俱舍論記 8

English (machine translation) 8

Language: English

8.2

Chapter 3: Exposition of the World, Part One

"Exposition of the World": "world" (loka) means the worldly realm, because it is subject to destruction and because it has an antidote. This chapter explains it extensively, and is therefore called "exposition." As for why the Chapter on the World is explained next: the preceding two chapters explained the sāsrava and the anāsrava in general, while the six chapters from here on explain the sāsrava and anāsrava in particular. The general is the root, so it was explained first; explaining the particular relies on the general, so the particular is explained later. Within the six chapters that specifically explain them, the first three chapters specifically explain sāsrava phenomena, and the last three chapters specifically explain anāsrava phenomena. The sāsrava is gross and obvious, so it is explained first; the anāsrava is subtle, so it is explained later. Within the specific explanation of the sāsrava, the Chapter on the World explains the fruit of the sāsrava, the Chapter on Karma explains the cause of the sāsrava, and the Chapter on Latent Defilements explains the condition of the sāsrava. Among these three chapters, the characteristics of the fruit are gross and obvious, so they are explained first.

8.4

Regarding the passage from "Having already relied upon the three realms..." up to "...how many distinct locations are there?": within the "Loka-nirdeśa", first, the world of sentient beings (sattva-loka) is explained; second, the container world (bhājana-loka) is explained. Within the explanation of the world of sentient beings, first, sentient beings' [modes of existence] are explained in general; second, their various groupings are distinguished. Within the general explanation of sentient beings, first, the birth of sentient beings is explained; second, the abiding of sentient beings is explained; third, the decease of sentient beings is explained. Within the explanation of the birth of sentient beings, first, the three realms are explained; second, the five destinies (gati); third, the seven abodes of consciousness (vijñāna-sthiti); fourth, the nine abodes of sentient beings (sattvāvāsa); fifth, the four stations of consciousness (vijñāna-sthiti); sixth, the four modes of birth (yoni); seventh, the intermediate state (antarābhava); eighth, dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda); ninth, the four existences (bhava). Below, this first [section] explains the three realms, concluding what came before and introducing the question. At the end of the previous chapter, the various minds were already distinguished based on the three realms; now next, it should be explained: What are the three realms? How many distinct locations are there within each realm?

8.5

Regarding the passage from "The verse says..." up to "...cause the mind and so forth to continue in unbroken succession": this directly explains [the subject]. The first verse explains the desire realm (kāmadhātu); the second verse explains the form realm (rūpadhātu); the third verse explains the formless realm (ārūpyadhātu). Following this sequence of differences, they answer the previous two questions.

8.6

Regarding the passage from "The commentary says..." up to "...Paranirmitavaśavartin": within the prose, first, the text of the verse is explained; second, distinctions are made through questions and answers. Below, this directly explains the text of the verse. Six heavens possess sensual desire, hence they are called the six heavens of the desire realm. The sixteenth fascicle of the Samayapradīpikā says: "Only the six heavens of the desire realm experience exquisite objects of desire." As for the six heavens of the desire realm: First, the heaven of the retinue of the four great kings (Cāturmahārājakāyika). That is to say, there are the four great kings and the retinue they lead; or, the divine retinue there serves the four great kings, because they are led by the four great kings. Second, the heaven of the thirty-three (Trāyastriṃśa). That is to say, that heavenly abode is where thirty-three groups of deities reside: on the summit of Mount Meru, there are eight groups of divine retinues on each of the four sides, and in the center there is one, namely the divine sovereign Indra (Śakra); thus there are thirty-three. Third, the Yāma heaven. Here translated as "divisions of time"; that is to say, in that heavenly place, at each time they mostly acclaim, "Oh, joyful bliss!" Fourth, the Tuṣita heaven. Here translated as "contentment"; that is to say, in that heavenly place, they mostly generate minds of joy and contentment regarding what they receive and experience. Fifth, the heaven of delighting in creations (Nirmāṇarati). That is to say, in that heavenly place, they delight in repeatedly conjuring objects of desire and experiencing pleasure therein. Sixth, the heaven of making mastery over the creations of others (Paranirmitavaśavartin). That is to say, in that heavenly place, they freely experience pleasure regarding objects of desire conjured by others.

8.7

"How many distinct locations are there in such a desire realm?": this is a question.

