俱舍論記 26

English (machine translation) 26

Language: English

26.2

Chapter 7: Exposition of Knowledge (Jñāna-nirdeśa), Part 1

Regarding the "Exposition of Knowledge" (Jñāna-nirdeśa): decisive determination and repeated cognizing are called "knowledge" (jñāna); because this chapter explains it extensively, it is called an "exposition." As for why the Chapter on Knowledge is explained next: the preceding chapter explained the result, whereas this chapter explains the cause; because the cause is intimately connected to the result, knowledge is analyzed next.

26.4

"At the beginning of the preceding chapter it was said ... is there knowledge that is not view?" Within this chapter there are two major sections: first, explaining the distinctions among the knowledges; second, explaining the virtues accomplished through knowledge. Within the explanation of the distinctions among the knowledges: first, explaining the distinctions among patience, knowledge, and view; second, explaining the distinct characteristics of the ten knowledges; third, explaining the cognitive aspects (ākāra) of the ten knowledges; fourth, analyzing knowledge through various approaches. This is the first, explaining the distinctions among patience, knowledge, and view. It takes up the previous passage to raise the question. At the beginning of the preceding Chapter on Noble Persons (Pudgala-nirdeśa), in the stage of the path of seeing, the eight patiences and eight knowledges were stated; later in that chapter, among the eight noble paths, right view was again stated, and among the ten aśaikṣa dharmas, right knowledge was again stated. Is there patience that is not knowledge? Is there knowledge that is not view?

26.5

"The verse states: ... are all knowledge; six are by nature views," in the verse's reply, the first two lines and "the remaining two" are explained in terms of the anāsrava. "Sāsrava discernment (prajñā)" and the final line are analyzed in terms of the sāsrava. Patience applies to both ordinary beings and noble ones; the word "noble" excludes ordinary beings. Although this patience is discernment, it is not knowledge. Generally speaking, there are briefly four kinds of patience (kṣānti): when forbearance toward insults is called patience, it takes non-anger as its nature; when endurance of suffering is called patience, it takes vigor (vīrya) as its nature; when assent and receptivity are called patience, it takes faith (śraddhā) as its nature; when examination of dharmas is called patience, it takes discernment (prajñā) as its nature. The patience spoken of here has discernment as its nature. Generally speaking, there are briefly two kinds of view (dṛṣṭi): first, deliberation is called view, which has discernment as its nature; second, visual illumination is called view, which refers to the eye faculty and the ten knowledges, since by nature they all function to illuminate the object before them. The view spoken of here is deliberation called view; therefore the knowledges of destruction (kṣayajñāna) and non-arising (anutpādajñāna) are said not to be views. The rest is as in the prose commentary.

26.6

"The treatise says: ... because it is of the nature of deliberation," this explains the first line. In summary, there are two kinds of discernment: first, sāsrava; second, anāsrava. Only anāsrava discernment is established with the title "noble," because it can truly and correctly contemplate the four truths; therefore it is called noble. Although sāsrava discernment also contemplates the truths, because it is not distinct and clear it is not called noble. Within noble discernment, the eight patiences are not of the nature of knowledge. Decisive determination is called knowledge; doubt is hesitation, and their intrinsic natures are mutually opposed. When the eight patiences arise, they are precisely concurrent with the acquisition of the doubt that they sever; at that time they are in direct opposition in the midst of proper severing; because [doubt] has not yet been severed, there is no decisive determination, and because there is no decisive determination, it is not called knowledge. It can be subsumed under the nature of view, because it is of the nature of deliberation. Although in the stage of the four dharma-patiences of one who has previously detached from desire one's own doubt is already severed, it is concurrent with the acquisition of doubt and belongs to the category of patience; hence it is also not knowledge. Although the various uninterrupted paths of ordinary beings severing defilements are concurrent with the acquisition of doubt, they are not true counteractive antidotes and not radically opposed, and can later regress; yet they still receive the name knowledge. Therefore the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 44, states: "Furthermore, because patience is concurrent with the acquisition of the doubt to be severed, it is not subsumed under knowledge. Even if it is not concurrent, it is of that category. Because the sāsrava uninterrupted path is not a true counteractive antidote, even though it is concurrent with the acquisition of doubt, it is also knowledge (end of treatise citation)." Question: Doubt obstructs decisive determination; when patience is concurrent with the acquisition of doubt, patience is not called knowledge. Ignorance obstructs deliberation; when patience is concurrent with the acquisition of delusion, patience should likewise not be called view. Explanation: Doubt possesses associated ignorance which aids the acquisition of doubt with strength to oppose patience; solitary ignorance lacks other defilements to aid it against patience, so when concurrent with its acquisition, it can still be called view. If one says that there is also associated ignorance, what is now called 'aiding' refers to a different moment. Another explanation: Re-contemplation is called knowledge; the statement that it has 'not yet been severed' indicates that it has not yet repeatedly cognized. Thus the Mahāvibhāṣā states: 'Question: Why are the various anāsrava patiences not knowledges? Answer: Because they have not yet repeatedly contemplated the viewed objects. That is, from beginningless time they have not seen the four noble truths with anāsrava true discernment; now, although seeing them for the first time, they have not yet re-contemplated them, hence they are not called knowledge; only when homogeneous discernment repeatedly contemplates the object does it become knowledge.' Moreover, Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 196, states: 'This reveals that the various patiences arise concurrently with the acquisitions of the doubt they sever; having not yet repeatedly and definitively determined, they do not obtain the name of knowledge.'"

