be observed and seen by the noble ones; although ordinary beings observe it, they cannot deeply realize it. Therefore the Sautrāntika master Kumāralāta has this verse: Furthermore, in contrast to ordinary beings, it reveals the superior revulsion of the noble.

22.50

Regarding "The truth of the path should also be... because it is of conditioned nature": this is a question.

22.51

Regarding "The truth of the path is not suffering... only reveals the sāsrava": this is the answer. The truth of the path is not suffering; opposing the noble mind is the characteristic of the suffering of conditioned existence, and the four aspects arising with the noble path as object do not oppose the noble mind, because this noble path leads to the exhaustion of all suffering. Moreover, resolving the sūtra passage "If one contemplates all conditioned phenomena as nirvāṇa is tranquil", it is explained: It is also because one first sees that those conditioned phenomena are of the nature of suffering, and afterwards contemplates the cessation above those phenomena as tranquil; therefore, the words "conditioned phenomena" spoken in that sūtra only reveal the sāsrava. The truth of the path is not suffering, nor is it devoid of nirvāṇa; therefore the words "conditioned phenomena" do not extend to the truth of the path.

22.52

Regarding "If among phenomena... suffering is the noble truth": this is a question.

22.53

Regarding "One group explains... conceptualize an ulcer as pleasure": this is an explanation by a group of Sarvāstivāda masters. It is understandable from the text.

22.54

Regarding "Others in this regard... say that pleasure is also called suffering": another Sautrāntika, Kumāralāta, explains this in a verse, saying: Because this pleasant feeling can serve as the cause for future fruits of suffering; because it can accumulate the fruits of multiple future sufferings; and because when oppressed by suffering, one longs for that pleasure; therefore pleasant feeling is also spoken of as suffering.

22.55

Regarding "In truth it should be said... is the truth and not pleasure": the author of the treatise states the correct explanation of the Sarvāstivāda. In truth it should be said: The noble ones observe all three realms of existence and the pleasures within the three realms of existence as entirely suffering in essence, because in terms of the suffering of conditioned existence they are of one identical flavor; based on this, suffering is established as the truth, and not pleasure.

22.56

Regarding "How is pleasant feeling also contemplated as suffering?": another school asks.

22.57

Regarding "Because its nature is impermanent... exactly like painful feeling": the author of the treatise answers. Because its nature is impermanent, it is distinguished from the truth of cessation; because it opposes the noble mind, it is distinguished from the truth of the path; therefore it is called suffering. Just as when one contemplates form and the rest with the aspect of the suffering of conditioned existence, that aspect of the suffering of conditioned existence is not entirely identical with painful feeling, showing the distinction of painful feeling.

22.58

Regarding "Some claim that pleasant feeling... what use is the suffering of conditioned existence?": the author of the treatise cites the previous verse of the Sautrāntika to refute it. The cause of suffering is origin; how could it pertain to suffering? Furthermore, when a noble one is born in higher [realms] taking them as objects, how could there be the arising of the designation suffering? Those aggregates are not the causes of painful feeling. If it is termed the truth of suffering based on the suffering of pain, then why does the sūtra further speak of the suffering of conditioned existence? For that school posits that pain is called the truth of suffering, and that pleasure and neutrality giving rise to suffering are also called the truth of suffering. Therefore he makes this objection.

22.59

Regarding "If it is because of impermanence... what is the distinction between the aspects?": this is a question.

22.60

Regarding "Because it is a phenomenon of arising and ceasing... can induce the aspect of suffering": this is the answer. Because it is a phenomenon of arising and ceasing, it is contemplated as impermanent; because it opposes the noble mind, it is contemplated as suffering. Merely seeing that sāsrava is impermanent, one knows it opposes the noble mind; therefore the aspect of impermanence can induce the aspect of suffering.

22.61

Regarding "Masters of other schools... feeling is solely suffering": this relates a different doctrine. Other Sautrāntikas, Mahāsāṃghikas, and so on hold this view: Definitely there is no real pleasure; all three feelings are solely suffering. Here one should say: Definitely there is neither pleasure nor neutrality; the three feelings are solely suffering. Because previously only pleasant feeling was asked about, in recounting the other school's view he merely states there is no pleasure, without stating there is no neutrality.