8.8

Regarding the passage from "The hells and the differences of the continents..." up to "...are all subsumed under the desire realm": this is the answer. The thirty-first fascicle of the Nyāyānusāra explains the first seven hells, saying: "Multiple sufferings press upon the body so that they repeatedly faint as if dead, but quickly revive as before; hence it is called Samjīva (Reviving). That is, although those sentient beings suffer various cuttings, stabbings, grindings, and poundings, when they briefly encounter a cooling breeze blowing upon them, they quickly revive as before, living again equal to prior; hence the name Samjīva is established. First, black cords are used to mark and measure the limbs, and only afterwards are they hacked and sawn; hence it is called Kālasūtra (Black Cord). Numerous instruments of suffering converge to oppress the body, and they gather in mobs to harm one another; hence it is called Saṃghāta (Crushing). Pressed by multiple sufferings, different groups weep and wail, crying out in enmity; hence it is called Raurava (Weeping). Oppressed by severe suffering, they emit terrible, agonizing sounds, weeping and crying out against enmity; hence it is called Mahāraurava (Great Weeping). Fire follows their bodies and turns, flaring all around them so that the suffering of heat is unbearable; hence it is called Tapana (Heating). Internally and externally, from their own bodies and the bodies of others, raging fires emerge and burn and harm one another; because it is the extreme of heat, it is called Pratāpana (Intense Heating)." Furthermore, a later passage of this treatise explains the eighth hell, saying: "Suffering is experienced without interruption (avīci); hence it is called Avīci. No pleasure intervenes in the suffering; hence it is called Avīci." As for the four continents: the southern continent, Jambudvīpa, is named either after the forest or marked by the fruit. The eastern continent, Pūrvavideha (Surpassing Body), is called "Surpassing Body" because bodily shapes are superior, or because their bodies surpass those of Jambudvīpa; in Sanskrit it is called Videha. The western continent, Aparagodānīya (Ox-Barter), is called "Ox-Barter" because they barter with oxen; in Sanskrit it is called Godānīya. Northern Uttarakuru: in the Tang language this means "superior place", because among the four continents this place is the most superior; or it is called "superior birth", because among the four continents birth there is the most superior. The rest of the text is understandable.

8.9

Regarding the passage from "Above this desire realm..." up to "...the eighth, the Akaniṣṭha heaven": this explains the seventeen heavens of the form realm. The twenty-first fascicle of the Nyāyānusāra explains the names of the various heavens, saying: "Because it is produced by vast goodness, it is called Brahma; this Brahma is great, hence it is called Mahābrahma. Because he obtains the intermediate concentration (dhyānāntara), is born first, dies last, and is superior in majesty and virtue, he is called 'Great'. What belongs to, is transformed by, and is led by Mahābrahma is called Brahmapāriṣadya (Retinue of Brahma). Those who stand in ranks and serve as retinue before Mahābrahma are called Brahmapurohita (Ministers of Brahma). Among the devas of their own stage, their radiance is the least; hence they are called Parīttābha (Limited Radiance). Their radiance becomes increasingly superior, its measure difficult to gauge; hence they are called Apramāṇābha (Immeasurable Radiance). Pure radiance universally shines through their own stage's abodes; hence they are called Ābhāsvara (Radiant Light). Joy experienced in the mental stage is called 'pure'; within their own stage, this purity is the least, hence they are called Parīttaśubha (Limited Purity). This purity increasingly expands, its measure difficult to gauge; hence they are called Apramāṇaśubha (Immeasurable Purity). This purity is universal, hence they are called Śubhakṛtsna (Universal Purity), intending to show that no joy can surpass this. The ground where the devas below in space dwell is dense like clouds, hence it is called 'cloud'. For the devas above this, there is no longer cloud-like ground; being at the head of the cloudless ones, they are called Anabhraka (Cloudless). Because there are further localities of superior merit to which ordinary beings can be reborn, they are called Puṇyaprasava (Merit-Born). Dwelling in this locality, among the fruits of ordinary beings this is the most exceptional; hence they are called Bṛhatphala (Vast Fruit). The noble ones who have abandoned desire wash away the defilements of affliction with the water of the noble path; hence they are called 'pure'. The place where pure bodies dwell is called the Pure Abodes (Śuddhāvāsa). Or, abiding here they exhaust the limit of birth and death, like fully paying off a debt, hence they are called 'pure'; where pure ones dwell is called the Pure Abodes. Or, in these heavens there is no admixture of ordinary beings, being dwelt in purely by noble ones; hence they are called the Pure Abodes. 'Complex' means complicated or vast; because among those without complexity this is the first, and among the vast heavens this is the lowest, it is called Avṛha (Not Complex). Or it is called 'Without Seeking', because they do not seek to enter the formless realm. Having skillfully suppressed the higher and middle defilements of the mixed cultivation of dhyāna, their mental intentions are gentle and compliant, freed from all burning distress (saṃtāpa); hence they are called Atapa (Free from Distress). Or, afflictions that cause rebirth below are called 'heat'; being the first to depart from these, they receive the name Atapa. Or again, 'heat' has the meaning of blazing flourish; meaning that the superior grade of cultivating dhyāna and its fruit are not yet realized here, hence they are called Atapa. Having already attained the superior grade of mixed cultivation of dhyāna, the fruit's virtues are easily displayed; hence they are called Sudṛśa (Pleasantly Visible). Defilements to mixed-cultivation concentration are extremely subtle in the remaining grades, and vision is extremely clear and penetrating; hence they are called Sudarśana (Clear-Seeing). There is no place among those possessing form that can surpass this; hence it is called Akaniṣṭha (Ultimate Form). Or, having reached here, it is the final limit of the body upon which multiple sufferings depend; hence it is called Akaniṣṭha. Some say: 'Form' means accumulated form; reaching its ultimate limit, it is called Akaniṣṭha.".

