俱舍論記 7

English (machine translation) 7

Language: English

7.2

Chapter Two: Exposition of the Faculties, Part Five.

"Having broadly explained causes, what are conditions (pratyaya)?": from here downward is the second major section, analyzing conditions. Within this: 1. generally clarifying the meaning of the four conditions; 2. specifically explaining the immediately antecedent [condition] (samanantara-pratyaya). Within the first section: 1. clarifying the real entities of the four conditions; 2. clarifying the functional operation of conditions; 3. clarifying the conditional arising of dharmas. From here downward clarifies the real entities of the four conditions, summing up the preceding and raising the question.

7.4

"The verse states: up to: 'predominance is the productive'" provides the answer. The first line presents the number and specifies the names; the second line explains the nature of the cause; the third and fourth lines explain the immediately contiguous; the fifth line explains the objective support; and the sixth line explains predominance. Furthermore, the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, fascicle 107, states: "Cause is like the principle of a seed. The immediately contiguous is like the principle of opening a way and giving place. The objective support is like the principle of leaning on a staff. Predominance is like the principle of non-obstruction." Question: Fascicle 16 of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* asks: "Question: Do the causes subsume the conditions, or do the conditions subsume the causes? Answer: They mutually subsume one another, in accordance with their particulars. That is to say, the preceding five causes are the cause-condition (hetu-pratyaya), while the productive cause (kāraṇa-hetu) is the remaining three conditions. There is [another] master who says: 'Conditions subsume causes, but causes do not subsume conditions. That is to say, the preceding five are the cause-condition, and the productive cause is the condition of predominance (adhipati-pratyaya). The immediately contiguous condition (samanantara-pratyaya) and the condition of objective support (ālambana-pratyaya) are not subsumed by cause.'" However, no critical arbiter is provided there. This treatise agrees with the latter statement of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. In explaining their mutual subsumption between these two accounts, is it stated in terms of entity (substance) or in terms of function? If it is stated in terms of entity, then the productive cause should subsume those four conditions, and the single condition of predominance should subsume those six causes, because both entities are extensive. If it is stated in terms of function, the functions of the six causes and the four conditions are each distinct; how could they subsume one another? The explanation says: The mutual subsumption of the six causes and four conditions has two meanings: first, explaining it in terms of entity; second, based on similarity of function. The first master of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* explains it in terms of entity: the cause-condition subsumes five [causes], while the productive [cause] subsumes three [conditions]; if considered in terms of the extensiveness of the productive [cause's] entity, it actually subsumes the four conditions, and because the entity of predominance is extensive, it can subsume the six causes. As to why it merely says that the productive subsumes three and predominance subsumes one: this master's intention is that in explaining subsumption by contrasting the six causes with the four conditions, it stops once it has exhausted the subsumed entities from one standpoint; therefore, he states that the cause-condition subsumes five and the productive [cause] subsumes three. Since outside of the productive cause there are the other five causes, and outside of the condition of predominance there are the other three conditions, in clarifying their mutual subsumption, he does not separately state that the productive subsumes four and predominance subsumes six. Question: If mutual subsumption is explained based on essential nature, essential nature is eternally existing; in that case, there would be no distinction between the six causes and the four conditions—how could they mutually subsume one another? Thus the *Mahāvibhāṣā* says: "I speak of function; what constitutes cause and result? The actual entities of all phenomena are eternally without change, because they are not causes and results." The explanation says: Considering that entities are changeless, causes and conditions are identical; taking entities according to their functions, distinctions are therefore stated. If one turns to the second master of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* and this treatise, they distinguish mutual subsumption based on similarity of function. If one speaks of the six causes and the four conditions, their functions are each distinct and do not mutually subsume one another. Yet the statement that the cause-condition subsumes five causes and predominance subsumes the productive cause is made by clarifying mutual subsumption based on similarity of function. Because the immediately contiguous and objective support conditions do not resemble causes, they are not subsumed by cause. Question: Among the productive causes, are the five causes beginning with production (janma) subsumed by the cause-condition among the four conditions, or are they subsumed by the condition of predominance? The explanation says: The five causes beginning with production are subsumed by the cause-condition. Therefore, when the orthodox authority in fascicle 17 of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* resolves the objection that "there is no time that is not a cause," he states: "One should say that that treatise was composed relying on the six causes, because the name 'cause' denotes and extends to the six causes." The explanation says: That passage conducts questions and answers on the basis of the cause-condition. Since the orthodox authority interprets the cause-condition as fully speaking of the six causes, we clearly know that the cause-condition also subsumes the five causes beginning with production within the productive cause. Furthermore, fascicle 131 of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* states: "As how many conditions do the primary elements serve for derived matter? Answer: Cause and predominance. 'Cause' refers to the cause of production, the cause of reliance, the cause of standing, the cause of maintenance, and the cause of nourishment; 'predominance' refers to not hindering production and merely being without obstruction (The explanation says: that passage conducts questions and answers based on the four conditions; 'cause' is precisely the cause-condition among the four conditions. From this we clearly know that the five causes beginning with production are subsumed by the cause-condition)." Question: If according to this explanation the cause-condition also subsumes a small portion of the productive [cause], and the productive [cause] also subsumes a small portion of the cause-condition, why is this not stated in this treatise and the *Mahāvibhāṣā* when explaining mutual subsumption? The explanation says: In principle, they indeed subsume them; that it is not stated is because it is not total subsumption, so it is omitted for brevity. Another explanation says: The five causes beginning with production are subsumed by the condition of predominance. How is this known? Thus fascicle 127 of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* states: "Question: What is the meaning of 'making' (upādāya)? Is it the meaning of 'cause', or is it the meaning of 'condition'? If so, what fault is there? A fault is seen in both. If it is the meaning of 'cause', these four primary elements lack all five causes with respect to derived matter; how could it be said that they can make derived matter? If it is the meaning of 'condition', with the exception of the own-entity of each derived matter, there is not a single remaining phenomenon that is not its condition of predominance; why then say only that it is made by the primary elements? Answer: It should be stated as follows: 'making' is the meaning of 'cause'. Question: Since these lack all five causes with respect to derived matter, how is it the meaning of 'cause'? Answer: Although they lack the five causes such as the homogeneous cause, there are distinctly five other meanings of cause: namely, the cause of production, the cause of reliance, the cause of standing, the cause of maintenance, and the cause of nourishment; on account of these they are able to make [derived matter]. There are other masters who say: 'making' is the meaning of 'condition'. Question: With the exception of the own-entity of each derived matter, all other phenomena are its condition of predominance; why then say only that it is made by the primary elements? Answer: The meaning of the condition of predominance has close and distant, near and far, conjoined and non-conjoined, present in this life and present in another life. Those that are close, near, conjoined, and in this life are called 'causes'; those that are distant, far, non-conjoined, and in other lives are called 'conditions'. Due to this meaning, to say that the primary elements serve as cause and predominance for derived matter is also not contrary to principle (the above is the textual passage)." The *Pañcavastuka* also contains these two explanations, neither of which has a critical arbiter. Now, in citing that passage, the intention is to use the latter master as proof; hence we know that the five causes beginning with production are subsumed by the condition of predominance. And as for saying 'cause', within the condition of predominance there is an intimate and superior function for which the name 'cause' is distinctly established; it is not the cause-condition among the four conditions. As for the earlier master of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, he follows the previous explanation. Question: The previous explanation states that the five causes beginning with production are subsumed by the cause-condition, while the latter explanation states that they are subsumed by the condition of predominance; which one is correct? The explanation says: Since neither the *Mahāvibhāṣā* nor the *Pañcavastuka* contains a critical verdict and the two explanations differ, who can rashly decide? Another explanation says: The previous explanation is correct. In the *Mahāvibhāṣā*'s exposition of derived matter, the previous explanation says 'it should be stated as follows', whereas the latter explanation says 'there are other masters who say'. Furthermore, in resolving the objection that 'there is no time that is not a cause', the orthodox authority says: 'One should say that that treatise was composed relying on the six causes.' Based on this, we know that the previous explanation is correct.