26.7

"The knowledge of exhaustion and the knowledge of non-arising […] because they do not reflect": this explains the second verse-quarter. Among noble wisdom, the two kinds—the knowledge of exhaustion (kṣayajñāna) and the knowledge of non-arising (anutpādajñāna)—are knowledges because they are decisive, or because they re-cognize. They are not of the nature of views because the seeking mind has already ceased and they do not reflect.

26.8

"The remainder all partake […] because they are of the nature of reflection": this explains the phrase "the remaining two" in the third verse-quarter. Excluding the preceding eight patiences and the knowledges of exhaustion and non-arising, all the other noble wisdoms individually partake of both natures, knowledge and view. Because they have already severed their own doubt, they are decisive; or because they re-cognize, they are called knowledges; and because they are of the nature of reflection, they are called views.

26.9

"All defiled wisdom […] worldly right view make six": this explains "defiled wisdom" and the following verse-quarter. Because all defiled wisdoms are decisive, they are all subsumed under the nature of knowledge. Among them, six are explained as also being of the nature of view because they are of the nature of reflection: namely, the five defiled views such as the view of selfhood, together with the worldly right view associated with the mental consciousness, making six. Question: If patience is concomitant with the possession of doubt and therefore patience is not called knowledge, then the wisdom that arises together with doubt should likewise not be called knowledge. Explanation: The wisdom concomitant with doubt is concordant with it, having the same intentional object, and being decisive regarding the object, it is also called knowledge. Thus the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 106, says: "Question: Why is it called knowledge? What does knowledge mean? Answer: The meaning of decisiveness is the meaning of knowledge. Question: If so, then the wisdom associated with doubt should not be called knowledge, because it is not determinate regarding the intentional object. Answer: That too is knowledge, because for a single moment it is also determinate regarding the intentional object. However, in this mental congeries the force of doubt is predominant, causing the mind to vacillate indecisively regarding the object across many moments; thus it is called a congeries of doubt. Just as samādhi remains constantly upon an object for a single moment, yet if at times it is associated with restlessness, it causes the mind to shift across many moments regarding the object and is called distraction." Another explanation is that because all defiled wisdoms involve re-cognition, they are all subsumed under the nature of knowledge; views are as explained before. Thus the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 44, says: "There is no sentient being who, since beginningless time, has not repeatedly observed all objects with defiled wisdom; therefore defiled wisdoms are all subsumed under knowledge" (end of śāstra passage). Question: The wisdom associated with the five [sense] consciousnesses discerns separate objects moment by moment; since it does not re-cognize, it should not be called knowledge. Explanation: Although the wisdom associated with the five [sense] consciousnesses does not re-apprehend [in that moment], it is spoken of as re-apprehending in terms of its own category. The defiled mental consciousness has certainly apprehended those five objects previously; since the wisdom associated with the five [sense] consciousnesses now apprehends them again, it is termed re-cognition, and thus it is also called knowledge.

26.10

"Those that have thus been explained […] are all subsumed under the nature of wisdom": because noble wisdom and defiled wisdom of this sort are both capable of discerning the objects of focus, they are all subsumed under the nature of wisdom.

26.11

"How many kinds of knowledge are there? […] taking the truths of suffering and so forth as objects": below, this is the second [section], clarifying the distinctive characteristics of the various knowledges. Within this: first, clarifying their gradual increase up to ten; second, clarifying the distinction between exhaustion and non-arising; third, clarifying their establishment as ten; fourth, clarifying the shared counteragents of dharma[-knowledge] and subsequent [knowledge]. Within the first [section] on their gradual increase up to ten: first, clarifying the two knowledges and three knowledges; second, clarifying the increase from three to nine; third, clarifying the increase from nine to ten. This is the first, clarifying the two knowledges and three knowledges. "Knowledge is ten" answers the first question; the remainder answers the second question. Alternatively, within this verse, "knowledge is ten" states the general names and numbers, while the remaining text specifically clarifies the two knowledges and three knowledges.

26.12

"The treatise says […] taking the four truths as objects": the text of the treatise here is largely self-evident. Furthermore, the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 73, says: "The aforementioned defiled knowledge is collectively called conventional [knowledge]. Things such as pots and clothes are perishable by nature, revealing conventional worldly conceptions; hence they are called conventional. Because this knowledge predominantly grasps conventional objects and predominantly operates in accord with conventional worldly affairs, it is established from the predominant perspective as 'conventional knowledge'. It is not that it never grasps the ultimate truth or operates in accord with ultimate matters; yet because it is an object of craving and lacks the supreme capacity to extinguish internal afflictions, it is not uncontaminated. Alternatively, because it obscures transcendence of the world and generates the worldly, it obtains the name 'conventional'. Its intrinsic nature is non-knowledge, but knowledge follows and belongs to it, and thus receives that name of knowledge; the intention is to show that this name designates defiled knowledge." This is explained in detail as in that text.

26.13

"Regarding these […] the first are solely of suffering and origination [and are] subsequent": this is the second [part], clarifying the increase from three to nine.

26.14

"The treatise says […] the four knowledges of cessation and path": this explains the upper two verse-quarters. In the preceding three knowledges, through the difference in objects between dharma and subsequent [knowledges], they are further divided into four kinds. The Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 73, says: "For what reason does conventional knowledge also take suffering and so forth as objects and adopt the aspect of suffering and so forth, yet is not the knowledge of suffering and so forth? Because, having previously observed suffering and so forth with the aspects of suffering and so forth, at a later time it may again observe the objects of suffering and so forth as pleasure and so forth. Furthermore, after having obtained such conventional knowledge, doubt regarding the truths may subsequently manifest again."