8.10

Regarding the passage from "The masters of Kaśmīra..." up to "...surrounded by the fourfold assembly": the author of the treatise, in his verse, sets forth the doctrine of the Western masters, stating that there are seventeen; thus the Mahāvibhāṣā states: "The Western masters state that the form realm has seventeen [heavens]. Those masters mean: Because the life span, size, abode, and so forth of the Great Brahma King differ from those of the other two heavens, three heavens are separately established in the first dhyāna." Thus the Mahāvibhāṣā states: "The Western masters speak thus: In the stage of the first dhyāna there are three distinct locations: first, the abode of the Brahma devas; second, the abode of the Brahmapurohita devas; third, the abode of the Mahābrahma devas, which is the intermediate dhyāna. The reason those masters do not establish the heaven of non-conception (Asaṃjñisattva) is that its life span, size, stage, and so forth do not differ from the Bṛhatphala heaven." Furthermore, the Nyāyānusāra states: "Other masters separately state the names of seventeen locations, establishing two locations in total within the first dhyāna, and separately stating the non-conception [heaven] in the fourth dhyāna." Explanation: Those masters mean that because it is cultivated in a distinct class, the fruit it incurs is established; not establishing Mahābrahma, they state two in the first dhyāna. Furthermore, the Nyāyānusāra states: "The Sthaviras establish eighteen locations in the form realm." Explanation: Due to the difference of two causes, they establish eighteen. Now the masters of this country [of Kaśmīra] establish neither of the two; because there are no separate stages, there are only sixteen. Thus the Mahāvibhāṣā states: "The treatise masters of Kaśmīra state that in the stage of the first dhyāna there are only two locations."

8.11

Regarding the passage from "In the formless realm..." up to "...superior and inferior differ": below, this explains the formless realm, elucidating the previous two lines [of the verse]. It shows that the formless realm definitely has no physical location; it is only because commonality of destiny (nikāya-sabhāga), life-force (jīvitendriya), and fruition-born [aggregates] have differences in superior and inferior that there are four distinctions. When first cultivating the formless concentrations, one must first be disgusted with form and reflect upon infinite space; hence one forms the conceptual understanding of infinite space (ākāśānantyāyatana). Next, being disgusted with external space, one again reflects upon internal consciousness; hence one forms the conceptual understanding of infinite consciousness (vijñānānantyāyatana). Next, consciousness is also felt to be disgusting, and one again reflects upon nothingness; hence one forms the conceptual understanding of nothingness (ākiṃcanyāyatana). Next, because it does not have the coarse ideation of the lower seven concentrations, it is called 'non-ideation'; yet because it is not identical to mindlessness, it is called 'neither non-ideation' (naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana); 'station' (āyatana) is because it is the place where sentient beings are born and grow. The first three have names established based on preliminary praxis (prayoga); the fourth receives its name based on its actual nature. Therefore the "Samādhi-nirdeśa" states: "The three names such as ākāśānantya are established based on preliminary praxis; naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñā is named because of its dimness and weakness." This will be explained extensively below.

8.12

"How again is it known that it has no physical location?": this is a question.

8.13

"Because intermediate existence arises at that very place..." is the answer. As for "that very place", it refers to the place in the desire or form realm where one appropriately attained that absorption. Although one who attains that absorption in this place may also die elsewhere, this statement is made provisionally on the basis of one who dies in this place. Alternatively, "that very place" refers to whichever continent or the like; this indicates the general location, because one who attains that absorption at that place may also die elsewhere. Hence we know that the word "place" refers to the general, not the specific. Since it says that rebirth is taken at that place and intermediate existence becomes present at that place, we clearly know that the formless [realm] has no distinct spatial location. If there were a distinct place, one would have to go to be reborn there and intermediate existence would become present there. This is the doctrine of the Mahāsāṃghika school. They hold that the formless realm has a distinct spatial location; [they ask:] if it has no spatial location, how could one speak of "this place"? Question: Since it says "because one is born at that place" and "because intermediate existence becomes present at that place", should this formless realm not have a spatial location? Explanation: Stating "that place" refers to the place where one attained the formless absorption; it does not say that the formless [realm] has a distinct spatial location. Just as the eye-consciousness relies on the eye faculty, where the faculty has a spatial location while the consciousness has no spatial location, by this reasoning it can be said that intermediate existence transmits consciousness to take rebirth. Another explanation: Stating "born at that place" reveals that it has no spatial location; it does not say that this place has a distinct spatial location, just like speaking of the "abode of space" (ākāśāyatana). Therefore, the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, fascicle 68, states: "When one dies in the desire realm and is born into the formless realm, birth in the formless realm occurs where one died in the desire realm" (end of treatise passage). Furthermore, when one dies from that [formless realm] and is born into the desire or form realm, intermediate existence arises right at the place where one is to be born. Thus, the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, fascicle 68, states: "Question: When dying in the formless [realm] and being born in the desire or form realm, where do those two intermediate existences become present? Some say: In the fourth dhyāna. Evaluation: They should not say this. Why? If the formless realm had a spatial location, one could say this. But the formless realm has no spatial location; for what reason would it go as far as the fourth dhyāna? Other masters say: If one dies from there and is born into the formless realm, intermediate existence becomes present right at that spatial location. They too should not say this. Why? If they say this, how could it be so for one dying in that formless realm and being born in the formless realm? One should state: If dying in the desire or form realm and being born in the formless realm, as well as dying in the formless and being born in the formless, when dying from that formless realm and being born into the desire or form [realm], the intermediate existence of those two becomes present right at the place where one is to be born." Question: If it is according to the latter explanation, it accords with the evaluator in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. If it is according to the former explanation, is it not contradictory? Explanation: The author of the treatise takes reason as primary and does not take the evaluator of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* as the standard; what need is there to reconcile them? Question: If it is according to the former explanation, one can say that intermediate existence transmits consciousness to take rebirth. If it is according to the latter explanation, appearing at the very place of future birth, what need is there for intermediate existence? Answer: The *Mahāvibhāṣā*, fascicle 69, states: "Question: When dying in the formless realm and being born in the desire realm or form realm, since intermediate existence becomes present according to the place where one is to be born, there is no coming and going; what use is intermediate existence? Answer: They previously created the karma that induces intermediate existence; although there is no coming and going, they still receive intermediate existence, because that which is drawn by the force of karma must inevitably arise." Another explanation: For the four modes of birth in the desire and form [realms], intermediate existence is required as the expedient means of birth, taking rebirth in accordance with defilement.