22.62

Regarding "How is this known to be so?": this is a question.

22.63

Regarding "From teaching and reason": the other school answers.

22.64

Regarding "How from teaching?": this is an inquiry.

22.65

Regarding "As the World-Honoured One said... is called an inversion": the other school cites three sūtras in response. It is understandable from the text.

22.66

Regarding "How from reason?": this is an inquiry.

22.67

Regarding "Because the causes of pleasure... only then does its characteristic become evident": the other school responds with reason. Because all causes of pleasure are variable, this demonstrates there is no real pleasure. Namely, with regard to things such as clothing: if used according to the proper time and without excess, sentient beings accept them as causes of pleasure. If these are used out of season or excessively, they immediately give rise to suffering and again become causes of suffering. For example, wearing a fur robe in summer or unlined hemp in winter; eating again repeatedly when already sated with food and drink; seeking cold on a cold day, or seeking heat when hot; these are all called out-of-season consumption, and things like clothing, food, cold, and heat then give rise to suffering and become causes of suffering. Even if such clothing and the like are used at the proper time, if they are used excessively they immediately give rise to suffering and become causes of suffering. It is not appropriate that a cause of pleasure, at the stage of increase and excessive use, or even when balanced without increase or decrease, simply by being out of season becomes a cause of suffering and produces suffering. Therefore, we know that clothing and the like are fundamentally causes of suffering; when suffering is slight it is not perceived, and only when suffering increases and flourishes does its characteristic become evident, whereupon one perceives suffering.

22.68

Regarding "The alternation of postures by reason should also be like this": this is an analogous explanation. The alternation of the postures—walking, standing, sitting, and lying down—is conceptualized by sentient beings as a cause of pleasure. If this is out of season or excessive, it becomes a cause of suffering, etc., which should be explained following the above. This shows that the pleasure-cause of bodily postures is variable, clarifying that there is no real pleasure.

22.69

Regarding "Furthermore, when remedying suffering... the sensation of pleasure then arises": furthermore, two headings are opened to show that there is no real pleasure: first, sensing pleasure when remedying suffering; second, sensing pleasure upon the alteration of suffering.

22.70

As for "That is, if one has not yet encountered... a cause capable of producing pleasure": this explains the first section. "Weariness" means fatigue; "desire" means sexual desire; or it means fatigue from sexual desire. Food remedies hunger; drink remedies thirst; warmth remedies cold; coolness remedies heat; resting, sitting, and lying down remedy weariness and desire. That is, if one has not yet been afflicted by the suffering of hunger and the like, an awareness of pleasure does not arise with respect to the various causes of pleasure such as food. It is only when afflicted by the suffering of hunger and the like that an awareness of pleasure arises with respect to the causes of pleasure such as food. Therefore, regarding the causes such as food that remedy severe suffering like hunger, the foolish ordinary person falsely imagines that this cause of light suffering is able to produce pleasure; in reality, there is no definite cause that produces pleasure.

22.71

As for "In the shifting of suffering... definitely no real pleasure": this explains the second section. In the shifting of suffering, the foolish ordinary person deems its light suffering to be pleasure, just as when carrying a heavy burden one temporarily shifts it to the other shoulder and the like, falsely deeming the initial light suffering to be pleasure; therefore, feeling is solely suffering, and there is definitely no real pleasure. If one follows the Sautrāntikas, all three feelings possess the three sufferings: because the three feelings are in reality painful feelings, they are all the suffering of suffering; because the three feelings undergo deterioration at the stage where their continuum is broken, they are all suffering that is deterioration itself; because the three feelings arise and perish moment by moment, they are all suffering that is conditioned existence itself.

22.72

As for "The masters of the Abhidharma... this statement is reasonable": the author of the treatise indicates that the Sarvāstivāda school states that pleasure really exists apart from painful feeling, and this statement is reasonable.

22.73

As for "How is this known to be so?": this is a question. As for "First, one should counter-interrogate... it should be established that pleasure exists": this briefly makes three rounds of interrogation against the Sautrāntikas, demonstrating that there is real pleasure.