7.5

"The treatise states: 'Where is it spoken of?'" Below this, the first line is explained. The question asks: Where are these four conditions spoken of?

7.6

"Namely, in the sūtra up to: 'are the categories of condition'" provides the answer, quoting and explaining the sūtra text. In this sūtra, the word "nature" (prakṛti/svabhāva) refers to the distinct categorical natures of the four conditions; hence it is called "nature". As for the term "cause-condition" (hetu-pratyaya), the cause itself is the condition; this is a karmadhāraya compound. It cannot be called a tatpuruṣa compound, because the cause is itself the condition. As for the term "immediately contiguous condition" (samanantara-pratyaya), the prior mind and mental factors are each called "equal" (sama); here, the entity of the condition is called "equal". Another explanation says: The subsequent mind and mental factors are each called "equal"; here, the entity of the result is called "equal". Another explanation says: The prior and subsequent mind and mental factors are each called "equal"; here, "equal" extends to both the condition and the result. Another explanation says: The prior mind and mental factors, etc., serve as conditions for the subsequent mind and mental factors, not only for those of their own category. Another explanation says: The subsequent mind and mental factors, etc., take the prior mind and mental factors as condition, not only those of their own category. Another explanation says: "Equal" applies to both the prior and subsequent loci. As for "immediately contiguous" (anantara), it either belongs to the condition, or belongs to the result, or extends to both condition and result. In general, when the prior mind and mental factors produce the subsequent mind and mental factors without any other mind arising in between, it is called "immediately contiguous". Another explanation says: That no equal phenomenon arises in the interval is called "equal and immediately contiguous". If the equal and immediately contiguous is itself the condition, it is a karmadhāraya compound. If it is the condition of the equal and immediately contiguous, it is a tatpuruṣa compound. As for the "condition of objective support" (ālambana-pratyaya), the objective support itself is the condition; this is a karmadhāraya compound and cannot be called a tatpuruṣa compound. As for the "condition of predominance" (adhipati-pratyaya), the predominant itself is the condition; this is a karmadhāraya compound. Another explanation says: Since among the productive [causes] there are close and distant, one may say "the cause of producing"; among the predominant there are also close and distant, so one may also say "the condition of predominance" [as a tatpuruṣa]. However, the treatises all treat them as karmadhāraya compounds; none of these four conditions may be construed as a bahuvrīhi compound. Question: Since the remaining three conditions also do not obstruct the result, they should also be called predominant. The explanation says: Although the other three conditions are also called predominant, their names are established on the basis of their specific features. The condition of predominance, however, has no other distinct name; although it bears a general title, it receives a specific name, just like the sense-field of form (rūpāyatana) and so forth.

7.7

"Among the six causes up to: 'is the nature of the cause-condition'" explains the second line, identifying the entity of the cause-condition.

7.8

"Except for the arhat up to: 'is the nature of the immediately contiguous condition'" explains below the third and fourth lines. This identifies its entity. The unlearners of the three vehicles are collectively named arhats. That is to say, except for the very last single moment of mind and mental factors when an arhat is on the verge of entering nirvāṇa without remainder, all other past and present already-arisen minds and mental factors are the nature of the immediately contiguous condition. "Already-arisen" excludes the future and the unconditioned. "Minds and mental factors" excludes matter and the non-associated [formations].

