俱舍論疏 1.181

1.181

論「於色界中至傳說如此」，已下第四界繫分別。上界決定無飢、渴二觸，不段食故。餘觸皆有，於理無違。「衣別不可稱」，重微少故，不能牽秤。聚集多即可稱，故知別時亦有重也。餘文可解。《婆沙》一百二十七「問：若色界中有重觸者，以何義故《施設論》說北俱盧洲衣重一兩，四王眾衣重半兩，三十三天衣重一銖，夜摩天衣重半銖，覩史多天衣重一銖中四分之一，樂變化天衣重一銖中八分之一，他化自在天衣重一銖中十六分之一。此上天衣皆不可稱耶？有說：色界衣雖不可稱，而餘物可稱。有說：彼界一一衣雖不可稱，多衣積集即可稱，如細縷、輕毛積集便重。」《正理論》云「觸謂所觸，十一為性。乃至若爾身根應成所觸，此既能觸彼，彼定觸此故。有說：身根唯能觸、非所觸，譬如眼根唯能見、非所見。復有說者：無有少法能觸少法，所依、所緣無間生時立觸名想。若依此識能得彼境，此於彼境假說能觸，境非識依故非能觸。即由此唯說地等名為所觸，依彼色等定非所觸。此中意顯依身根識不緣彼境而生起故。若彼色等非所觸者，如何花等由身觸時色等變壞？由彼所依被損壞故。現見所依有損益故能依損益，非此相違。如地方所甘澤沃潤、苗稼鮮榮，烈日所迫與此相違，故知所依大種被損，能依色等變壞，非餘。」《婆沙》一百二十七云「問：緣五色根所依大種發身識不？有說不發，如五色根不可觸故不發身識，所依大種理亦應然。問：何故說身識所識？答：依法性說身識所識，未來世中身識境故，然無現在發身識義。有說：除身根所依大種皆能發身識，以身根所依極隣近故不能發身識。然他身識所緣境故，亦得名為身識所識。」今詳兩釋恐非應理。於自身中異處相觸，何理能遮？或可自身異處亦得名他。又云「飢、渴二觸為是長養？為是等流？為是異熟生？西方師說：此非異熟，以飲食能斷故。又說：飢、渴亦通異熟生，以飲食暫斷，非永斷故。斷有二種，永斷、暫時斷。永斷不可續，非暫時斷，如地獄中斬裁身分，異熟生色斷已續生。迦濕彌羅國諸論師言：飽時彼亦不斷，飲食障故不可覺知，飲食消已還可覺知。」問：異熟者為善？不善？答：與《雜心》同。《婆沙》一百二十七云「不由大種偏增故生滑等，但由大種性類差別有生滑果，乃至有生渴果。有餘師言：水、火增故滑。地、風增故澁。火、風增故輕。地、水增故重。水、風增故冷。風增故飢。火增故渴。」無評家，今詳二義兼有。《雜心論》云「飢、渴，或是善報，謂富者飢、渴是善報。貧者飢、渴是不善報。」問：飢、渴何處大種所造？有說腹邊大種所造，有餘師說遍身大種所造，於飢、渴時遍身惱故。《正理論》云「餘所未說悶、力、劣等攝在此中，故不別說。」悶不離滑。力即澁、重。劣在輕軟，輕性中攝。如是其餘所觸種類，隨其所應十一中攝。准此十一觸攝一切觸盡，乃至火、風界增故生輕性，故死身內重性偏增。水、風界增故生於冷，由是亦說此所生悶。若爾，云何言不離滑，隨一一增？此無有過。或復悶者是滑差別，非唯滑性。應知此因亦有差別，是故滑性，或因水、風界增故起，或因水、火界增故生，所以二言無相違失。