22.74

As for "If it is said that what is agreeable... because it is not agreeable": this takes up the defence by the Sautrāntikas and others. Since at the time of detachment the noble ones become revulsed, and what was agreeable becomes disagreeable again, it is clear that the proposition that pleasant feeling lacks reality is established.

22.75

As for "It is not so; the agreeable... there is a real pleasant feeling": this is the Sarvāstivāda's refutation. It is understandable from the text.

22.76

As for "However, when the World-Honoured One said... is not truly definitive": from here on, the Sarvāstivāda resolves the three sūtras cited by the Sautrāntikas and others. This resolves the first sūtra. As for the sūtra stating that all feelings are nothing but suffering, the Buddha said: "Relying on the impermanence of all conditioned things and their deterioration, I spoke with implicit intent that all feelings are nothing but suffering." If one relies on impermanence, feeling is said to be the suffering of suffering and the suffering of conditioned existence; if one relies on deterioration, feeling is said to be the suffering of suffering and the suffering of deterioration. Thus one knows that this sūtra only relies on the two types—the suffering of conditioned existence and the suffering of deterioration—in stating that feeling is suffering, and does not state this relying on the suffering of suffering. Therefore the *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Thus one knows that this sūtra speaks relying on two sufferings, and does not utter the statement that all are suffering relying on the suffering of suffering." Another interpretation: Impermanence and deterioration are both the suffering of conditioned existence, since it says that all feelings are nothing but suffering. If it spoke of the suffering of deterioration, it would apply solely to pleasant feeling, and would not extend to painful and neutral [feeling]. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "That which extends to the suffering of deterioration is precisely the suffering of conditioned existence that is deterioration and impermanence within the suffering of conditioned existence; it is not the suffering of deterioration among the three sufferings." From "If because..." downward, it shows that there are three feelings. The statement that feelings are all suffering relies on an implicit statement showing that there is another intent; it is not truly definitive. When stating that there are three feelings, it does not speak with an implicit intent; hence it is known that it is definitive that there are really three feelings.

22.77

As for "Furthermore, a sūtra says... view pleasure as suffering": this resolves the second sūtra. When the sūtra says that one should view pleasant feeling as suffering, this suffering is precisely the suffering of conditioned existence, which is impermanence, and the suffering of deterioration, which is decay. Pleasant feeling has two aspects: first, it has the nature of pleasure; second, it has the nature of suffering. With respect to viewing the faults of pleasure, the Buddha did not urge viewing [them as pleasure]; with respect to the benefit of viewing suffering, the Buddha therefore urged viewing [it as suffering]; it is not that there is no pleasure. Another interpretation: Impermanence and deterioration are both the suffering of conditioned existence.

22.78

As for "How is it known that its intrinsic characteristic is pleasure?": the Sautrāntikas and others ask. How is it known that the entity of the intrinsic characteristic of this pleasant feeling is pleasure, and that its nature is not painful feeling and not subsumed under the suffering of suffering?

22.79

As for "As a verse says... therefore it is said that feelings are all suffering": the Sarvāstivāda replies. In the verse, it only relies on the suffering of conditioned existence, which is non-eternity, and the suffering of deterioration, which is decay, to say that feelings are all suffering, and does not say that feelings are all suffering relying on the suffering of suffering; hence it is known that there is separately an intrinsic nature of pleasant feeling. If the nature of pleasure were suffering, why would one not also view it through the suffering of suffering? Another interpretation: Impermanence and deterioration are both the suffering of conditioned existence.

22.80

As for "Furthermore, a sūtra says... therefore it becomes an inversion": this resolves the third sūtra, first laying out three sections and second taking them up and explaining them separately. This lays out the sections. When the sūtra says that taking suffering to be pleasure is an inversion, this is spoken with a particular intent: because worldly beings exclusively imagine pleasure first with respect to pleasant feelings, second with respect to exquisite sensual desires, and third with respect to a portion of pleasure in the three realms of existence, it therefore becomes an inversion; it is not that imagining a minor pleasure is termed an inversion.