7.9

"The phenomena produced by this condition up to: 'the name equal and immediately contiguous'" explains the name. The phenomena produced by this condition are similar before and after, equal and without interval; based on this meaning, the name "equal and immediately contiguous" is established. Question: Can the six consciousnesses mutually serve as the immediately contiguous condition for one another? Answer: They all can. Therefore the *Pañcavastuka* states: "Immediately contiguous to visual consciousness, the mental consciousness does not definitely arise; among the six classes of consciousness, any one of them may arise as it happens. If mental consciousness were definitely to arise immediately contiguous to visual consciousness, then the faculty of pain (duḥkhindriya) should not serve as the equal and immediately contiguous [condition] for pain, because the faculty of pain exists only in the five classes of consciousness. If that were so, it would contradict what is stated in the Indriya-skandha, as it says: 'The faculty of pain serves as cause, equal and immediately contiguous [condition], and predominant [condition] for the faculty of pain.' However, relying on visual consciousness to cognize form, an analytical mental consciousness is immediately evoked; therefore it is said: 'Visual consciousness first cognizes; having received it through visual consciousness, mental consciousness follows and cognizes.'"

7.10

"On this account, matter and so forth up to: 'the equal and immediately contiguous condition'" clarifies that matter is not an immediately contiguous condition. That is, in the prior moment there is only matter of the desire realm, or immediately contiguous to it there arise two types of unmanifest matter belonging to the desire realm and the form realm—this is based on attaining the prātimokṣa vows upon entering mundane concentration. Or immediately contiguous to it there arise two types of unmanifest matter belonging to the desire realm and the undefiled—this is based on attaining the prātimokṣa vows upon entering supramundane concentration. Because matter is mixed and disordered, it is not an immediately contiguous condition. If one relies on the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, it further says that matter of the form realm and unlinked matter arise together. The *Mahāvibhāṣā* speaks comprehensively relying on other forms of matter, whereas this treatise relies solely on unmanifest matter; there is definitely no co-arising of the unmanifest matter of concentration and the path. Furthermore, when one's body is born in the desire realm, having created a manifestation of the form realm, one enters supramundane concentration; then three kinds of matter also appear simultaneously together. The treatises do not state this, merely explaining that matter is mixed and disordered based on one general aspect.

7.11

"Venerable Vasumitra up to: 'the equal and immediately contiguous condition'" clarifies that based on simultaneously nourished matter not being equal, matter is therefore not established as an immediately contiguous condition.

7.12

"The Venerable further said up to: 'casts many overshadowings'" explains that based on matter before and after not being equal, it is not an immediately contiguous condition.

7.13

"Is it not so that mental factors up to: 'samādhi and so forth'" asks a question: Is it not so that mental factors arise mutually from the three natures, and arise mutually with investigation and scrutiny, so that their number before and after is also unequal?

7.14

"With respect to disparate kinds up to: 'there is no fault of inequality'" answers. Looked at mutually with respect to disparate kinds, there is indeed a greater or lesser number; but looked at mutually with respect to the same kind, there is no inequality.

7.15

"[Does it act as the immediately antecedent condition] only for its own category ...?" is a question.

7.16

"Not so," is the reply.

7.17

"How so?" is the inquiry.

7.18

"A dharma of a preceding mental composite ... is said to be 'equal'" explains this. A dharma belonging to a preceding mental composite serves as the immediately antecedent condition for both homogeneous and heterogeneous categories of the subsequent composite in general, not only for its own category. The preceding text provided a general explanation: considering merely the self-nature categories of feeling and so forth in their sequence before and after, there is neither fewer producing more nor more producing fewer, which is why it is said to be "equal" (samanantara).

7.19

"Those who hold that only the homogeneous category ... arises having it as condition" sets forth the doctrine of the pseudo-śramaṇas, [who hold that] only the arising of the homogeneous category from the homogeneous constitutes the immediately antecedent condition.

7.20

"What they say is incorrect ... could nevertheless arise" is the author's refutation. Mind and mental factors necessarily arise from four conditions. If one insists that the homogeneous produces only the homogeneous, then since there is no such category prior to the first undefiled mind, it would follow that it could arise even though it lacked this immediately antecedent condition. If it could arise lacking [this condition], there would be the fault of arising from three conditions. Although it does not arise from a homogeneous cause (sabhāga-hetu), it arises from associated and coexistent causes (saṃprayuktaka-hetu, sahabhū-hetu); therefore, the causal condition (hetu-pratyaya) is present.

7.21

"Formations not associated with mind ... can be co-present" means: among non-associated [formations] considered in relation to one another, those of the three realms and the unconditioned can be co-present; because they arise in confusion, they are not immediately antecedent conditions. Among minds and mental factors, even two realms do not arise together, much less many. Because there is no confusion, the immediately antecedent condition is established. Another explanation: possession (prāpti) and the four characteristics (lakṣaṇa) can be co-present across the three realms and the unconditioned; nikāya-sabhāga can be co-present across the three realms; non-possession (aprāpti), āsaṃjñika, the two absorptions (samāpatti), the life-faculty (jīvitendriya), and the groups of names, phrases, and syllables (nāma-pada-vyañjana-kāya) each manifest in only one realm as appropriate. These fourteen, moreover, each co-arise as appropriate with other non-associated formations of the three realms and the unconditioned; being confused, they are not established [as this condition]. Minds and mental factors are not like this. Another explanation: if distinguished specifically, possession and the four characteristics each have multiple entities, and those of the three realms and the unconditioned can be co-present. Nikāya-sabhāga also has multiple entities, which can be co-present across the three realms. Non-possession also has multiple entities, which can be co-present within a single realm as appropriate. The absorption of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti) also has multiple entities, which can be co-present within a single realm. The life-faculty is a single entity, manifesting in one realm as appropriate. The groups of names, phrases, and syllables also have multiple entities, which can be co-present within a single realm as appropriate, just as many magically created persons speak simultaneously. These twelve each co-arise as appropriate with other non-associated formations of the three realms and the unconditioned. Āsaṃjñika-vipāka and the āsaṃjñi-samāpatti also have multiple entities, which can be co-present within a single realm. These two each co-arise as appropriate with other non-associated formations of the three realms. Among these fourteen non-associated formations, some have multiple entities, arising across multiple realms, arising in only one realm, co-arising with many, or co-arising with one; some have a single entity, arising in only one realm and not spanning multiple realms. Co-arising with one and co-arising with many both result in confusion, and their mutual relations are not equal; therefore, they cannot be established as immediately antecedent conditions. Minds and mental factors are not like this. Furthermore, the *Nyāyānusāra*, fascicle nineteen, states: "The *Vibhāṣā* says: Mind and mental factors are obstructed in their basis (āśraya), objective support (ālambana), and mode of activity (ākāra); on this account, the immediately antecedent condition is established. Matter and non-associated [formations] have no such characteristic; therefore, they are not established as the substance of this condition."