26.15

"Six knowledges of this kind […] because they take [the skandhas of the summit of existence] as their domain": this explains the lower two verse-quarters. When these six knowledges—dharma[-knowledge], subsequent [knowledge], and the four truths—are subsumed under the stage of no-more-learning and are not of the nature of views, they are called the knowledge of exhaustion and the knowledge of non-arising. When these two knowledges occur later, they universally take the four truths as their objects, adopting the fourteen aspects. However, when these two knowledges first arise, they are solely subsequent [knowledges] of suffering and origination, because they take the skandhas of the summit of existence as their domain by adopting the six aspects of suffering and origination. Question: For what reason does the initial stage solely take the suffering and origination of the summit of existence as its object? Explanation: The suffering and origination of the summit of existence could not be severed since beginningless time. Having now severed them for the first time, one first takes them as object to bring about self-congratulation and solace. Question: Why do they not adopt the aspects of emptiness and non-self? Explanation: Because these two knowledges touch upon the conventional, meaning that after emerging from meditative contemplation, they form understandings such as 'my births [are exhausted]'. While within the preceding contemplation, they do not adopt the aspects of emptiness and non-self; this is the cause touching upon the result. Had they adopted emptiness and non-self within that preceding contemplation, the mind after emerging from contemplation would also not be able to form understandings such as 'my births [are exhausted]'.

26.16

"Is the domain of the diamond-like samādhi the same as this?": this is a question.

26.17

"In taking suffering and origination as objects it is the same; in taking cessation and path as objects it differs": this is the answer. As for the diamond-like samādhi, if it takes the suffering and origination of neither-conceptualization-nor-non-conceptualization as its object, it is the same; if it takes the cessation and path of the nine grounds as its object, it differs, because by taking the cessation and path of the three realms as objects, it is in all cases capable of severing those afflictions.

26.18

"Among those previously mentioned […] two, three, thought, all": this is the third [part], clarifying the increase from nine to ten.

26.19

"The treatise says […] the others are not so": this explains the upper two verse-quarters. Among the nine knowledges previously mentioned, there are the knowledges of dharma, subsequent, path, and conventional. They constitute the knowledge of another's mind: if one knows another's uncontaminated mind, one knows it through the knowledge of another's mind that is dharma, subsequent, or path[-knowledge]; if one knows another's defiled mind, one knows it through the conventional knowledge of another's mind. The other five are not so: because the uncontaminated knowledge of another's mind does not know defiled minds, it is not the knowledge of suffering or origination; cessation is unconditioned, so it is not the knowledge of cessation; and because the knowledge of another's mind is of the nature of a view, whereas the knowledges of exhaustion and non-arising are not of the nature of views, it is not the knowledge of exhaustion or non-arising.

26.20

"This knowledge regarding its objects […] refers to ground, faculty, and state": this explains the third and fourth verse-quarters. This is the opening of the section.

26.21

"'Ground' means that the knowledge of a lower ground does not know the mind of a higher ground": this explains specifically. Since the knowledge of a lower ground does not know the mind of a higher [ground], it follows by implication that it can know its own ground and lower grounds. All knowledges of lower grounds do not know the minds of higher grounds; but when knowing their own and lower grounds, there are distinctions. Thus the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 99, says: "Previously acquired defiled mental states and mental factors are of fifteen kinds that are the appropriate objects to be grasped by the knowledge of another's mind: namely, the desire realm and the four dhyānas each have low, middling, and superior grades of mental states and mental factors. There are twelve previously acquired defiled knowledges of another's mind: namely, the four dhyānas each have low, middling, and superior grades of the knowledge of another's mind. Herein, the low-grade previously acquired defiled knowledge of another's mind of the first dhyāna can know the three grades of the desire realm and the low-grade previously acquired defiled mental states and mental factors of the first dhyāna. The middling grade can know the three grades of the desire realm and the low and middling grades of the first dhyāna. The superior grade of previously acquired defiled mental states and mental factors can know the three grades of the desire realm and each of the three grades of previously acquired defiled mental states and mental factors of the first dhyāna. Progressing in this manner up to the superior grade of previously acquired defiled knowledge of another's mind of the fourth dhyāna, it can know the three grades of the desire realm and each of the three grades of previously acquired defiled mental states and mental factors of the four dhyānas. Just as the twelve kinds of previously acquired defiled knowledges of another's mind know the fifteen kinds of previously acquired defiled mental states and mental factors, the twelve kinds of not-previously-acquired defiled knowledges of another's mind knowing the fifteen kinds of not-previously-acquired defiled mental states and mental factors are likewise. Uncontaminated mental states and mental factors are of twelve kinds that are the appropriate objects to be grasped by the knowledge of another's mind. Uncontaminated knowledges of another's mind are also of twelve kinds: namely, the four dhyānas each have three grades. Herein, the low-grade uncontaminated knowledge of another's mind of the second dhyāna can know only the low-grade uncontaminated mental states and mental factors of the first dhyāna and the second dhyāna. The middling grade can know the low and middling grades of uncontaminated mental states and mental factors of the first dhyāna and the second dhyāna. The superior grade can know all three grades of uncontaminated mental states and mental factors of the first dhyāna and the second dhyāna. Progressing in this manner up to the superior grade of uncontaminated knowledge of another's mind of the fourth dhyāna, it can know all three grades of uncontaminated mental states and mental factors of each of the four dhyānas. Question: For what reason can both the low and middling grades of defiled knowledge of another's mind of a higher ground know the three grades of defiled mental states and mental factors of a lower ground, whereas the low and middling grades of uncontaminated knowledge of another's mind of a higher ground cannot know the middling and superior grades of uncontaminated mental states and mental factors of a lower ground? Answer: Defiled and uncontaminated mental states and mental factors are established differently. Defiled mental states and mental factors are established based on the continuum: within the continuum of a single person, one possesses the three grades of defiled mental states and mental factors. Uncontaminated mental states and mental factors are established based on the grade of faculties: within the continuum of a single person, one does not possess two grades of uncontaminated mental states and mental factors, let alone possessing all three. Since their establishment is different, what they know differs accordingly." Furthermore, the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 73, says: "How can it be said that a single pudgala achieves the nine-grade path to sever the nine grades of afflictions? This distinction in the path is not a difference in faculties. Because the causes gradually mature, subsequent paths progressively increase, and sequentially they cause the severing of many grades of afflictions. Alternatively, each spiritual disposition has nine grades; possessing one set of nine grades necessarily precludes possessing the others. Therefore, the earlier and later statements do not contradict each other." Furthermore, the Mahāvibhāṣā says: "Question: Regarding the fruition-of-mastery mental states and mental factors of the four dhyānas in the desire realm, how many kinds can the knowledge of another's mind of the first dhyāna know? Some say: It can know four kinds. Why? Because they are all subsumed under the desire realm. Others say: It can only know the fruition-of-mastery of the first dhyāna, not the other three. Why? Just as it does not know the cause, so it is with the fruit." Furthermore, the Mahāvibhāṣā says: "Question: Which ground's knowledge can know the mental states and mental factors of the intermediate dhyāna? Some say: The superior knowledge of the first dhyāna can know them. Others say: The low knowledge of the second dhyāna can know them. The evaluation states: It should be said that all three grades of knowledge of the first dhyāna can know them. Why? Because they are subsumed under the same ground (explanation: this temporarily speaks of the first dhyāna; in reality, the second dhyāna and so on can also know them)." Furthermore, the Mahāvibhāṣā says: "Regarding the previously acquired defiled mental states and mental factors of the Tathāgata, whenever the Buddha wishes for another to know them, they know them immediately." This is explained extensively as in that text.