22.81

As for "That is, pleasant feelings... therefore it becomes an inversion": this explains the first section. That is, although pleasant feelings by way of their intrinsic characteristic are pleasurable by nature and are not the suffering of suffering, by another way of explanation they also have the nature of the suffering of deterioration and the suffering of conditioned existence. Worldly beings solely view them as pleasure and do not view them as suffering; therefore it becomes an inversion.

22.82

As for "Exquisite sensual objects... therefore it becomes an inversion": this explains the second section. Exquisite sensual objects are slightly conducive to pleasant feeling, but are largely conducive to the suffering of conditioned existence and of deterioration. Worldly beings solely view them as pleasure and do not view them as suffering; therefore it becomes an inversion.

22.83

As for "The realms of existence are also like this": this explains the third section. The three realms of existence are also like this: they are slightly conducive to pleasant feeling, but largely conducive to the suffering of conditioned existence and of deterioration; worldly beings solely view them as pleasure and do not view them as suffering; therefore it becomes an inversion.

22.84

As for "Therefore, not by this... the proposition that [pleasure] lacks reality is established": this is the conclusion. Therefore, one cannot, on the basis of these three sūtras cited, establish the proposition that pleasant feeling lacks reality.

22.85

As for "If the intrinsic characteristic of feeling... what superior benefit is there?": this questions the Sautrāntikas and others once more.

22.86

As for "If it is said that the World-Honoured One... because none are not suffering": this takes up the defence and interrogates to refute it. If it is said that the World-Honoured One, with respect to a single painful feeling, spoke of three feelings in accordance with worldly conventions, this is not reasonable, because the Buddha implicitly spoke of feelings as being nothing but suffering. If spoken with implicit intent, feelings are all suffering; if spoken explicitly, feelings are of three kinds. Since he spoke exhaustively of the principle and explicitly stated that there are three, it is clearly known that speaking of three is not in accordance with worldly conventions.

22.87

As for "Furthermore, regarding the observation of the five feelings... and so forth in detail": the sūtra speaks of seeing the five feelings as they truly are; hence it is known that the statement of three feelings is not spoken in accordance with convention, because those three feelings subsume the five feelings. If the five feelings are real, the three feelings are also real. The three fetters are the view of individuality, adherence to rules and rituals, and doubt. By permanently abandoning these three, one attains the fruit of stream-entry. "And so forth in detail" means: furthermore, by abandoning and attenuating greed, anger, and delusion, one attains the fruit of once-returner; furthermore, by abandoning the five lower fetters, one attains the fruit of non-returner; furthermore, by abandoning all fetters, one attains the fruit of the aśaikṣa.

22.88

As for "Furthermore, how could the Buddha... an awareness of superior and other pleasures?": this questions them once again. Furthermore, how could the Buddha, with respect to a single painful feeling, distinguish and speak of three in accordance with worldly conventions? If it is said that the world, with respect to low, high, and middling suffering, in corresponding order gives rise to an awareness of pleasure with respect to low suffering, an awareness of suffering with respect to high suffering, and an awareness of equanimity with respect to middling suffering, and the Buddha spoke of the three—pleasure and the rest—in accordance with them, the reasoning is also not so. Why would there only be three types of suffering? Since pleasure also has three types, one should, with respect to the three sufferings of low and other grades, give rise only to an awareness of superior and other pleasures. That is, with respect to low suffering one would only give rise to an awareness of superior pleasure, with respect to middling suffering one would only give rise to an awareness of middling pleasure, and with respect to high suffering one would only give rise to an awareness of low pleasure, and should not give rise to an awareness of equanimity. The import of the objection here is: if suffering and pleasure each have three, there should be no awareness of equanimity, but only awarenesses of suffering and pleasure. Another interpretation: Since pleasure also has three, one should, with respect to the three sufferings of low and other grades, only give rise to an awareness of superior and other pleasures, and not give rise to an awareness of suffering or an awareness of equanimity. Furthermore, the *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Furthermore, because pleasure also has the three grades of low and the rest, one should not say that pleasure is solely low suffering."

22.89

As for "Furthermore, when experiencing an extraordinary... because none at all exists": this raises an objection based on facts. Furthermore, when experiencing the pleasure produced by an excellent object, what low suffering is there with respect to which an awareness of pleasure arises? If you accept that there is low suffering at that time, such low suffering has already ceased in the past or has not yet arisen in the future; there should then be an awareness of supreme pleasure, because at this stage no suffering at all exists.