7.22

"For what reason is it not admitted that ... an immediately antecedent condition?" is a question.

7.23

"Because future dharmas ... have no before and after" is the reply. The immediately antecedent condition establishes sequence with reference to before and after in time (adhvan); because dharmas of the future time have no before and after, they are not immediately antecedent.

7.24

"How does the World-Honoured One ... this dharma will arise?" is the inquiry.

7.25

"By inferring from past and present dharmas ... therefore it is not inferential cognition" gives the accounts of three masters in total in the reply; this represents the explanation of an alternative master of the Sarvāstivāda. It claims that the Buddha, the World-Honoured One, by inferring from past and present dharmas, is able to directly comprehend the future; this is subsumed under the knowledge resulting from resolve (praṇidhi-jñāna) belonging to the fourth dhyāna, and knowing according to his resolve, it is not inferential cognition.

7.26

"If so, the World-Honoured One ... should be unable to know" is the author's refutation. If so, when the World-Honoured One has not seen the prior limit of the past and present, he should be unable to know the posterior limit of the future. Furthermore, the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, fascicle one hundred and seventy-nine, states: "Question: How does the knowledge resulting from resolve know the future? Some say: Through past and present, it infers and knows the future. Just as a farmer, having sown seeds, infers and knows that such a fruit will certainly arise, so it is here. Others say: If so, the knowledge resulting from resolve would be inferential cognition (anumāna-jñāna), not direct perceptual cognition (pratyakṣa-jñāna). It should be said: This knowledge resulting from resolve does not depend on observing the cause to know the fruit, nor does it depend on observing the fruit to know the cause. Therefore, this knowledge is direct perceptual cognition, not inferential cognition."

7.27

"Others again say ... the supernormal knowledge and wisdom of dhyāna" sets forth the explanation of a second alternative master of the Sarvāstivāda. Other alternative masters say: Within the bodies of sentient beings there are portents of future fruits and causes, which are varieties of the skandha of non-associated formations. The Buddha generates conventional cognition (saṃvṛti-jñāna) of the desire realm to observe these portents and thereby knows the future. He does not necessarily have to be currently abiding in a fundamental dhyāna and generating the supernormal knowledge of birth and death to first be able to know these portents of cause and fruit. According to Western tradition, this is subsumed under dharma-sabhāgatā.

7.28

"If so, the Buddhas' ... would not be direct realization" is the author's refutation of the second master.

7.29

"Therefore, as the Sautrāntikas [say] ... inconceivable" is the third, where the author rejects the two previous theories and presents the Sautrāntika view. According to the *Nyāyānusāra*, fascicle nineteen, there are three theories. The first theory says that the virtues, functions, and sphere of the Buddhas are inconceivable. The second theory says that just as with past time, the Buddha's direct knowing and seeing operates with respect to the future; that is, the Buddha wishes to know the causes and fruits of sentient beings, but since the duration of the present time is fleeting, he mostly examines the past and future. It is not that when the World-Honoured One wishes to know the posterior limit, he first examines the prior limit and only then can know it, and so forth in detail. (The explanation says: That master's intention is that the knowledge of past abodes directly knows the past, and the knowledge of birth and death directly knows the future. The *Nyāyānusāra* rescues this and does not refute it.) The third theory says that within the bodies of sentient beings there are currently prior signs of future causes and fruits, like reflections, which are non-associated formations of either form or mind. The Buddha simply observes these and knows the future; he does not necessarily have to currently abide in the supernormal knowledge and wisdom of dhyāna. Yet he does not know by divination of those signs, because he directly realizes and sees the future, and so forth in detail. (The explanation says: This master means that by knowing the prior signs, the future is directly realized, just as one only turns one's head after hearing a sound. The *Nyāyānusāra* rescues this and does not refute it.) According to the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, fascicle eleven, there are also three theories. The first and second theories are refuted in the same way as in this śāstra; the third, the reviewer's verdict, says: "It should be said: The Buddha's knowledge of the future is direct perception, not inference," and so forth in detail. Question: Since the first two theories in this śāstra are also refuted in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, why does the *Nyāyānusāra* rescue them? The explanation says: The author of the *Nyāyānusāra* deliberately opposed this śāstra and temporarily offered this rescue, which cannot be considered correct. Question: What is the difference between the first theory of the *Nyāyānusāra*, the reviewer in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, and the Sautrāntika here? The explanation says: All three theories are identical. Another explanation: The first theory of the *Nyāyānusāra* agrees with the reviewer in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, but differs from the Sautrāntikas; this is a difference in tenets. Question: Whether different or identical, how is it explained? The explanation says: Regarding what this śāstra calls "knowing all simply by directing the mind," the Sautrāntikas have two explanations: one says that the Tathāgata has no uncollected mind, and that knowing all simply by directing the mind is entirely due to concentration; according to the Sarvāstivāda school, the Buddha also has a distracted mind, which knows all without error even in a distracted state. Question: Is the Tathāgata's distracted mind direct perception? The explanation says: In the distracted mind of the two vehicles, only the mental consciousness generated immediately after the five consciousnesses is called direct perception, and the mental consciousness induced after a concentrated mind is also called direct perception. Since the five consciousnesses cognizing objects and the concentrated mind cognizing objects are both direct perception because they are clear with respect to the object, the mental consciousness induced from them is also clear with respect to that cognitive object and can also be called direct perception. For example, although the knowledge resulting from resolve spans concentration and distraction in essence, when based on the knowledge resulting from resolve induced within a distracted mind knowing future dharmas, this is called direct perception in a distracted mind. As for the Tathāgata's cognition, even when it is not induced by a concentrated mind and not produced immediately following the five consciousnesses, it is still subsumed under direct perception. This is the difference between the Sautrāntika and the Sarvāstivāda. Another explanation: The Sautrāntikas also allow that the Tathāgata has a distracted mind. If one takes this view, it is identical to the Sarvāstivāda; hence this śāstra does not refute the reviewer's position.