26.22

"'Faculty' refers to liberation through faith […] the minds of those in superior states": since one cannot know superior faculties and superior states, it follows by implication that one can know one's own faculties and lower faculties, and one's own state and lower states.

26.23

"This knowledge does not know […] as its intentional object": among the three times, it only knows the present function of another's mind and so forth; because the past and future lack [present] function, it cannot know them.

26.24

Regarding "Moreover, the dharma and subsequent categories ... because they take [the antidotes] as their objective domains": this explains the fifth line. Because dharma knowledge takes as its objective domain the antidote to the entirety of the desire realm, and because subsequent knowledge takes as its objective domain the antidote to the entirety of the upper realms, dharma knowledge and subsequent knowledge do not take each other as objective domains. Although the dharma knowledges of cessation and the path can also remedy the defilements abandoned through cultivation in the upper realms, they are not the complete remedy, because the dharma knowledges of suffering and origination, being dharma knowledges belonging to the path of seeing, do not remedy the upper realms.

26.25

Regarding "This knowledge of others' minds ... the objective domain of this knowledge": below this, the final three lines are explained. This knowledge of others' minds knows the particular characteristics of others, which belongs to the relaxed path of cultivation; it does not exist in the path of seeing, because in that path one contemplates the principles of the truths collectively and operates with extreme rapidity. Although it lacks both cultivation through practice and cultivation through acquisition, both [kinds of mind] can nevertheless become the objective domain of this knowledge. Or, because it contemplates the principles of the truths collectively, it lacks cultivation through practice; and because it operates with extreme rapidity, it lacks cultivation through acquisition.

26.26

Regarding "If sentient beings ... does not know the path of seeing": a śrāvaka, through either superior preparatory practice or middling preparatory practice, upon bringing preparatory practice to completion, is able to know the first two mental moments of the path of seeing. This is stated provisionally with respect to the initial [stages], speaking only of two moments. The subsequent thirteen moments may also all become the objective domain of the knowledge of others' minds. Question: Having known the first two mental moments, why does one not immediately know the subsequent-category mind and so forth of the third moment? The explanation is: dharma and subsequent are not the same, and their objective domains are distinct; hence one cannot know it. If, in order to further know the subsequent-category mind, one separately undertakes preparatory practice, it takes thirteen moments to bring preparatory practice to completion. By then, the other person has already crossed over to the sixteenth mind; although one knows this mind, it is no longer the path of seeing.