8.14

"Just as in the realm possessing form... the continuity of mind and the rest" introduces the explanation of the last two lines below. The author of the treatise asks: The desire and form realms both possess form, hence they are called "possessing form". Sentient beings possessing form must rely on the material body for the continuity of mind and the rest; on what do formless sentient beings rely for the continuity of mind and the rest? This uses the lower two realms as an analogy to question the formless realm.

8.15

"The masters of the Abhidharma... thus attain continuity" is the answer of the Sarvāstivāda. Although the mind and the rest in the formless realm lack a material body, they attain continuity by relying on generic similarity (sabhāgatā) and the rest.

8.16

"If so, in that possessing form... continuity of these two" is the objection by the author of the treatise. Why do the mind and the rest in that possessing form not rely on these two, generic similarity and the life faculty (jīvitendriya)?

8.17

"Because in births in the form realm these two are weak" is the explanation of the Sarvāstivāda. In that possessing form, these two are weak, so the mind and the rest do not rely on them.

8.18

"For what reason are these two strong in the formless?" is the author of the treatise objecting again.

8.19

"These two in that realm arise from... capable of subduing the notion of form" is the answer of the Sarvāstivāda. Because they arise from superior absorption, those two are strong. Because the absorption subdues form, the absorption is said to be superior. Or, because the absorption subdues form, they do not rely on form, but only rely on these two.

8.20

"If so, in that [realm]... what need is there for a separate support?" is the fatal objection by the author of the treatise. Since that absorption is superior, the mind and the rest should rely on it; what use are a separate generic similarity and life faculty?

8.21

"Furthermore, it should now be explained... on what do they rely?" is the question by the author of the treatise. For sentient beings in the desire and form [realms], generic similarity and the life faculty necessarily operate relying on form. On what do these two in the formless rely? This compares the lower to the higher.

8.22

"These two operate relying mutually upon one another" is the answer of the Sarvāstivāda. Generic similarity and the life faculty rely mutually upon each other.

8.23

"Why do these two in that possessing form not rely mutually on one another?" is the objection by the author of the treatise.

8.24

"Because in births in the form realm these two are weak" is the answer of the Sarvāstivāda. Being weak, they do not rely mutually on one another.

8.25

"For what reason are these two strong in the formless?" is the author of the treatise challenging again.

8.26

"These two kinds in that realm... capable of subduing the notion of form" is the answer of the Sarvāstivāda. Because the cause is superior, its fruit is also strong. It was previously stated that that absorption is capable of subduing the notion of form, hence it is said to be superior. Or, subduing the notion of form, they do not rely on form.

8.27

"Then this returns to the same objection concerning the continuity of mind" is the fatal objection by the author of the treatise, referring back to the previous refutation. If you say that because the absorption is superior the two are strong and rely on one another, then this returns to the previous objection concerning the continuity of mind. One should say: If so, as for the continuity and operation of generic similarity and the life faculty there, they should just rely on the superior absorption; what use is relying mutually on one another?

8.28

"Or mind and mental factors rely solely on one another" is the author of the treatise objecting further through reasoning. If you say that generic similarity and the life faculty in the formless rely mutually on one another, then alternatively, mind and mental factors in the formless realm rely solely on one another, without needing a separate support. Another explanation: Since their cause is superior, mind and mental factors should rely solely on one another. The purpose of this objection is to show that generic similarity and the life faculty do not have real substantial entities.