7.30

"If in the future ... other dharmas do not arise?" is a question. Since dharmas arise in sequence, it is clearly known that the future has a sequence of before and after.

7.31

"If the arising of this dharma ... is an immediately antecedent condition" is the reply. If the arising of this result dharma is tied to that causal dharma, only immediately upon that cause can this result arise. Just as the arising of a sprout and other results requires the aid of a seed and other causes, although these various dharmas are mutually tied and described as before and after in principle, there is nevertheless no immediately antecedent condition here. In the future, the worldly supreme dharmas (laukikāgradharma) and so forth, speaking generally, are mutually tied and described as before and after in principle, but they cannot possess the immediately antecedent condition, because the immediately antecedent condition is formulated based on functional activity before and after in time.

7.32

"Why is the final mind of arhats ... not an immediately antecedent condition?" is a question.

7.33

"Because no further mind arises in continuation of it" is the reply. Because no further mind arises continuing after this final mind, the final mind is not an immediately antecedent condition.

7.34

"Does not the immediately ceased mind ... should not be called 'mind-element' (manas)" is an objection. Does not the mind that has just ceased without interval also receive the name "mind-element" (manas)? Since consciousness does not arise without interval after the final mind of the one beyond training (aśaikṣa), it should not be called "manas."

7.35

"Manas is manifested by being a support ... immediately antecedent condition" explains this. Manas is manifested as a support (āśraya), not manifested by functional activity; therefore, the final mind can still be called manas. The immediately antecedent condition is manifested by functional activity: when a dharma reaches the state of arising, once this condition has grasped it as its result, no dharma and no sentient being can obstruct it from entering the present from the state of arising. Because there is no further mind to continue it, the final mind is not an immediately antecedent condition.

7.36

Regarding the passage from "If a phenomenon is [equal and immediate] to mind" up to "arising, abiding, decay, and cessation": from here down, two sets of four alternatives are explained. This is the first set of four alternatives, differentiating between "equal and immediate to mind" and "immediate to mind" via four alternatives. As for "equal and immediate to mind" (citta-samanantara): if a phenomenon is an effect drawn forth by the mind as an equal and immediate condition, it is called "equal and immediate". The two mindless absorptions as well as mind and mental factors are equal to what precedes them, hence "equal"; because there is no other mind intervening between them, it is called "immediate". As for "immediate to mind" (citta-anantara): if there is a phenomenon that arises contiguous to the mind—whether it is an effect of the mind or not an effect of the mind—as long as it arises contiguous to the mind, it is called "immediate to mind". In the first alternative, the mind and mental factors that emerge from the mindless absorptions, as well as the moments of the two absorptions from the second moment onward. (The "moments" reveal the essence of the absorptions.) Because they are effects of the mind, they are called "equal and immediate"; because they do not arise contiguous to the mind, they are not "immediate to mind". In the second alternative, the arising, abiding, decay, and cessation upon the moments of the two absorptions as initially arisen, and the arising, abiding, decay, and cessation upon mind and mental factors in states with mind: because they arise contiguous to the mind, they are "immediate to mind"; because they are not effects of the mind, they are not "equal and immediate to mind". In the third alternative, the moments of the two absorptions as initially arisen, and the mind and mental factors in states with mind: because they are effects of the mind, they are "equal and immediate to mind"; because they arise contiguous to the mind, they are "immediate to mind". In the fourth alternative, the arising, abiding, decay, and cessation upon the moments of the two absorptions from the second moment onward, and the arising, abiding, decay, and cessation upon the mind and mental factors emerging from the mindless absorptions: because they are not effects of the mind, they are not "equal and immediate to mind"; because they do not arise contiguous to the mind, they are not "immediate to mind".