26.27

Regarding "The rhinoceros-like [pratyekabuddha] ... the dharma-category ... up to the fifteenth mind": a pratyekabuddha can know three mental moments of the path of seeing; having known the first and second moments, by further employing five moments of mind to cultivate preparatory practice, he knows the eighth mind. Because this is accomplished merely by inferior preparatory practice, this refers provisionally to one modality of knowing these three moments; the remaining twelve moments can also all become the objective domain of [the knowledge of] others' minds. Question: Having known the eighth mind, why does he not further employ five moments of mind as preparatory practice to know the fourteenth mind? The explanation is: he could if he wished to know it. That he does not know it is because the minds in the stage of the path of seeing have two divisions in total: first, the dharma division, and second, the subsequent division. Knowing the first and second moments is the dharma division; knowing the eighth division is the subsequent division. Having fully known both, his mind rests, and therefore he does not seek to know further. Another explanation: even if he wished to know it, he could not. Initially cultivating preparatory practice, he knows the first two moments; secondly, again employing five moments of mind as preparatory practice, he knows the eighth mind; when it comes to cultivating preparatory practice a third time, his power is weak and inferior, and employing five or six moments of mind as preparatory practice cannot accomplish it. Another explanation: the preceding minds are somewhat inferior, so a preparatory practice of five minds is sufficient to enable knowing them; the subsequent minds are progressively superior, so employing five or six minds as preparatory practice does not enable knowing them. Another explanation: having known the first two moments, his intention was to know the third mind, the receptivity to the subsequent knowledge of suffering, with five minds of preparatory practice; when preparatory practice was completed, he took advantage of it to know the eighth mind, the subsequent knowledge of origination. Because the objective domains of that third and eighth minds—suffering and origination—are of one substance divided by the meaning of cause and effect, when knowing them it is easy; thus, although he could not know the third, he could know the eighth. Having known the eighth, wishing further to know the ninth mind, the receptivity to the dharma knowledge of cessation, he employed five minds as preparatory practice, but could not know the fourteenth mind, the dharma knowledge of the path. Because the objective domains of those two minds are each distinct—one takes the conditioned as its objective domain, and one takes the unconditioned as its objective domain, not being of one substance—knowing them is difficult, and therefore he cannot know it. Even if he employed six minds as his preparatory practice, he still could not know the fifteenth mind. Some say: a pratyekabuddha knows the first two moments, and with a further twelve moments as preparatory practice, knows the fifteenth mind. Furthermore, Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 73, states: "Regarding pratyekabuddhas, there are four theories. The first two theories are the same as this treatise. The latter two theories state: Some say the rhinoceros-like knows four moments, namely the first two minds, the eighth, and the fourteenth. This statement is reasonable. Why is this so? It is accepted that after knowing the first two mental moments, separated by only five moments, he knows the eighth mind. If he were to further cultivate preparatory practice for the dharma division, after the passage of five moments the preparatory practice should be accomplished; why not accept that he knows the fourteenth moment? Others also say: he knows four moments, namely the first two moments, and the eleventh and twelfth (the Nyāyānusāra intentionally contradicts this treatise, approving and adopting the third theory)." Furthermore, the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 99, also contains four theories, identical to the Nyāyānusāra, but without an arbiter's judgment.

26.28

Regarding "The World-Honoured One, when wishing to know ... can know all": when the World-Honoured One wishes to know, without relying on preparatory practice, he fully knows all fifteen mental moments of the path of seeing.

26.29

Regarding "Knowledge of exhaustion and knowledge of non-origination ... is named knowledge of non-origination": this is the second section, which clarifies the distinction between [the knowledges of] exhaustion and non-origination. It cites the root treatise to show the distinction between the two knowledges. Knowledge (jñāna) means decisive judgment, or it means knowing again. View (dṛṣṭi) means investigation, or it means direct illumination. Understanding (vidyā) means illumination. Awakening (bodhi) means awakening. Comprehension (adhigama) means penetrating comprehension. Wisdom (prajñā) means discerning selection. Light (prabhā) means the light of wisdom. Contemplation (vipaśyanā) means observation. The eight terms, beginning with knowledge, are all alternative names for wisdom. Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 73, says: "For what reason does the treatise, in the context of the knowledge of non-origination, again state: 'I have known suffering,' and so forth? In principle, it should only say 'I will not know it again,' and so forth, because the two modes of activity should not operate simultaneously. If they operate sequentially, since the former would not differ from the knowledge of exhaustion, it should not be stated repeatedly. It should be understood that this statement is intended to dispel doubt. For fear that someone might raise the doubt: 'Just as one who is liberated at [certain] times first produces the knowledge of exhaustion and later attains non-origination, so should it be accepted that one who is liberated without regard to time first produces non-origination and later attains the knowledge of exhaustion.' In order to show that in all cases the knowledge of exhaustion arises first, it therefore again first states the words 'I have known,' and so forth. Or, first stating only 'I have known,' and so forth, shows that one who is liberated at [certain] times possesses only the knowledge of exhaustion. Later repeating the words 'I have known,' and so forth, shows that for one who is liberated without regard to time, after exhaustion, non-origination arises. Therefore, although it is repeated, there is no fault. As for 'knowledge of non-origination,' what is meant by 'non-origination'? The masters of the Nyāyānusāra say: it refers to analytical cessation (apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha); because there is non-origination, this knowledge is able to arise; because the knowledge relies on non-origination, it is named the knowledge of non-origination. Although cessation is eternal, its acquisition is not eternal; only when one acquires that cessation does this knowledge operate; it is necessarily due to the arising of acquisition that there is said to be cessation, and at the stage where there is cessation, this knowledge arises. Or, the word 'non-origination' designates the acquisition of that cessation, just as the acquisition of nirvāṇa is also named nirvāṇa, since the sūtra speaks of placing nirvāṇa in the mind. At the stage where there is that acquisition, this knowledge arises; because the knowledge relies on non-origination, it is named the knowledge of non-origination. Others raise this objection here: 'If relying on non-origination it is named the knowledge of non-origination, then the knowledge of non-origination takes a dharma that is not a truth as its objective domain; if so, what you say contradicts your own tenet, for the arising of undefiled wisdom takes only the four truths as its objective domain.' They make this objection without careful examination, for I have already stated above that only after emerging from contemplation does such discriminative knowledge arise. Or, this expression 'relies on' has the sense of a locative of existence, not a locative of the objective domain, just as with the knowledge of exhaustion. Or, it is accepted that this knowledge takes the acquisition of non-origination as its objective domain, and since this is subsumed under the truth of suffering, it is not a non-truth (end of the treatise text)."

