俱舍論記 26.53

26.53

Regarding "This is not logical ... knowledge of the path (mārga-jñāna)": the Vaibhāṣikas refute them. This is not logical: if defiled minds were associated with torpor (middha), they would have to apply to both gathered and distracted—gathered because of torpor, and distracted because of defilement. Furthermore, it would contradict what is stated in the root treatise, the Jñānaprasthāna: "Knowing the gathered mind as it truly is fully possesses four knowledges, namely: dharma knowledge (dharma-jñāna), subsequent knowledge (anvaya-jñāna), conventional knowledge (saṃvṛti-jñāna), and knowledge of the path (mārga-jñāna)." Furthermore, the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 190, says: "Contracted mind: knowing the contracted mind as it truly is possesses these four knowledges, namely, dharma knowledge, subsequent knowledge, conventional knowledge, and knowledge of the path. Distracted mind: knowing the distracted mind as it truly is possesses this one knowledge, namely, conventional knowledge. This applies appropriately as before." A preceding fascicle of the Mahāvibhāṣā explains: "Question: Why is knowledge of the minds of others (paracitta-jñāna) not mentioned here? Answer: Knowledge of the minds of others knows the minds and mental factors of another's continuity. Here, knowing as it truly is knows the minds and mental factors of one's own continuity; therefore it is not mentioned. Furthermore, knowledge of the minds of others knows present minds and mental factors; here, knowing as it truly is knows past minds and mental factors." This is explained extensively as in that work. It also says: "Question: Why are knowledge of suffering and knowledge of the origin also not mentioned here? Some say: Here suffering and origin should also be mentioned, and that they are not mentioned should be understood as indicating that this meaning is incomplete. Some say: Knowledge of suffering and origin is knowledge whose aspect is disgust; here, knowing as it truly is is knowledge whose aspect is aspiration, therefore they are not mentioned. Some say: Knowledge of suffering and origin takes objects of disgust as intentional objects; here, knowing as it truly is takes objects of aspiration as intentional objects." This is explained extensively as in that work. It also says: "Knowledge of destruction (kṣaya-jñāna) and knowledge of non-arising (anutpāda-jñāna) are not mentioned because this is the skandha on view (dṛṣṭi-skandha), which speaks only of knowledges whose nature is view; they are not knowledges whose nature is view, hence they are not mentioned." The text of the Mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra does not explicitly exclude knowledge of cessation, because it does not know the mind, which is beyond verbal formulation. If sleep is said to be the gathered mind, then according to the text of the Mahāvibhāṣā, it should only be said to be known by a single conventional knowledge; how could it be said to be known by four knowledges? The reviewer in the Mahāvibhāṣā refutes it in the same way as this treatise.