8.29

"Therefore the Sautrāntika masters... do not operate relying on form" cites a doctrine in agreement with his own. Therefore the Sautrāntikas say: The continuity of mind and mental factors in the formless realm merely rely mutually on one another, without having a separate generic similarity, life [faculty], or the like as a support. That is, if there is a cause that has not yet separated from craving for form, it induces the fruit of mind and the rest. Because the cause has not separated from craving for form, the induced fruit of mind and the rest arises co-present with form and operates relying on form. If the cause has already attained separation from craving for form, having loathed and turned away from form, then because the cause is separated from form, the induced fruit of mind and the rest does not arise co-present with form and does not operate relying on form. This demonstrates that mind and mental factors in the formless realm rely solely on one another.

8.30

"Why are they named the three realms of desire and so forth?" begins the catechism below, inquiring into the names of the three realms.

8.31

"Able to hold their own characteristics... the analogies are as explained before" is the answer: "realm" (dhātu) means either "holding" (dhāraṇa) or "lineage" (gotra); the two explanations are as before. The name "realm" is general, while "desire" and the rest are specific; the specific relies on the general, hence they are called "the realm of desire" and so forth. In full, one should say "the realm pertaining to desire"; abbreviating "pertaining to", one simply says "desire realm". Desire is that which pertains, and realm is that to which it pertains; combining the two, it is called the desire realm. Because desire is strong, one provisionally specifies desire, thereby designating the general realm by the specific. Just as with a person's district: the person is that which pertains, and the district is that to which it pertains. The realm pertaining to form being called the form realm should be understood in the same way. When there is black pepper in a beverage, it is called a pepper drink; when there is a diamond on a ring, it is called a diamond ring. In full, one should say "a beverage to which black pepper pertains" and "a ring to which a diamond pertains"; abbreviating the middle word, one speaks thus: these all attribute the specific to the general. That realm has no form, therefore it is called formless. The word "form" (rūpa) means that which undergoes transformation and obstruction, namely the ten kinds of form; or it means manifesting, namely the form base (rūpāyatana). Fearing that one might suspect that the formless has the absence of form as its substantial entity, he now explains: those four formless states are not form in their substantial entity, so the name "formless" is established; it is not that those formless states merely take an unconditioned non-entity—a place lacking form—as their substantial entity. The explanation of the formless realm and the two analogies are all in accordance with what was said before.

8.32

"Furthermore, the realm of desire... should be understood likewise" is the second explanation in terms of the genitive compound (tatpuruṣa). This realm is the realm of desire, hence it is called the desire realm. That is, it is the supporter of desire, because this realm can support desire. The realm is the supporter, and desire is that which is supported; combining the two, it is called the desire realm. The other two realms are likewise.

8.33

"Herein, what dharma is referred to by the word 'desire'?" is the question.

8.34

"Briefly stated, solid food... wondrous form" is the answer. Briefly stated, the craving induced by solid food and sexual intercourse is termed "desire". Below, a verse is cited again to prove that desire is craving, the general meaning of which can be understood. As the *Dharmaskandha*, fascicle 6, states: "However, the five wondrous sensual objects (kāmaguṇa) are not the real substantial entity of desire; the real substantial entity of desire is the craving conditioned by them. As the World-Honoured One said: 'The wondrous objects of the world are not real desire; / Real desire is man's conceptualized craving. / Wondrous objects abide in the world as they are; / The wise have eliminated desire therein.' The meaning of this verse is: lovely and wondrous sights, sounds, smells, tastes, and tangibles are not the real substantial entity of desire. The real substantial entity of desire is the conceptualized craving and attachment arising conditioned by them. Sensual objects remain as they are; the wise are called separated from desire in their regard. Thus the Venerable Śāriputra once recited this verse to others. At that time, an Ājīvika non-Buddhist was staying not far away and challenged Śāriputra with a verse, saying: 'If the wondrous objects of the world are not real desire, / And real desire is man's conceptualized craving, / Then a bhikṣu should be called one who experiences desire, / Because he gives rise to evil conceptual thoughts.' Then Śāriputra replied to the non-Buddhist: 'Giving rise to evil thoughts is indeed called experiencing desire. But not all bhikṣus give rise to unwholesome conceptual thoughts toward the wondrous objects of the world; therefore, you should not raise such an objection.' He then questioned that non-Buddhist in return with a verse, saying: 'If the wondrous objects of the world are real desire, / And desire is said not to be man's conceptualized craving, / Then your master should be called one who experiences desire, / Because he constantly views agreeable and wondrous form.' At that time, that non-Buddhist remained silent and could not answer, because his master indeed viewed lovely form. From this it is known that desire is craving, not the objective realm" (end of treatise passage). Question: Why are objective realms called desire? Explanation: Because they are implements of desire, they are called desire, just as implements of pleasure are called pleasure. Question: Why are they called wondrous? Answer: As the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, fascicle 173, explains in one interpretation: Furthermore, sensual desires are base, but those who crave them conceptually superimpose upon them and grasp them as pure and wondrous, hence they are called wondrous (explained extensively therein). Question: Why does it only speak of the five wondrous sensual objects and not mention mental phenomena (dharma)? Answer: As the *Mahāvibhāṣā* states: "Why are dharmas cognized by the mind not established as wondrous desires? Answer: Those which are entirely the intentional objects of love are established as wondrous desires. Among dharmas cognized by the mind, there are those that are not the intentional objects of love, so they are not established as wondrous desires" (explained extensively therein).