26.30

Regarding "How can undefiled knowledge have such knowing?": this is a question. How can undefiled knowledge have such knowing, namely the understanding: "I have known suffering," and so forth?

26.31

Regarding "The Kaśmīra [masters say] ... the distinction between the two knowledges": this is the answer. The orthodox doctrine of the Sarvāstivāda is: emerging from the contemplation of the two knowledges of exhaustion and non-origination, within the subsequently attained defiled knowledge, one has such knowing as: "I have known suffering," and so forth. It is not that within undefiled contemplation one has such knowing; therefore, there is no fault. Because of the difference in the results of these two subsequently attained knowledges, it indicates the difference in the causes of the two knowledges in the preceding contemplation. Being induced by the two causes, they are their puruṣakāra-phala; this is differentiating the causes by means of the results. If there were no intervening minds, immediately following the knowledge of exhaustion there should be the understanding: "I have known suffering," and so forth; and immediately following the knowledge of non-origination there should be the understanding: "It should not be known again," and so forth. However, because they are intervened by the right view of an aśaikṣa and so forth, they arise only later.

26.32

Regarding "Some say that undefiled knowledge also has such knowing": this is the tenet of the western śramaṇas, the Sautrāntikas, and others. They say: there is undefiled knowledge that does not adopt the sixteen modes of activity, which also has such knowing as: "I have known suffering," and so forth.

26.33

Regarding "However, stating the word 'view' ... is also a view": this reconciles the text of the root treatise. In truth, because the knowledges of exhaustion and non-origination have brought investigation to rest, they are not views; but because in the root treatise, when explaining the ten knowledges, it says in each case the eight terms including knowledge and view, when coming to exhaustion and non-origination it still speaks of "view" simply for stylistic convenience. Another explanation: as for the knowledges of exhaustion and non-origination, if considered in terms of having brought investigation to rest, they are not called views; but because they operate as direct illumination upon the principles of the truths, they are also called views. For this reason, the root treatise also states: moreover, all knowledges are also views.

26.34

Regarding "How do these ten knowledges subsume one another?": this is a question.

26.35

Regarding "Conventional knowledge ... portions of six": this is the answer. Conventional knowledge subsumes the entirety of one knowledge—itself—and a portion of one, the knowledge of others' minds. Dharma knowledge and subsequent knowledge each subsume the entirety of one knowledge—themselves—and portions of seven: the knowledges of suffering, origination, cessation, the path, exhaustion, non-origination, and others' minds. The knowledges of suffering, origination, and cessation each subsume the entirety of one knowledge—themselves—and portions of four: dharma, subsequent, exhaustion, and non-origination. The knowledge of the path subsumes the entirety of one knowledge—itself—and portions of five: dharma, subsequent, exhaustion, non-origination, and others' minds. The knowledge of others' minds subsumes the entirety of one knowledge—itself—and portions of four: dharma, subsequent, the path, and conventional. The knowledges of exhaustion and non-origination each subsume the entirety of one knowledge—themselves—and portions of six: suffering, origination, cessation, the path, dharma, and subsequent.

26.36

Regarding "For what reason are the two knowledges established as ten?": below this is the third section, explaining the establishment of the ten knowledges. Question: For what reason are the two knowledges, defiled and undefiled, established as ten?

26.37

Regarding "The stanza says ... because of arising as cause": this is the answer. By reason of seven conditions, the two are established as ten. First, by intrinsic nature, conventional knowledge is established. Its essence is defiled, being a conventional dharma. This conventional knowledge does not have undefiled ultimate knowledge as its intrinsic nature. According to the preceding text, its name is also established from its objective domain. Therefore the preceding text says: the former defiled knowledge is collectively called conventional because it mostly grasps conventional objective domains such as jars. Second, by antidote, dharma knowledge and subsequent knowledge are established. Dharma knowledge can completely remedy the desire realm; subsequent knowledge can completely remedy the upper realms. Although the dharma knowledges of cessation and the path can also remedy defilements abandoned through cultivation in the upper realms, they do not do so completely. Third, by mode of activity, the knowledges of suffering and origination are established. Because the essences of the objective domains of these two knowledges do not differ, they are distinguished solely by the difference in the modes of activity that cognize them. By means of the four modes of activity, impermanence and so forth, the knowledge of suffering is established; by means of the four modes of activity, cause, origination, and so forth, the knowledge of origination is established. Another explanation: the modes of activity reside in the objective domain; although the essences of the objective domains of these two knowledges do not differ, based on the difference in modes of activity they are divided into suffering and origination. Another explanation: modes of activity pertain commonly to both the cognizing subject and the cognized domain. Because those eight kinds of modes of activity—impermanence and so forth—exist upon the objective domain, when the cognizing subject resembles those eight modes of activity, it is called the cognizing subject. Although the essences of the objective domains of these two knowledges do not differ, they are divided into two based on the modes of activity. Fourth, by mode of activity and objective domain, the knowledges of cessation and the path are established. Because the modes of activity of these two have a difference—one produces the four modes of activity of cessation and so forth, and the other produces the four modes of activity of the path and so forth. The three explanations of mode of activity should be understood by analogy with the preceding. Because the objective domains of these two have a difference—one takes the unconditioned as its objective domain, and one takes the conditioned as its objective domain. Due to the difference in modes of activity and the difference in objective domains, the knowledges of cessation and the path are established.