22.90

As for "When experiencing sensual pleasure, the interrogation is also like this": this is an explanation by analogy. When experiencing sexual pleasure, the interrogation is also like this, which can be understood following the preceding.

22.91

As for "Furthermore, low-grade feeling... the three feelings of pleasure and the rest": this raises an objection in terms of grades and meditative stages. When a low-grade painful feeling is present before one, it is admitted to be a pleasant feeling, being clear and distinctly graspable. When a middling painful feeling is present before one, it is called a neutral feeling, not being clearly grasped. How could this be reasonable? Furthermore, because pleasure is said to exist in the lower three dhyānas of the form realm, there should be low suffering there. In the clear definition of the three feelings, joy (prīti) is also called pleasure (sukha), hence it extends through the three dhyānas. In the five stages above the fourth dhyāna and beyond, neutral feeling is said to exist, so there should be middling suffering. If meditation is superior, suffering increases—how could that be reasonable? The concluding refutation can be known.

22.92

As for "Furthermore, a sūtra says... a slight portion of real pleasure": this cites a sūtra as proof once more. As the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, fascicle sixty, says: "Question: There are also dharmas that are receptive vessels of pleasure. As a sūtra says: 'Mahānāman, you should know! If form were exclusively suffering and not pleasure, not accompanied by pleasure, and not attended by any slight portion of pleasure and joy, no sentient beings would be attached to form for the sake of seeking pleasure. Mahānāman, you should know! Because form is not exclusively suffering, is also pleasure, is also accompanied by pleasure, and is attended by a slight portion of pleasure and joy, sentient beings become attached to form for the sake of seeking pleasure.' The same is stated in full up to the aggregate of consciousness (Explanation: 'not accompanied by pleasure' means not conforming and increasing; 'not attended by any slight portion of pleasure and joy')." The sūtra says that sentient beings are greedily attached to pleasure and the like; hence it is known that there is definitely a slight portion of real pleasure.

22.93

As for "Thus, having first explained... also cannot establish proof": from here on, it demonstrates that rational proof also cannot be established. Intending to refute their reasoning, it concludes what came before and introduces what follows.

22.94

As for "First, because the causes of pleasure... is established as a definite principle": from here on is the first refutation: that causes of pleasure are indefinite. The causes of suffering and pleasure are definite as causes due to the assembly of internal and external causes and conditions being different before and after, not merely due to the external object. "Basis" means the basis of the physical body. "State" means the earlier and later states. "Distinction" means differing before and after. Or "adverse cause" means a cause that does not ripen pleasantly. The remaining text and metaphors can be understood upon reflection.

22.95

As for "Furthermore, in the three dhyānas... because it can produce suffering": this raises an objection concerning the higher stages, demonstrating that causes of pleasure are definite. "Three dhyānas" refers to the lower three dhyānas. The remaining text can be understood.

22.96

As for "Furthermore, what they say... should be stated following the preceding": this refutes the second point, that remedying suffering produces pleasure. Furthermore, what they say about an awareness of pleasure arising only when suffering is remedied has already been refuted in the preceding text on low suffering producing pleasure. That is, when experiencing the pleasure produced by an excellent object, what suffering does it remedy that an awareness of pleasure arises? Even granting that it remedies coarse suffering at that time, this subtle suffering that remedies it has already ceased in the past or has not yet arisen in the future, so at that time an awareness of supreme pleasure should instead arise. Furthermore, while in the desire realm it might be possible to remedy coarse suffering and imagine subtle suffering to be pleasure, what suffering does the pleasure in dhyāna remedy that it can arise? Such refutations should be stated following what was said above regarding low suffering producing pleasure.

22.97

As for "Furthermore, what they say... should be known to be likewise": this is the third refutation, concerning the shifting of suffering producing pleasure. Furthermore, regarding their claim that an awareness of pleasure only arises upon the shifting of suffering, like shifting a load between shoulders: when this bodily state first shifts the load to the shoulder, it is truly able to produce pleasure, and up until the time before this bodily state ceases, pleasure will certainly arise; once it ceases, it is not so. If it were otherwise, after this initial stage pleasure should increasingly grow, because suffering gradually diminishes. However, when it has been shifted for a long time, although suffering gradually diminishes, pleasure does not arise; therefore it is known that pleasant feeling is not low suffering. Shifting the body's four postures in this way, where pleasure arises and weariness is dispelled at the initial stage of shifting, should be known to be likewise.