7.37

Regarding the passage from "If a phenomenon is [equal and immediate] to mind" up to "the fourth alternative": this clarifies the second set of four alternatives. "Equal and immediate" is as explained before. "Immediate to the mindless absorptions" means that if there is a phenomenon that arises contiguous to the mindless absorptions, it is called "immediate to the mindless absorptions". This differentiates between "equal and immediate to mind" and "immediate to the mindless absorptions" via four alternatives. The previous third alternative—namely, the moments of the two absorptions as initially arisen, and the mind and mental factors in states with mind—becomes the present first alternative: because they are effects of the mind, they are "equal and immediate to mind"; because they do not arise contiguous to the mindless absorptions, they are not "immediate to the mindless absorptions". The previous fourth alternative—namely, the arising, abiding, decay, and cessation upon the moments of the two absorptions from the second moment onward, and the arising, abiding, decay, and cessation upon the mind and mental factors emerging from the mindless absorptions—becomes the present second alternative: because they arise contiguous to the mindless absorptions, they are "immediate to the mindless absorptions"; because they are not effects of the mind, they are not "equal and immediate to mind". The previous first alternative—namely, the mind and mental factors emerging from the mindless absorptions, and the moments of the two absorptions from the second moment onward—becomes the present third alternative: because they are effects of the mind, they are "equal and immediate to mind"; because they arise contiguous to the mindless absorptions, they are "immediate to the mindless absorptions". The previous second alternative—namely, the arising, abiding, decay, and cessation upon the moments of the two absorptions as initially arisen, and the arising, abiding, decay, and cessation upon mind and mental factors in states with mind—becomes the present fourth alternative: because they are not effects of the mind, they are not "equal and immediate to mind"; because they do not arise contiguous to the mindless absorptions, they are not "immediate to the mindless absorptions". Furthermore, the Vibhāṣā, fascicle eleven, says: "Question: Why does that [text] not speak of non-conceptual fruition (āsaṃjñika-vipāka)? Some say: It should have been spoken of, but was not spoken of; one should know that this meaning is incomplete. Some say: The two mindless absorptions are attained through exertion and effort, therefore that text speaks of them; non-conceptual fruition is contrary to this, therefore it does not speak of it. Some say: Because the two mindless absorptions are wholesome, they are spoken of; non-conceptual fruition is unobstructed neutral (anivṛtāvyākṛta), therefore it is not spoken of. Some say: If it is induced immediately by the power of the mind without confusion, it can be called a phenomenon equal and immediate to mind; non-conceptual fruition is induced by the force of the fruitional cause and operates spontaneously, not being induced by the force of the mind that enters into it, hence it is not called a phenomenon equal and immediate to mind. Question: If so, fruitional mind and mental factors are also induced by the force of the fruitional cause and operate spontaneously; they should also not be called phenomena equal and immediate to mind. Answer: Homogeneous series inducing one another have superior force, not being like that [non-conceptual fruition], because they are all associated, possess a support, and so forth, which is why they are called 'homogeneous'. Question: Why are the two mindless absorptions phenomena equal and immediate to mind, yet not equal and immediate conditions of the mind? Answer: Because they are acquired and induced through the exertion, function, and effort of the mind, they are called phenomena equal and immediate to mind. But because they are contrary to the mind and obstruct and cut off the mind, they are not equal and immediate conditions of the mind. Some say: Because they are induced by the power of the mind, they are called phenomena equal and immediate to mind; but because they are non-associated, lack a support, lack mental aspects (ākāra), lack alertness, and lack cognitive objects, they are not equal and immediate conditions of the mind. Some say: Because through the power of the mind they attain increase and have activity, they are called phenomena equal and immediate to mind; but because they impair the mind and cause it not to produce activity, they are not equal and immediate conditions. Question: Why do the two mindless absorptions arise continuously, similar and unconfused before and after, yet the former is not the equal and immediate condition of the latter? Answer: Because they are induced by the power of the mind entering absorption, and not induced to arise by the power of the preceding moment; therefore, the former is not the equal and immediate condition of the latter. Question: If so, fruitional mind and mental factors are induced by the force of fruitional causes and operate spontaneously; the former should not be the equal and immediate condition of the latter. Answer: Mind and mental factors are associated and possess a support; they have mental aspects, alertness, and cognitive objects. The preceding moment has superior force with respect to the latter, inducing it and clearing the way; hence all are equal and immediate conditions of the latter. Formations non-associated [with mind] are contrary to this and cannot serve as an analogy." (Thus far the text of the treatise.) Question: Does the mind entering the two absorptions, as an equal and immediate condition, grasp its effect and give its effect at the same time, or at different times? Explanation: This is not fixed. Therefore, the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle nineteen, says: "When the mind entering absorption resides in the present state, it grasps the absorptions and the effect that is the emerging mind all at once, and it also gives the effect of the initial moment of absorption, then ceases and enters the past. Subsequently, as each of the absorptions and the emerging mind arises, it gives the effect, but does not grasp it, because it was already grasped before. Is it not so that all equal and immediate conditions never grasp the effect and give the effect at different times? This objection is unreasonable. Grasping the effect must be simultaneous, while giving the effect is gradual; thus there is no error. Furthermore, another explanation says: Those who maintain this say that only after the mind entering the two absorptions has ceased and entered the past can it gradually grasp the absorptions from the second moment onward and the emerging mind." The Nyāyānusāra refutes this: "That mind entering absorption should then not be past. For grasping the effect is another name for drawing forth the effect; all capacities to draw forth effects are the activity (kāritra) of conditioned phenomena, and it is based on the activity of conditioned phenomena that the distinction of the three times is established. If there were an activity that is not present, would that not ruin the basis for the distinction of the times?" Moreover, the purport of that treatise is: although the absorption and the emerging mind are both effects of the mind, because absorption is sought, absorption arises first. To arise simultaneously among absorptions would be useless, and the arising of one is sufficient to obstruct the mind. Question: Since the Nyāyānusāra says that it grasps the effects all at once, it is not known whether the grasped effects are certain to arise or not. If one says they are certain to arise, future phenomena would be confused; since what is grasped is manifold, how could they arise determinately? If one says it grasps only one, by what reason is it not the others? If one is designated first, the future would be ordered in sequence. If they do not arise determinately, this contradicts what has been said: that once the effect of an equal and immediate condition has been grasped, it must determinately arise, because no phenomenon can obstruct it so as to make it not arise. Explanation: The arising of the effect is not determinate, because what is grasped is manifold and what arises is few. Those who say that it determinately arises intend to show that once this condition has grasped its effects, among what is grasped there is determinately an effect that arises, but not that all arise. To speak truthfully, there are also some that do not arise. Or it is stated with reference to states with mind that they must arise. Question: In states with mind, why does it not grasp all at once and give gradually? Explanation: In the state with mind, the preceding arises and the subsequent mind is just arising, being necessarily intervened by a mind; therefore, it does not grasp all of them together. The mindless state is not like this, hence it grasps all at once. Another explanation: The mind entering absorption acts as an equal and immediate condition, grasping and giving simultaneously. In the initial moment, it grasps and gives in the present; from the second moment onward, it gradually grasps and gradually gives in the past. Therefore, the Vibhāṣā, fascicle one hundred ninety-six, in explaining the equal and immediate condition, says: "Here, some say: If the preceding phenomenon has not reached the already-arisen state, it does not act as equal and immediate to the subsequent phenomenon; if it has reached it, it does. If so, this is possible for states with mind; how can it be possible for mindless states? Answer: Here it speaks of states with mind, not of other states. Some say: Even if stated with reliance on mindless states, there is no error. Namely, when the mind entering absorption is present, it grasps the absorptions and the emerging mind as effects all at once, and also gives the effect of the initial moment of absorption. When subsequent moments and the mind emerging from absorption arise, it gives the effect, but does not grasp it, because it was already grasped before. Critical evaluation: They should not state it like this. Why? There is no equal and immediate condition that grasps the effect at one time and gives the effect at a different time. If it grasps the effect at this time, it gives the effect at this time." Question: Why does the Nyāyānusāra contradict the meaning of the Vibhāṣā's critical evaluator? Explanation: This is the fault of the Nyāyānusāra master, and has nothing to do with the master of the Kośa. Or it may be that the treatises have distinct intentions; why must the Nyāyānusāra take the Vibhāṣā's critical evaluator as the standard in every case? The intention of the Nyāyānusāra establishes the present time based on the activity of grasping the effect, whereas giving the effect is merely a capacity, so it does not speak of grasping the effect in the past. In the Vibhāṣā's intention, since the past can produce the function of giving an effect, why can it not produce the function of grasping an effect? The one that grasps the effect first is established as the present time, while the ones that grasp the effect later can also arise in the past. Now the intention of the Abhidharmakośa-śāstra agrees with the Vibhāṣā's critical evaluator, and differs from the Nyāyānusāra.

