俱舍論疏 1.168

1.168

論「如不許一至聲亦應爾」，論主破也。如《婆沙》不許一顯色極微、二四大所造，故知一聲亦不得內外大種共造。今詳此意，論說聲因大種別者，是造義也，非唯緣擊發聲。《正理論》云「雖有執受與無執受二四大種共相扣擊，而俱為因、各別發聲，彼聲各據自所依故，不成三體。」問：何故但言可意、不可意，不言處中聲耶？答：若言可意、違意，即有處中。既言可意、不可意故，所以攝聲盡也，以除可意外皆是非可意故。此即可意聲狹、不可意寬，違意、處中皆是不可意故。又可意、不可意就情而說，非決定也。問：於色等中，何不說有可意、不可意等？答：亦應說有執受等為因之異，然因聲性難知，故但就因、情等說有差別。

[Regarding the] treatise's [statement]: "Just as it is not admitted that a single […] sound should also be thus": the author of the treatise refutes [them]. Just as the *Vibhāṣā* does not admit that a single paramāṇu of color is made by two sets of the four great elements, one thus knows that a single sound likewise cannot be jointly made by internal and external great elements. Now, examining this meaning: when the treatise states that the great elements causing sound are distinct, this is in the sense of making, not merely being the conditions for striking and issuing sound. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Although the two sets of four great elements—appropriated and unappropriated—strike against one another, both serve as causes and each separately issues a sound; since those sounds each reside in their own support, they do not form a third entity." Question: Why does it only speak of agreeable and disagreeable, and not of neutral sound? Answer: If it said agreeable and contrary-to-mind, there would be neutral. Since it says agreeable and disagreeable, it therefore subsumes sounds completely, because everything besides agreeable is non-agreeable. Thus, agreeable sound is narrower and disagreeable is broader, because both contrary-to-mind and neutral are disagreeable. Moreover, agreeable and disagreeable are stated in terms of sentient disposition, not definitively. Question: Among visible form and so forth, why does it not speak of agreeable, disagreeable, and so forth? Answer: Differences such as having appropriated [elements] as cause should also be stated [there], but because the nature of sound is difficult to know, differences are stated only in terms of cause, sentiment, and so forth.