俱舍論疏 1.155

1.155

敘異說者，有人云：長短者，長、短極微各有別體，相雜而住，形長見短、形短見長。彈曰：此釋違其教、理。違教者，憑何經論作此釋耶？而違《成業論》及此論「一面多名長、一面少名短。」言違理者，一色之內具有長、短極微，形長見短、形短見長者。准此，無長不見短、無短不見長。若爾，有長有短同時相形，應見長見短。若無長短相形之時，應物不見長短二色。正對眼前作意取長短色，因何不見，要待相形？皆不應理。又待比方知，是意識境，非眼識取，眼識不能計度緣故。知為非理。又云：可量已去名長，不可量者名短。亦違教、理及違世間。違教者，如前引文。違理者，如觸中說，不可稱名輕、可稱名重，不簡多少，但牽秤下即名重觸。此亦應爾，但有分量即應名長，七微已上即有分量應名為長，世間即無見短色者。違世間者，一切世間皆不說可量名長、不可量名短。又自問答云：此短極微既有眾多，如何說彼而不可量？解云：雖有多體，而不可量。如輕極微雖有多體，而不可稱。短微雖多，而不可量。若言眼見非不可量，顯亦眼見，應當可量。若言同聚應可量者，香等同聚，應亦可量。此既雜住而不可量，短與長雜亦不可量。准上所釋，全無理趣，前後相違。准上標宗，釋長、短色別。第二釋云：可量已去名為長色，即是可量聚色名為長也，不可量聚名短色也。釋難即云：短微長微相雜而住，准此即是可量已去亦長亦短，不可量聚亦短亦長，豈不與宗自相乖反？又引觸例，亦不應理。極微體性非定是重，故有一類觸微不能牽秤，多亦非重，七微體是對礙法故。多必可量，如何成例？又自釋色相云：中凸名高、中凹名下。自問答云：長與高何別？短與下何殊？自釋云：長、短據橫，高、下就竪。准此，前後自相違也。豈可竪凸名高、橫凸名長？竪凹名下、橫凹名短？又諸大乘師皆云：聚顯以成長等，復說長等相待而立。明知即是假聚長等。此唯意緣，如何色處？又聚觸等何得無長？

Presenting the divergent views: Someone says: As for long and short, the long and short atoms each have distinct essences and reside intermingled; through the long configuration one sees the short, and through the short configuration one sees the long. We refute this: This explanation contradicts both scripture and logic. Contradicting scripture: Relying on which sūtra or treatise is this explanation made? It contradicts the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* and this treatise's "one face abundant is called long, one face deficient is called short." As for contradicting logic: if within one matter there are both long and short atoms, and through the long configuration one sees the short, and through the short configuration one sees the long, then according to this, without long one would not see short, and without short one would not see long. If so, when long and short simultaneously compare with each other, one should see both long and short. If there is no time when long and short compare with each other, one should not see the two configurations of long and short in an object. When directly facing an object and mentally attending to perceive long and short configurations, why should one fail to see them and have to wait for mutual comparison? None of this is logical. Furthermore, knowing only through comparison is the domain of mental consciousness, not an apprehension of visual consciousness, because visual consciousness cannot engage in deliberate calculation. Thus it is known to be illogical. Another says: That which is measurable and upward is called long; that which is not measurable is called short. This also contradicts scripture, logic, and worldly convention. Contradicting scripture: as in the texts cited earlier. Contradicting logic: as stated regarding tactile sensations, that which cannot be weighed is called light, and that which can be weighed is called heavy, without distinguishing between more or less—as long as it pulls the scale down, it is called a heavy tactile sensation. Here it should also be like this: as long as it has dimension, it should be called long; from seven atoms upward it has dimension and should be called long, and in the world there would be no one who sees short configuration. Contradicting worldly convention: the entire world never says that measurable is called long and unmeasurable is called short. Furthermore, they raise a question and answer themselves: Since these short atoms are numerous, how can you say they are not measurable? The answer: Although they are multiple in entity, they cannot be measured. Just as light atoms, though multiple in entity, cannot be weighed, so short atoms, though numerous, cannot be measured. If you say that being visible to the eye means they are not unmeasurable, color is also visible to the eye and should likewise be measurable. If you say that existing in the same aggregation means they should be measurable, fragrance, etc., existing in the same aggregation should likewise be measurable. Since they reside intermingled and cannot be measured, short intermingled with long likewise cannot be measured. Based on what was explained above, this lacks any rational principle and contradicts itself from beginning to end. Following the thesis stated above, it distinguishes between the two configurations of long and short. The second explanation states: that which is measurable and upward is called long configuration—that is, measurable aggregated matter is called long, and unmeasurable aggregated matter is called short configuration. Answering the objection, it says: short atoms and long atoms reside intermingled. According to this, that which is measurable and upward would be both long and short, and unmeasurable aggregated matter would also be both short and long; how is this not directly contradictory to the premise? Moreover, citing the example of tactile sensation is also illogical. The essence of an atom is not necessarily heavy; thus there is a type of tactile atom that cannot pull a scale down, and even when multiple, it is not heavy. Since seven atoms possess obstruction, multiple atoms must be measurable—how could that serve as an analogy? Furthermore, they explain the configuration characteristics themselves as: protruding in the center is called high, and indented in the center is called low. They raise their own question and answer: What is the difference between long and high? What is the distinction between short and low? They answer: Long and short pertain to the horizontal; high and low pertain to the vertical. According to this, it contradicts itself from beginning to end. How could vertical protrusion be called high, while horizontal protrusion is called long? How could vertical indentation be called low, while horizontal indentation is called short? Furthermore, the Mahāyāna masters all say: colors aggregate to form long, etc., and they also state that long, etc., are established relatively. It is clearly known that these are merely nominally aggregated long and the like. Since these are cognized only by the mind, how could they belong to the sense-field of form? And why would aggregates of tangible objects, etc., lack length?