俱舍論疏 1.154

1.154

論「此中正者至故今不釋」，逐難釋形色也。此形色相者，古今諸師多不得意，不依聖教妄述其相。今明此相，二門分別：一述正義、二敘異說出過。述正義者，大小乘論述八色相，皆無相待立長、短也。《大乘成業論》對有部等諸宗立八色相，及此論〈業品〉經部對有部立八色相，皆云「見面齊平起於正覺，見面參差起不正覺。見一面多便起長覺，見一面少便起短覺。見四面等便起方覺，見一切處生則起圓覺。見中凸出便起高覺，見中㘭凹便起下覺。」兩論少異，大意同也。准此論文，長短二色非相形立，是各別體勢。依論所立，體相各異。依大乘釋，即是顯色安布不同名為長、短等；依有部釋，別有形微攝持，成此八相差別。古來大小乘師迷一面多名長、一面少名短，作種種釋，皆不得意，遂謂相待以立長等。今釋：一面多者。六面之中一面多故。亦應是六面之中兩面多，恐難解故，故言一面。如竹、笋、越瓜等名為長色。若言兩面多，人即不解六面之中是何兩面，故言一面多也。一面少者，飜此可解。長即是細，短即是麁，故八色中不立麁細。《正理．業品》中云「離顯之外別有形微，是眼識境。積集長等，是假非實，唯意識緣，非眼識境。此假長等，要由形色攝持邊故方有分量。餘物入中，破別成分，中可穿鑿成孔穴等，方有形色。」論意但說顯外別有形微，不說八種形微體性別有。今詳形色長等有二：一相待得名、二形量各別。相待立名，體不定故，此中不明。形量各別，體不同故，是此所說。《婆沙》第九云「五相待有，謂此、彼岸，長、短等事」者，非是明色體類別也。長、短等事通餘法故，縱說於色亦不違此，是前相待得名攝故。就形量各別，復有二類：一外緣來，如金石，待工匠等成長等故。二種性異，如鹽性方，縱散成水，後還方故。越瓜自長、苽樓性短、胡桃高下，櫻桃自圓、豆角性邪，如是等物種類各別，若待緣成、若種類別，并皆不是相待立名。如針雖對苽樓是短，而是長色；苽樓雖對棗是長，而是短色。此等皆由長、短微力令成長等，長、短之微不相雜也。又即由此、於餘境中不立長等、無別形微令同時聚成長等故。餘文易了，故不釋也。

The treatise says: "Among these, the regular ... therefore it is not explained now." This explains the configurations by resolving difficulties. Regarding the characteristics of configuration, many ancient and modern masters have failed to grasp the intended meaning, arbitrarily presenting characteristics without relying on the sacred teachings. Now, to clarify these characteristics, they are analyzed under two headings: first, presenting the correct doctrine; second, stating the divergent views and exposing their flaws. In presenting the correct doctrine, both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna treatises expound the characteristics of the eight types of configuration without establishing "long" and "short" mutually relative to each other. In the *Mahāyānakarmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, responding to schools like the Sarvāstivādins, the characteristics of the eight configurations are established; and in this treatise's chapter "Karmanirdeśa", the Sautrāntikas responding to the Sarvāstivādins establish the eight configurations. Both say: "Seeing faces equal and level gives rise to the cognition of regular; seeing faces uneven and irregular gives rise to the cognition of irregular. Seeing one face abundant gives rise to the cognition of long; seeing one face deficient gives rise to the cognition of short. Seeing four faces equal gives rise to the cognition of square; seeing growth in all parts gives rise to the cognition of round. Seeing the center protruding gives rise to the cognition of high; seeing the center indented gives rise to the cognition of low." The two treatises differ slightly, but the main idea is identical. Following these treatises' texts, the two configurations of long and short are not established by mutual comparison; their individual natures and profiles are distinct. Based on what the treatises establish, their individual characters are distinct. According to the Mahāyāna explanation, long, short, etc. are simply designations for different arrangements of color; according to the Sarvāstivādin explanation, there are distinct configuration-atoms that maintain them, thus forming the differences among these eight characteristics. Ancient masters of Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna were confused about "one face abundant is called long" and "one face deficient is called short", offering various explanations that all failed to grasp the point, and consequently claimed they were established relatively. Now I explain: "one face abundant" means abundant among the six faces. It could also mean two faces being abundant among the six faces, but fearing difficulty in comprehension, it states "one face". Like bamboo, bamboo shoots, cantaloupe, and the like, which are called long configurations. If one said "two faces abundant", people would not comprehend which two faces among the six faces are meant; thus it says "one face abundant". "One face deficient" can be understood conversely. Long is slender, and short is thick; therefore thick and thin are not established among the eight configurations. In the "Karmanirdeśa" of the *Nyāyānusāra*, it says: "Apart from color, there are distinct configuration-atoms, which are the domain of visual consciousness. Aggregated long, etc., are nominal, not real; they are objects only of mental consciousness, not the domain of visual consciousness. These nominal long, etc., have measurement only because configuration-matter holds the boundaries together. Only when other things enter within, breaking it apart into fractions, and holes can be drilled into the center, etc., does configuration-matter exist." The treatise's intention is merely to say that distinct configuration-atoms exist apart from color, not that the eight kinds of configuration-atoms have distinct individual essences. Now, examining long, etc., among configurations, there are two kinds: first, acquiring the name relatively; second, having distinct dimensional forms. Since the essence is indeterminate when names are established relatively, it is not clarified here. Since the essences are distinct when dimensional forms are distinct, this is what is discussed here. When the ninth fascicle of the *Vibhāṣā* says: "Five exist relatively, namely this shore and that shore, long and short things, etc.," it is not clarifying the categories of color-matter's essence. Because long and short things apply generally to other phenomena, even if spoken with respect to matter, it does not contradict this, as it is subsumed under acquiring names relatively as mentioned above. Regarding having distinct dimensional forms, there are further two categories: first, arriving from external conditions, like gold and stone that rely on craftsmen to form long and the like; second, differences in nature, like the nature of salt being square—even if dissolved into water, it returns to squareness later. Cantaloupes are naturally long, snake gourds are naturally short, walnuts are uneven, cherries are naturally round, and bean pods are naturally curved. Such things belong to distinct kinds. Whether formed relying on conditions or differing by kind, neither is established by mutual relativity. For example, although a needle is short compared to a snake gourd, it is a long configuration; although a snake gourd is long compared to a jujube, it is a short configuration. These are all caused to become long, etc., by the power of long and short atoms; the long and short atoms do not mix. Furthermore, precisely because of this, long, etc., are not established in other sensory fields, for there are no distinct configuration-atoms causing them to aggregate simultaneously to form long and the like. The rest of the text is easy to understand, so it is not explained.