7.38

Regarding the passage "Emerging from the two absorptions, [how can it be] equal and immediate?": this is a question. Since they are separated by a long distance, how can it be immediate?

7.39

Regarding the passage "Because in between there is no intervention by mind or mental factors": this is the answer. Although they are separated by a long distance, because there is no intervention by other mind or mental factors in between, it is called "immediate".

7.40

Regarding the passage from "Thus having explained" up to "acts as the cognitive-object condition": from here down, the fifth phrase is explained. Mind and mental factors are that which cognizes (ālambaka), and all phenomena are cognitive objects (ālambana). Because all phenomena are what mind and mental factors arise from and grasp onto, they are called cognitive objects. These very cognitive objects have a distinct ontological nature; because they are the condition for generating mind and mental factors, they are called the cognitive-object condition (ālambana-pratyaya). The reason why mind and mental factors are called that which cognizes while the objective realm is called the cognitive object is that when mind and the like face the objective realm, they manifest bearing the aspect of the realm, and thus are called that which cognizes. The objective realm does not manifest bearing the aspect of mind and the like; hence it is not called that which cognizes, but is merely the cognitive object. The remainder is as in the text.

7.41

Regarding the passage from "If a phenomenon is to that phenomenon" up to "because the characteristic has no difference": this demonstrates that cognitive objects are fixed. Whether cognized or not cognized, all are called cognitive objects, just as firewood and the like, whether burned or not burned, are all called that which is burned, because their essence has no difference.