The commentary states: "In the form realm... so it is traditionally explained." Below is the fourth [section], the differentiation according to realm. In the higher realms there definitely are no sensations of hunger and thirst, because there is no solid food. All the other tangibles are present, which does not contradict reason. "Individual garments cannot be weighed," because the heaviness is subtle and minute, unable to pull down the scales. When many are gathered together they can be weighed, from which we know that when separated they also possess weight. The remaining text is easily understood. The Vibhāṣā, scroll 127, asks: "If the form realm contains the tangible of heaviness, on what basis does the Kāraṇaprajñapti say that the garments of Uttarakuru weigh one liang, those of the Four Heavenly Kings half a liang, those of the Trāyastriṃśa devas one zhu, those of the Yāma devas half a zhu, those of the Tuṣita devas a quarter of a zhu, those of the Nirmāṇarati devas an eighth of a zhu, and those of the Paranirmitavaśavartin devas a sixteenth of a zhu, whereas the garments of the deities above these cannot be weighed at all? Some say: Although the garments of the form realm cannot be weighed, other objects can be weighed. Others say: Although each single garment of that realm cannot be weighed, when many garments are accumulated they can indeed be weighed, just as fine threads and light hairs become heavy when accumulated." The Nyāyānusāra states: "Touch refers to the tangible, eleven items being its nature. ...Up to: If that were so, the physical faculty of the body would become a tangible, because as this is able to touch that, that must touch this. Some say: The physical faculty of the body is solely capable of touching, not a tangible object, just as the faculty of the eye is solely capable of seeing, not an object seen. Others say: No entity can touch any entity; when the support and the objective support arise without interruption, the designation 'touch' is established. If, depending on this consciousness, one apprehends that object, this is figuratively said to be 'capable of touching' regarding that object, but the object is not the support of consciousness and hence not 'capable of touching'. Because of this, it is only earth, etc., that are called tangibles, while the color-forms dependent upon them are definitely not tangibles. The intent here is to clarify that the consciousness based on the body faculty arises without taking that [color] as its object. If those color-forms are not tangibles, why is it that when flowers and the like are touched by the body, their color and so forth alter and spoil? Because their supporting elements are injured and impaired. It is evident that when the support experiences injury or benefit, what is supported also experiences injury or benefit; this is not contradictory. Just as when a tract of land is moist with sweet rain, the crops flourish, whereas when oppressed by scorching sun, the opposite occurs; thus we know that when the supporting primary elements are harmed, the supported color and so forth are ruined, not otherwise." The Vibhāṣā, scroll 127, states: "Question: Does bodily consciousness arise taking the supporting primary elements of the five physical faculties as its object? Some say it does not arise, just as the five physical faculties, being non-tangibles, do not give rise to bodily consciousness, so by principle it should be the same for their supporting primary elements. Question: Why then is it said to be known by bodily consciousness? Answer: It is called known by bodily consciousness in terms of the nature of phenomena (dharmatā), as it is an object of bodily consciousness in future times, but there is no sense of it giving rise to bodily consciousness in the present. Others say: Except for the supporting primary elements of the body faculty, all can give rise to bodily consciousness; because the supporting elements of the body faculty are exceedingly adjacent, they cannot give rise to bodily consciousness. Yet because they are the objective field of another person's bodily consciousness, they may also be called known by bodily consciousness." Examining these two explanations now, I fear neither is in accord with reason. When different parts touch each other within one's own body, what principle could prevent it? Or perhaps different parts of one's own body may also be designated as 'other'. Furthermore, it says: "Are the two tangibles of hunger and thirst nutriment-grown (aupacayika), naturally-flowing (niṣyanda), or maturation-born (vipākaja)? The Western masters say: These are not maturations, because they can be cut off by food and drink. They also say: Hunger and thirst also extend to maturation-born, because food and drink interrupt them only temporarily, not permanently. There are two kinds of cutting off: permanent cutting off and temporary cutting off. Permanent cutting off cannot be continued, unlike temporary cutting off, just as in hell when body parts are sliced off, maturation-born form continues to grow after being severed. The masters of the Kaśmīra country say: When one is full, they are not severed either; because of the obstruction of food and drink, they are imperceptible, and when the food and drink are digested, they become perceptible again." Question: Are these maturations wholesome or unwholesome? Answer: It is the same as in the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya. The Vibhāṣā, scroll 127, states: "It is not that smooth and the rest are produced through an excess of a specific primary element, but rather, through the distinctive varieties of the primary elements, some produce the result of smoothness, up to some produce the result of thirst. Other masters say: From an excess of water and fire comes smoothness; from an excess of earth and wind comes roughness; from an excess of fire and wind comes lightness; from an excess of earth and water comes heaviness; from an excess of water and wind comes cold; from an excess of wind comes hunger; from an excess of fire comes thirst." There is no critical arbiter's opinion given; examining it now, both senses are present. The Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya states: "Hunger and thirst can be wholesome retributions, that is, hunger and thirst in the rich are wholesome retributions, whereas hunger and thirst in the poor are unwholesome retributions." Question: By the primary elements of which location are hunger and thirst created? Some say they are created by the primary elements around the abdomen; other masters say they are created by the primary elements throughout the whole body, because at times of hunger and thirst the entire body is afflicted. The Nyāyānusāra states: "The other unstated tangibles, such as faintness, strength, and weakness, are subsumed within these, hence they are not stated separately." Faintness is not separate from smoothness. Strength is roughness and heaviness. Weakness resides in lightness and softness, being subsumed within the nature of lightness. In this manner, other categories of tangibles are subsumed within the eleven according to their applicability. Following this, the eleven tangibles subsume all tangibles completely. ...Up to: Because of the increase of the fire and wind elements, lightness is produced, and therefore heaviness is particularly increased in a dead corpse. Because of the increase of the water and wind elements, cold is produced, and through this, the faintness produced thereby is also explained. If so, how can it be said not to be separate from smoothness, according to the increase of each one? There is no flaw in this. Alternatively, faintness is a distinction of smoothness, not smoothness alone. One should know that its causes also have distinctions; therefore, the nature of smoothness arises either due to an increase in the water and wind elements, or due to an increase in the water and fire elements, so the two statements do not conflict.