8.35

"If a dharma is in that [realm]... bound to the three realms?" asks: Are active dharmas in the three realms bound to the three realms?

8.36

"Not so" is the answer.

8.37

"How so?" is the inquiry.

8.38

"That among them which conforms to the increase... is bound to the three realms" is the answer. Among active dharmas in those three realms, that which conforms to and increases craving of the three realms is bound to the three realms.

8.39

"Herein, what dharma is named craving of the three realms?" asks again about craving of the three realms.

8.40

"Namely, that which individually conforms and increases in the three realms": the reply. That which individually conforms with and increases sāsrava dharmas in the three realms is called "attachment of the three realms".

8.41

"Now, what is said here [...] both fail to bring about understanding": an external objection. In the Western regions, when someone explains a meaning indistinctly, people tease them, saying it is like the "answer of tying the horse". What the author of the treatise says now is like the "answer of tying the horse". When non-Buddhists slay a horse to sacrifice to heaven and tie the horse to a post, someone asks, "Who is the one who tied the horse?" The reply is, "The horse's owner." "Who is the horse's owner?" The reply is, "The one who tied it."

8.42

These two replies both fail to bring about understanding, for one still does not know who the person is or what their name is, and thus they bring no understanding. One should know that the author of the treatise answering the question is also like this: I asked the author of the treatise about the dharmas bound to the three realms, and he answered that they are those in which the attachment of the three realms conforms and increases. I asked again what dharma is called the attachment of the three realms, and he answered me again that it refers to that which individually conforms and increases in the three realms. These two answers both fail to bring about understanding; one does not know what dharma is bound to the three realms, nor what dharma is attachment of the three realms. His answer is indistinct, just like the answer of tying the horse.

8.43

"Now, what is said here [...] is called bound to the formless realm": the author of the treatise answers. What is said now is not like your cited answer of tying the horse. For among the previously explained twenty places of the desire realm, in one who is not free from attachment, attachment is called attachment of the desire realm; the places which this attachment conforms with and increases are called dharmas bound to the desire realm. Among the previously explained seventeen places of the form realm, in one who is not free from attachment, attachment is called attachment of the form realm; the places which this attachment conforms with and increases are called dharmas bound to the form realm. Among the previously explained four places of the formless realm, in one who is not free from attachment, attachment is called attachment of the formless [realm]; the places which this attachment conforms with and increases are called dharmas bound to the formless realm. Attachment and the bound dharmas differ vastly in scope and are distinct in intrinsic nature—how could this be the same as tying the horse? The second explanation according to indeterminate [dharmas] and so forth should be understood in accordance with the preceding.

8.44

"How does desire-attachment arise with respect to the mind of creation belonging to the desire [realm]?": a question. When one attains the mind of creation belonging to the desire [realm], desire-attachment is already severed; if attachment is not yet severed, one cannot attain the mind of creation. How does attachment arise with respect to the mind of creation belonging to the desire [realm]?

8.45

"Because hearing from another [...] one generates greedy attachment": the reply. Either hearing from another, one generates relishing attachment toward a future mind of creation; or having regressed oneself, one generates relishing attachment toward a past mind of creation; or observing the sovereign power of the creator, one generates greedy attachment toward a present mind of creation.

8.46

"If the mind can create [...] because it creates fragrances and tastes": this is explained in passing as appropriate to the meaning.

8.47

"Is there only one such three realms?": a question about the number.

8.48

"The three realms are boundless [...] just like empty space": the reply. The three realms are boundless, which is why liberating sentient beings is difficult to exhaust. If one relies on the Mahīśāsakas, then there are sentient beings who newly begin without arising from karma and defilement; only from the second life onward do they arise from defilement and karma. Because they are repeatedly born, it is difficult for the Buddhas to liberate them exhaustively.

8.49

"How should the worlds be said to abide?": a question. Are they laid out horizontally, or are they stacked vertically?

8.50

"It should be said that they abide horizontally [...] without speaking of above and below": the Sarvāstivāda replies. They state that the worlds in the eight directions abide horizontally. Since the sūtra speaks of the four directions and does not speak of above and below, it is clear that they are arranged horizontally. When the sūtra speaks of the four directions, it subsumes the four intermediate directions as well. Furthermore, it says that the raindrops fall without interval and without interruption; this is an analogy for the worlds being boundless, without interval, and without interruption, whether dissolving or forming without ceasing for an instant.

8.51

"Some say that there are also [...] should be known to be likewise": some say that there are also the two directions of above and below, because the sūtras of other [schools, such as] the Dharmaguptakas, speak of ten directions. In the desire realms of these ten directions, when a sentient being is separated from the attachment of one desire realm, attachment to all desire realms in the ten directions is eradicated, because their characteristics are identical. Freedom from the form and formless realms should be known to be likewise. The area illuminated by one sun and moon is called one world. In a thousand worlds, there is one Brahmā king; the Brahmā king is universally the lord of the thousand worlds. However, when one gives rise to direct-knowledge cognition relying on the first dhyāna, the supernatural power that is produced can only go to the thousand worlds of one's own birth and to the Brahmā world of one's own birth; it cannot go to other worlds or other Brahmā worlds, because the places are distinct. When one gives rise to direct-knowledge cognition relying on the remaining second dhyāna and so on, it should be known to be likewise according to what is appropriate. Another explanation: the remaining four direct-knowledge cognitions should also be known to be likewise. This is stated with respect to worldlings; if stated with respect to noble persons, this is not fixed. This is stated with respect to the five superknowledges; if stated with respect to the destruction of the outflows, one can also universally realize the unconditioned of other realms.