7.42

Regarding 'Do mind and mental factors have such determinations [with respect to the supporting bases] as well?': this is a question. Mind and mental factors have three determinations with respect to the objective field; do they also have three determinations with respect to the supporting sense-faculties? The three determinations with respect to the objective field are: first, determination of locus; second, determination of entity; third, determination of the moment. 'Determination of locus' means that visual consciousness and its associated dharmas cognize only the locus of visible form, and definitely do not cognize the locus of sound, and so forth. 'Determination of entity' means that within the locus of visible form there are twenty kinds in total; either one entity is cognized separately, or two entities are cognized together, up to twenty entities cognized together. As appropriate, it is determined with respect to this entity and not that entity; hence it is called determination of entity. 'Determination of the moment' means, furthermore within the entities, cognizing separately moment by moment, where 'moment' expresses the meaning of the characteristics of abiding and arrival. If it ought to arise at this moment, it arises; if the conditions are lacking, it does not arise; this is called determination of the moment, not at another moment. Just as visual consciousness and its associated dharmas have three determinations with respect to the objective field, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile consciousnesses and their associated dharmas each likewise have three determinations with respect to their own objective fields. As for the three determinations of mental consciousness and its associated dharmas with respect to the objective field: the objective field of mental consciousness extends over the twelve loci; cognizing an existent dharma in this locus is determination of locus, not cognizing a nonexistent locus, which is called determination of locus. 'Determination of entity' means that, among the existent dharmas of the twelve loci, as appropriate, it is determined to cognize this entity and not other entities. 'Determination of the moment' means, furthermore within the entities, cognizing separately moment by moment. 'One should say that there are also such determinations' is the answer: one should say that with respect to the six supporting faculties there are also these three kinds of determination. 'Determination of locus' means that visual consciousness and its associated dharmas are determined to the locus of the eye, because relying on the eye, they do not rely on the ear and so forth. Although they also rely on the mind, here the distinction of dharmas is shown based on their specific support. 'Determination of entity' means that, within the determination of locus, there are differences such as male, female, deva, and human eyes, or differences between fruition-matured and nourished eyes. Visual consciousness and its associated dharmas must be determined to rely on this entity and not on other entities; this is called determination of entity. 'Determination of the moment' means, furthermore within the entities, determination moment by moment, meaning visual consciousness and its associated dharmas must be at this moment and not at another moment. Question: Does the eye faculty of a single moment serve as the support for only one consciousness, or does it also serve generally as the support for multiple consciousnesses? Explanation: It serves generally as the support for multiple consciousnesses. Therefore, in the third fascicle of this treatise, in explaining the predominance of the faculties, it says: 'Because it is the general cause for discerning multiple visible forms, and because consciousness is clear or dim according to the eye faculty. Visible form is not so, because the two are contrary. … Up to the mind faculty with respect to dharmas is also like this.' Furthermore, the first fascicle of this treatise states: 'When the eye and the mind are dedicated to one visible form, the other visible forms, sounds, odors, tastes, tangible objects, and so forth cease. The five groups of consciousness and so forth that cognize those objects remain in the future, never arising; because they cannot cognize past objects, due to the incompleteness of conditions, they obtain non-analytical cessation.' From this, we know that the eye of a single moment can serve as the support for multiple consciousnesses. If one said that faculty, object, and consciousness all become present moment by moment in a one-to-one manner, then when the eye sees visible form, at that time there should be no visual consciousness obtaining non-analytical cessation, which would contradict the earlier passage. If it is said that the eye faculty serves generally as the support for multiple consciousnesses, then at this moment, as appropriate, it may discern this visible form or may discern that visible form. For example, if a person at this moment is inside a room, they see the visible forms inside the room; if at this moment they are outside the room, they see the visible forms outside the room. If one were to say that the eye faculty generates only one consciousness, what principle would dictate that at this moment only this consciousness should become present to discern this visible form, and not other consciousnesses? If one were to say that seeing form inside the room at this moment means the faculty and consciousness inside the room become present, while the faculty and consciousness outside the room obtain non-analytical cessation; and if seeing form outside the room at this moment means the faculty and consciousness outside the room become present, while the faculty and consciousness inside the room obtain non-analytical cessation; and that a single eye faculty generates only one consciousness and is not the support for multiple consciousnesses—this too would be unreasonable. For example, fruition-matured cause brings about ten years of lifespan and ten years of the eye faculty; although they have no sequence of before and after, their intrinsic nature and characteristics are already determined. How could it be that when this fruition-matured eye sees this visible form, this type of eye becomes present, and at that time the eye that ought to see that visible form obtains non-analytical cessation; or when it sees that visible form, that type of eye faculty becomes present, and at that time the eye that ought to see this visible form obtains non-analytical cessation? Furthermore, if the conditions meet at this place for ten years, one sees this form for ten years; if conditions were to meet at another place for ten years, one would again see that form for ten years. If that were so, there would be the fault of the eye faculty being long and the lifespan being short. From this, we know that this eye of a single moment can see multiple visible forms of this and that, and can generate multiple consciousnesses of this and that. Another explanation: Just as the blue color of a single moment may separately generate one consciousness, or generate one consciousness together with two colors, up to generating one consciousness together with twenty colors; the eye faculty of a single moment should be known to be likewise: it may separately generate a consciousness cognizing one color, up to being able to generate a consciousness cognizing twenty kinds of colors. This is to equate the faculty with the object. Just as visual consciousness and its associated dharmas have three determinations with respect to the support, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile consciousnesses and their associated dharmas each likewise have three determinations with respect to their own support. As for the three determinations of mental consciousness and its associated dharmas with respect to the supporting mind faculty: 'determination of locus' means that they are definitely supported by the locus of mind, not by the eye, and so forth. 'Determination of entity' means that, within the determination of locus, there are many kinds: the distinctions of sāsrava and anāsrava minds, or the distinctions of the minds of the three realms, the three natures, the three stages of training, and so forth—as stated in the взаимное arising of the twenty minds, such minds can arise after this mind—or distinctions between deva and human minds. They must rely on this mind and not on other minds; this is called determination of entity. 'Determination of the moment' means, furthermore within the determination of entity, that mental consciousness and its associated dharmas of this moment definitely rely on this faculty and not on other faculties. For example, when mental consciousness and its associated dharmas definitely reach the characteristic of arising, they rely on the present mind faculty; this is called determination of the moment. If it flows into the present, it relies on the past mind faculty. If it reaches the past, it again takes the past as support. In this way, viewed mutually in succession within the past, they are all called determination of the moment, because from the characteristic of arising onward there is before and after. One can say that the consciousness of this moment definitely relies on this mind. Prior to the characteristic of arising, before and after are not yet determined; when viewing the various minds in relation to one another, their support is indeterminate, hence it is not spoken of. If one emerges from the two mindless absorptions, the mind and mental factors take the past as their support; this is called determination of the moment. It should be known that here, the five consciousnesses and their associated dharmas, with respect to the three determinations of support and object, all extend across the three times. As for mental consciousness and its associated dharmas, the three determinations of the object, and the two determinations of locus and entity of the support, all extend across the three times; regarding the determination of the moment of the support, only when reaching the characteristic of arising onward is it called determination of the moment.

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俱舍論記 — Classical Chinese