26.38

Fifth, knowledge of the minds of others is established by reason of preparatory application (prayogatas): its name is established from its preparatory application, and because the mind is primary, at the beginning it knows only the mind. Sixth, knowledge of exhaustion (kṣayajñāna) is established by reason of task completion (kṛtyānuṣṭhānataḥ): that is, because it arises first within the person of an arhat whose task is accomplished. Seventh, knowledge of non-arising (anutpādajñāna) is established by reason of completeness of causes (hetusāmagryataḥ): it arises having completely taken all noble paths—those of seeing, cultivation, and the path beyond training—as homogeneous causes (sabhāgahetu), and hence is called "completeness of causes." When the initial knowledge of exhaustion arises, although it has the noble paths of seeing and cultivation as causes, it does not yet have the noble path beyond training as a cause, and so is not called "completeness of causes." In the subsequent state of continuity, although it also has the noble path beyond training as a cause and should be called "completeness of causes," [the label] is stated in terms of the initial [moment]. Or alternatively, that knowledge of exhaustion does not arise having knowledge of non-arising as its cause, and so is not called "completeness of causes."

26.39

As for the passage from "As stated above..." to "...does it counteract the higher and the desire [realms]?": this is the fourth section, clarifying how the knowledge of phenomena and the subsequent knowledge counteract each other's realms in addition. It refers to the previous statement to raise a question: As stated above, knowledge of phenomena can completely counteract phenomena of the desire realm, and subsequent knowledge can completely counteract phenomena of the higher realms; is there any fraction of knowledge of phenomena that counteracts the higher realms? Is there any fraction of subsequent knowledge that counteracts the desire realm?

26.40

As for the passage from "The stanza states..." to "...none can counteract the desire [realm]": this is the answer. Knowledge of phenomena regarding cessation and the path, subsumed under the path of cultivation, can additionally counteract what is abandoned through cultivation in the higher realms. Because cessation and the path of the desire realm are superior to the phenomena of suffering and origination of the higher realms, observing the superior [aspect] of the lower can counteract the inferior [defilements] of the higher. Suffering and origination of the desire realm are coarse, while suffering and origination of the higher realms are subtle; observing the coarse cannot counteract the subtle, so knowledge of phenomena regarding suffering and origination does not counteract the cultivation defilements of the higher realms. Furthermore, once one has eliminated the enemies of one's own realm, one can additionally counteract the enemies of other realms; therefore, no subsequent knowledge can counteract the desire realm. Thus the *Nyāyānusāra* states: "Only when one's work in one's own realm has already been perfected may one additionally perform work for other realms. It is not the case that when the work of the various subsequent knowledges of one's own [realm] is accomplished while the work of the other is not yet accomplished, there is any need for assistance. Therefore, no subsequent knowledge counteracts the phenomena of the desire realm" (thus far the śāstra text). Furthermore, *Mahāvibhāṣā* 158 says: "Question: When one separates from the defilements abandoned through cultivation in the form and formless realms by means of the knowledge of phenomena regarding cessation and the path, is the unconditioned, undefiled acquisition of disjunction (visamyoga-prāpti) of those phenomena abandoned through cultivation in the form and formless realms subsumed under the category of knowledge of phenomena, or under the category of subsequent knowledge? If it is subsumed under the category of knowledge of phenomena, this is unreasonable, because those phenomena and their abandonment are known by subsequent knowledge. If it is subsumed under the category of subsequent knowledge, this is also unreasonable, because that abandonment and acquisition are realized by knowledge of phenomena. Some make this statement: that acquisition of disjunction is subsumed under the category of subsequent knowledge. Question: Are not that abandonment and acquisition realized by knowledge of phenomena? Answer: Although realized by knowledge of phenomena, they are known by subsequent knowledge. Other masters say: That undefiled acquisition of disjunction is subsumed under the category of knowledge of phenomena. Question: Are not those phenomena and their abandonment known by subsequent knowledge? Answer: Although known by subsequent knowledge, they are subsumed under knowledge of phenomena because they are realized by knowledge of phenomena. Critical appraisal: Here, the first explanation is good, because the category of subsequent knowledge is their uncommon and definitive counteragent."

26.41

As for the passage from "Among these ten knowledges..." to "...meaning excluding emptiness and non-self": this is the third section, clarifying the aspects (ākāra) of the ten knowledges. Within this, first is to clarify the aspects of the ten knowledges, second is to clarify their comprehensive subsumption, and third is to clarify the real entities of the grasper and the grasped. Here it clarifies the aspects of the ten knowledges.

26.42

As for the passage from "The commentary states..." to "...the four aspects": this explains the first line of the stanza. "Et cetera" means including the contemplation of fictive mental construct, etc. The rest of the text is understandable.