8.52

"Having explained the three realms [...] sentient beings, not the intermediate state": from here below is the second part, explaining the five destinies. The upper two lines provide the direct answer, and the lower two lines delimit the dharmas.

8.53

"The treatise says: [...] a part of the celestial destiny": there is a prison below the earth called "hell"; this is a translation of the sense, and the Sanskrit name is naraka. If one relies on the explanation of the names of the five destinies in Nyāyānusāra 22, it says: "'Nara' means human, and 'ka' means evil. Humans mostly commit evil and tumble into it, hence it is called the naraka destiny. Or, it is called naraka because it is close to humans, for humans who commit grave transgressions quickly fall into it. Or again, 'ka' is an alternate name for joy; 'na' means non-existent; 'raka' has the sense of giving; having no joy to bestow is called naraka. Or again, 'raka' has the sense of rescue, and 'na' means impossible; being impossible to rescue is called naraka. Or again, 'raka' has the sense of cherishable, and not being cherishable is called naraka. The Mahāvibhāṣā says that it is called nairayika: 'nai' is a short vowel, referring to that destiny in general; 'nā' is a long vowel, referring to individual possession. The former is general and the latter is particular, the particular being possessed by the general; with reference to this distinct meaning, a distinct name is established. As for animals (tiryañc), it is because for the most part in that destiny their bodies abide horizontally, or because in that destiny there may be a small portion who move horizontally; moreover, because their kinds are numerous and because they have much delusion, they are named animals. As for hungry ghosts (preta), it means that in other lives they were fond of stealing others' possessions, accustomed to stinginess and greed, and so forth; moreover, they are mostly ancestors who were sacrificed to, and they mostly yearn and seek in order to sustain themselves; furthermore, they are mostly timid and wretched, their appearance emaciated, their bodies and minds flighty and agitated, hence they are called hungry ghosts. Humans (manuṣya) are said to make devas give rise to conceit in relation to them, thinking, 'Among this class of good destinies, I am supreme'; or their own minds have much overweening conceit, or they have much deliberate thought, hence they are called humans. Devas (deva) are said to have blazing radiant splendour, sport, converse, and boldly vie with one another; or they are exalted, their spiritual power sovereign, and they are prayed to by the multitude, hence they are devas (the above is the treatise text)." The Mahāvibhāṣā also explains the names of the five destinies, which cannot be detailed fully. The Mahāvibhāṣā 172 states that asuras are said by some to be subsumed under the celestial destiny, while the approved view is that they are subsumed under the ghost destiny. If one relies on the Saṃmatīya and Mahāsāṃghika schools, asuras are a sixth destiny. Question: What are the bodily forms and languages of the five destinies? The explanation says: The bodies of devas stand upright, and they all speak the noble language. The forms of humans are seen directly; at the beginning of the kalpa, they all spoke the noble language, and later, according to different localities, they produced various languages. Hungry ghosts at the beginning of the kalpa all spoke the noble language; later, according to different localities, their forms and languages became indeterminate. The bodily forms of animals are seen directly; at the beginning of the kalpa, they all spoke the noble language, and later, according to different localities, they produced various languages. Sentient beings in hell have forms like humans; upon initial birth, they all speak the noble language, and later, after undergoing suffering, they utter various sounds of suffering. The forms and languages of the five destinies are thus briefly explained according to the meaning of the Mahāvibhāṣā.

8.54

"Within the existent three realms [...] are the five destinies said to exist?": from here below explains the third line, raising the question.

8.55

"Some say wholesome and defiled [...] the nature is not the intermediate state": the reply. Destinies are strictly indeterminate and do not extend to the wholesome or defiled; this corresponds to the position of the evaluators in the Mahāvibhāṣā. If it were otherwise, saying that they extend to the wholesome and defiled, the destinies would be mutually confused, because within a single destiny the karma and defilements of all five destinies are fully accomplished. The five destinies are subsumed strictly under the category of sentient beings and do not extend to the external vessel, because this external vessel is also capable of being shared and used by the five destinies; [otherwise] it would also result in confusion, and therefore is not the essential nature of a destiny. The essential nature of the five destinies is not the intermediate state: a destiny is that which is gone to, whereas the intermediate state is not a destiny that is gone to, but an expedient means toward a destiny; therefore it is not subsumed under a destiny.

8.56

"The Prajñaptipāda-śāstra [...] namely, the intermediate state": by this, one knows that the intermediate state is not a destiny.