22.98

Regarding "If initially there is no suffering ... how could the awareness of suffering arise?": The Sautrāntikas and others ask: If initially there is no suffering, why in the final state should an awareness of suffering suddenly arise? It is precisely because in the initial state suffering is subtle and unperceived, and subsequently suffering gradually increases, that one is only then able to perceive suffering.

22.99

Regarding "Owing to bodily alteration ... sweet and sour tastes arise": The Sarvāstivādins reply: Owing to the bodily alteration, the preceding and succeeding states are distinct and different; in the preceding state pleasure arises, and in the subsequent state suffering arises. It is like the distinct differences of subsequent states in wine and the like: initially a sweet taste arises, and subsequently a sour taste arises; it is not that [the latter] already existed previously and only then arose.

22.100

Regarding "Therefore, pleasant feeling is logically proven to be truly existent": This is a specific conclusion. Therefore, pleasant feeling, as I explain it, is truly existent, and according to reason it is also established.

22.101

Regarding "From this it is definitely known ... is called suffering according to what is appropriate": This is a general conclusion. From the scriptural passages and reasoning explained above, showing that feeling is not entirely suffering and that there is also a small amount of real pleasure, it is definitely known that all sāsrava conditioned forces, being united with the three types of suffering, are called suffering according to what is appropriate; it is not merely unpleasant feeling that is called suffering.

22.102

Regarding "The intrinsic nature of these suffering conditioned forces is also called the truth of the origin": Next, the second [section] clarifies the truth of the origin. The Sarvāstivāda states its tenet: the intrinsic nature of these sāsrava suffering conditioned forces is also called the truth of the origin, because it can produce results.

22.103

Regarding "This statement definitely [contradicts scripture] ... because craving is [stated as] the origin": The Sautrāntikas raise an objection, showing that this statement contradicts the sūtras.

22.104

Regarding "Because the sūtra refers to what is preeminent ... are also the truth of the origin": The Sarvāstivāda reconciles the sūtra. Because the sūtra refers to what is preeminent, it states that craving is the origin; in truth, all remaining sāsrava phenomena are also the truth of the origin. In stating that craving is preeminent, it is preeminent in moistening rebirth and the like.

22.105

Regarding "By what is such a principle proven and known?": The Sautrāntikas ask: By what is such a principle—that all sāsrava phenomena are the truth of the origin—proven and known?

22.106

Regarding "In other sūtras ... explained in accordance with the characteristics of phenomena": The Sarvāstivāda replies: Other sūtras also state other phenomena to be the origin, and gāthās do not state only craving to be the cause, but also state karma and ignorance to be the causes that bring about future conditioned forces. Therefore, we know that the truth of the origin is not merely craving. Furthermore, a sūtra speaks of five kinds of seeds: first, roots; second, stems; third, branches; fourth, joints; and fifth, seeds. These specific names are metaphors for consciousness with grasping. Grasping is defilement; because consciousness possesses grasping, it is called consciousness with grasping, just as one speaks of sāsrava consciousness. Furthermore, in that sūtra it speaks of placing the five kinds of seeds in the earth element; these specific names are metaphors for the four stations of consciousness. The seeds and the field together produce sprouts and the like, and both are causes. Consciousness and the four stations of consciousness are both capable of producing results, and both are called the truth of the origin. Therefore, we know that the truth of the origin is not merely craving. Another explanation: The five kinds of seeds are metaphors for the consciousnesses of the five destinies. Placing them in the earth element is a metaphor for the four stations of consciousness. Both can produce results and both are the truth of the origin. Therefore, what the sūtra states about craving being the truth of the origin is an intentional statement, not the definitive meaning. The Abhidharma explains in accordance with the characteristics of phenomena, stating that all sāsrava phenomena are the truth of the origin.

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俱舍論記 — Classical Chinese