26.43

As for the passage from "In the knowledge of others' minds..." to "...does not observe ideation, etc.": this explains the second stanza. Although the undefiled knowledge of others' minds produces common characteristics, because it is an aspiring mode of activity, it can observe specifically. The rest of the text is understandable. Question: When knowing the undefiled mind of another, it produces the four aspects under the path; why, when knowing the defiled mind of another, does it not produce the eight aspects of suffering and origination? Explanation: Preparing to answer this question, three distinctions are briefly presented: first, stating ancient explanations; second, pointing out errors and fallacies; third, setting forth the correct meaning. Stating the ancient explanations: First, Master Yuān said: "Knowing the undefiled mind of another has the knowledge of the path as its preparatory application, and therefore it produces the four aspects of the path. Knowing the defiled mind of another does not take the knowledge of suffering and origination as its preparatory application, and for this reason does not produce the eight aspects of suffering and origination." Second, Master Nian of Wei said: "If, when knowing the undefiled mind of another, one produces the four aspects under the path, one knows the activity of the other's mind exhaustively. If, when knowing the defiled mind of another, one does not produce the eight aspects of suffering, etc., it is because knowing the activity of the other's mind is not exhaustive: knowing suffering does not know origination, and knowing origination does not know suffering; therefore it does not produce the eight aspects of suffering and origination." Third, Master Song of Pengcheng said: "The grasper and the grasped, the principle and the phenomenon, must correspond: since the grasped undefiled mind is a contemplation of principle, the grasping knowledge of others' minds must also be known by producing a contemplation of principle; therefore, knowing the undefiled mind of another produces the four aspects under the path. Since the grasped defiled mind is a contemplation of phenomena, the grasping knowledge of others' minds must also be known by a contemplation of phenomena; therefore, knowing the defiled mind of another does not produce the eight aspects of suffering and origination." Second, pointing out errors and fallacies: First, refuting Master Yuān: since the root treatise states that the eight knowledges of those in training can mutually serve as equal-and-immediate conditions (samanantarapratyaya), then saying that the knowledge of the path is the preparatory application for knowledge of others' minds—is that not contradictory? Second, refuting Master Nian of Wei: on the undefiled mind there are also four aspects; knowing one and not the rest is still not knowing exhaustively, so one should likewise not produce the aspects under the path. Third, refuting Master Song: since the defiled levels of heat, etc., produce contemplations of principle, the grasping knowledge of others' minds should also produce a contemplation of principle. If one says it is not a true contemplation of principle but an apparent contemplation of principle, then the knowledge of others' minds should also know it by producing an apparent contemplation of principle, not a contemplation of phenomena. Third, setting forth the correct meaning: The first explanation says: The undefiled mind is superior and difficult to know. The defiled knowledge of others' minds cannot know it; one must give rise to the undefiled before one can know it. Therefore, knowing the undefiled mind of another produces the four aspects under the path. The defiled mind is inferior and easy to know; since the defiled knowledge of others' minds can know it, one does not give rise to that undefiled knowledge of others' minds to know it. Why is that? The defiled knowledge of others' minds has been repeatedly cultivated since beginningless time, so it arises easily. The undefiled knowledge of others' minds has not been much cultivated since beginningless time, so it arises with difficulty. Because the defiled arises easily, when knowing the defiled mind of another, one still gives rise to the defiled knowledge of others' minds. Because the undefiled arises with difficulty, when knowing the defiled mind of another, one does not produce the contemplation of the eight aspects of suffering and origination. What arises easily is sufficient to know it; who would abandon the easy and follow the difficult? Question: Then it should only be the knowledge of others' minds of the first dhyāna that knows the mind of the desire realm, because it arises easily; the knowledge of others' minds of the second dhyāna and above should not be able to know the mind of another in the desire realm, because it arises with difficulty. Who would abandon the easy and follow the difficult? Explanation: When wishing to know the mind of the desire realm, one certainly does not deliberately give rise to the knowledge of others' minds of the second dhyāna and above to know it; rather, having entered the second dhyāna, etc., for some other purpose, relying on entering that absorption, one gives rise to that knowledge of others' minds to know the mind of the desire realm. Objection: Then it could also be that, having given rise to an undefiled mind for some other purpose, one gives rise to the undefiled knowledge of others' minds to know the defiled mind of another. Explanation: From an undefiled mind, giving rise to defiled knowledge of others' minds is easy, while giving rise to undefiled knowledge of others' minds is difficult. What arises easily is sufficient to know it, so one does not give rise to the difficult. Question: When entering the second dhyāna, etc., to know the mind of the desire realm, why does one not instead give rise to the knowledge of others' minds of the first dhyāna to know the mind of the desire realm, but gives rise to the second dhyāna, etc., to know the desire-realm mind? Explanation: Arising in its own stage is easy, so it arises in its own stage. Arising in a different stage is difficult, so one does not give rise to that of the first dhyāna. The second explanation says: An aspiring contemplation can allow specific cognition; therefore, knowing the undefiled mind of another produces the four aspects under the path. A repelled contemplation must seek to dispel generally; therefore, knowing the defiled mind of another does not produce the contemplation of the eight aspects of suffering and origination. Thus *Nyāyānusāra* 73 says: "That the undefiled mind and mental factors in another's body, being subtle and superior, are not the object of one's own defiled knowledge of others' minds is reasonable. For what reason can one's own undefiled knowledge of others' minds not know the defiled mind and mental factors of another? When undefiled knowledge arises regarding a defiled object, its aspect and object differ from this knowledge. That is to say, when undefiled knowledge observes a defiled object, it is necessarily a general observation with an aspect of repulsion; therefore, it definitely cannot specifically observe another's mind and mental factors to constitute knowledge of others' minds. Because when noble knowledges observe a defiled object, they necessarily produce deep repulsion toward the object, delighting in general renunciation and not delighting in specific observation. When observing the undefiled, because they produce aspiration and delight, having observed generally, they also delight in specific observation. Just as when someone sees or hears an unpleasant matter, upon generally observing it they abandon it and do not delight in specific observation; but regarding what is pleasant it is not so: having generally seen or heard it, they also delight in specific observation. Therefore, regarding another's defiled mind, etc., there is certainly no noble knowledge that specifically observes each one individually to constitute an undefiled knowledge of others' minds observing a defiled mind, because knowledge of others' minds definitely knows another's mind and mental factors individually. Is there not also the patience and knowledge regarding suffering and origination subsumed under the three applications of mindfulness? Although they exist, they do not observe merely a single phenomenon, because they observe multiple entities" (thus far the śāstra text).

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俱舍論記 — Classical Chinese