俱舍論記 7.26

7.26

"If so, the World-Honoured One ... should be unable to know" is the author's refutation. If so, when the World-Honoured One has not seen the prior limit of the past and present, he should be unable to know the posterior limit of the future. Furthermore, the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, fascicle one hundred and seventy-nine, states: "Question: How does the knowledge resulting from resolve know the future? Some say: Through past and present, it infers and knows the future. Just as a farmer, having sown seeds, infers and knows that such a fruit will certainly arise, so it is here. Others say: If so, the knowledge resulting from resolve would be inferential cognition (anumāna-jñāna), not direct perceptual cognition (pratyakṣa-jñāna). It should be said: This knowledge resulting from resolve does not depend on observing the cause to know the fruit, nor does it depend on observing the fruit to know the cause. Therefore, this knowledge is direct perceptual cognition, not inferential cognition."