8.57

"The Dharmaskandha-śāstra [...] cultivated, and the intermediate state": quoting further proof. Being an eye excludes the ear and so forth. Among the twenty-two faculties, it is the eye faculty; among the twelve āyatanas, it is the eye āyatana; among the eighteen dhātus, it is the eye dhātu. As well as the eyes of the five destinies, the cultivated divine eye, and the eye of the intermediate state: since the intermediate state is stated separately from the five destinies, it is clear that the intermediate state is not subsumed under the five destinies.

8.58

"The sūtra also distinguishes the intermediate state from the destinies": citing a sūtra as proof.

8.59

"Which sūtra is it?": a question.

8.60

"Namely, the Sūtra on the Seven Existences [...] distinct from the destinies": the reply. Namely, the Sūtra on the Seven Existences: that sūtra states the intermediate state separately from the destinies as an expedient means toward a destiny, hence one knows that the intermediate state is not subsumed under the five destinies. This directly proves that the intermediate state is not a destiny, and taking advantage of this meaning, it concurrently reveals that the nature of a destiny is strictly indeterminate. That sūtra states karmic existence separately from the destinies as the cause of the five destinies, so one knows that the five destinies are maturation fruits; therefore, that destinies are strictly unobstructed and indeterminate is an established principle, because the sūtra distinguishes the karmic cause as distinct from the destinies.

8.61

"The masters of Kaśmīra [...] unobstructed and indeterminate": citing a sūtra again to prove that destinies are strictly indeterminate. "All outflows" directly reveals the defilements that initiate karma. "Karma to be experienced in hell" directly reveals their cause. "Crooked" refers to flattery; "defiled" refers to hatred; "turbid" refers to greed. Because their bodily, verbal, and mental [actions] arise from flattery, hatred, and greed, they are called crooked, defiled, and turbid actions of body, speech, and mind. This directly reveals karma whose experience is aligned with hell. Due to creating this evil karma, one undergoes the maturation fruit of the five skandhas in naraka. Once the maturation has arisen, it is called naraka. Apart from the dharmas of the five skandhas, that naraka cannot be found at all. Because of this sūtra statement, destinies are strictly unobstructed and indeterminate, since maturation fruits are strictly indeterminate.

8.62

"If so [...] because they conform and increase": an objection. The treatise states that all anuśayas conform and increase in the five destinies, so it is clear that they also extend to the defiled. If they were strictly indeterminate maturation fruits, that treatise ought to have said that what is abandoned by cultivation and universal anuśayas conform and increase in the five destinies; it should not have said "all". Since it says "all", it is clear that they extend to the defiled.

8.63

"That states the five destinies [...] collectively called a village": resolving [the objection]. In the continuation of life in the five destinies, various defilements can arise, which is called the destiny-entering mind. The destinies and the entering mind are collectively called "destinies", so there is no contradiction or flaw. The analogy is readily understood.

8.64

"Some say that the nature of a destiny [...] therefore it is stated separately": some Mahāsāṃghikas say that the nature of a destiny also extends to the wholesome and defiled. However, in the Sūtra on the Seven Existences, distinguishing karmic existence apart from the five destinies does not mean that speaking of karma separately makes it definitely not subsumed under destinies. The five turbidities refer to the kalpa turbidity, lifespan turbidity, sentient being turbidity, defilement turbidity, and view turbidity. Just as among the five turbidities, defilement and views are stated separately as turbidities, yet because they are stated separately, those views are not definitely un-subsumed under defilement, since the ten anuśayas are all defilements. Although karma is a destiny, to reveal the cause it is stated separately.

8.65

"If so, the intermediate state should also be a destiny": an objection. Although karmic existence is stated separately, it is said to be subsumed under a destiny. The intermediate state is also stated separately, so it should also be subsumed under a destiny.

8.66

"Not so; the meaning of a destiny [...] taking birth in that place of death": resolving the objection according to a different opinion. A destiny is that which is gone to, whereas the intermediate state is that which can go; it cannot be said that that which can go is the destiny gone to, for it takes birth right in the place of death.

8.67

"If so, the formless [realm] ... because of taking rebirth" is an objection. The intermediate existence is born right where one dies, and the intermediate existence is not subsumed under the destinies; [beings in] the formless [realm] are also born right where they die, so they too should not be subsumed under the destinies.

8.68

"Since this is so, the intermediate existence ... is called the intermediate existence" provides a better explanation. Because it is called the 'intermediate existence', it should not be called a 'destiny'. It is called the 'intermediate existence' because it takes birth in the middle between two destinies. If this were subsumed under the destinies, it should not be called 'intermediate'.

8.69

"However, that Venerable ... therefore spoke these words" is where the Mahāsāṃghika and others again reconcile the earlier sūtra. However, what that Venerable Śāriputra said—that only after retribution has arisen is it called a 'hell'—does not mean it is exclusively retribution; hence it includes wholesome and defiled [states] as well. That sūtra also states that 'apart from the five skandhas, that Naraka cannot be found', which was said in order to ward off the deviant adherence to a real pudgala, a real ātman, that is able to go to the various destinies. That was the reason for speaking thus, not to ward off the remaining wholesome and defiled skandhas.

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俱舍論記 — Classical Chinese