俱舍論疏 1.226

1.226

論「設許影光至未為釋難」，此縱釋破也。前不許寶與光為依破，後許為依義不同破。《正理》救云「此言意顯影等大種、樹等大種為所依故。所以者何？影等大種生、住、變時皆隨彼故。此影光言，意表總聚，非唯顯色，如樹、寶言。是故影等顯色極微，依止影等大種而轉，影等大種復依樹等大種而生，故於此中無不順過。」《正理》救縱云「此難不關毘婆沙義，能依所依許俱滅故。無表所依大種若滅，能依無表未嘗不滅。初念無表可與所依大種俱滅，第二念等無表云何？第二念等大種若無，其無表色豈得現有？雖此位中非無大種，而彼大種非此所依，非生因故。奇哉！如是善解對法，豈不非唯生因大種望所造色能為所依，然更有餘四因大種望所造色許為依故。若彼所依大種滅已，能依無表猶不滅者，聖生無色無漏無表既許成就應得現前。生、依二因大種滅已，無漏無表雖成不行。故知欲界無表行者，定由所依大種不滅，此若不爾，彼云何然？由此諸師咸作是說：諸所造色有二種依，一生起依、二力轉依。聖生無色由力轉依大種無故，無漏無表雖復成就而不現行。」已上《正理》引例釋。今破《正理》無色界中雖成下地無表而不行者，以必不起下地定故。若謂以無依因大種生第四定，成下五地無漏無表有依因大。此豈得生上起下無表耶？然眼等識所依五根雖有變礙而不成色，由彼種類有別異故，有識種類不依於色，唯五識身依色而起。六識皆用意為所依，無色界中意亦可得。乃至又理不應六識自性一法種類亦色非色。無有無表不依色生，故應所依有變礙故，能依無表亦得色名。述曰：一切識依意，雖一分識亦依於色，故不名色。無表一切依色，故名色也。又言色者，如牛、孔雀，依少分類以立想名，非無差別，不應為難。述曰：水牛名地眠，孔雀名地叫，非一切時眠叫。又如世說急食、急行故名為馬，而非一切。雖無彼德而似彼故，種類義成，但隨少分建立名想。此亦如是，由此即釋，定不生法住色相故亦得色名。述曰：同牛及孔雀，亦可用此釋無表色。俱舍師破云：汝言影等大種、樹等大種為所依者，何異影等依於樹等、樹等望彼皆是疎依，並非親生。等非能造，汝說影等大種依樹等大種，還是違宗，故救非理。又破救縱云：汝意立初念生因大種，望第二念等無表能為所依。第二念等四因大種，望第二念等同時無表亦為所依。故說能依、所依俱滅，同樹等滅，影等隨滅。即言初念大種為生因，第二念大種為依等四因者，豈有別世兩具四大種，共為五因生一所造？諸論皆說：一切四大望所造色皆具五因。故《婆沙》一百三十二云「過去大種與未來所造色為幾緣？答：因、增上。因者五因，謂生等五。增上者，如前說。現在大種與未來亦爾，現在與現在亦爾。」准此文，初念大種望第二念所造色具五因，云何乃言但作生因？若轉救言：初念大種為生因者，即五因皆名生因，以親能生造色故。第二念四因大種名依等四因，雖初念大種得具五因，第二念大種即關生因，還有別世兩具四大共造色過。若轉救言：第二念四因大種者，非是依等四因。即四大種各為一因，名為四因，總是依因。故諸論說：初念大種為能生因，現在大種能為依因。若作此救，雖無闕因之過，既言第二念大種為所依，為別起大種？為即造身根等大種？為是親所依？為是疎依？若言即是身根等大種，望無表色但為疎依者，我亦許此同時疎依，非親所依。無表不由同時依力而得色名，但由初念所依力故而得色名。由此理故，初念大種為親所依，可得同彼影、光二種親依樹、寶。故我就此說所依滅無表不滅，不可說彼疎為所依，但應言依，彼說所依言中有過。若言無表亦望同時疎依得名色者，眼等五根望眼等識亦是疎依，應眼識等亦名為色。又由彼力得名色者，應是能造。若是能造，還應具有生等五因。故為非理。

Regarding the Śāstra's statement: "Even if it were granted that shadow and light... still this would not resolve the objection": this refutes [the opponent] by way of granting their premise. Previously, the refutation was that a jewel is not conceded to be the support for light; subsequently, the refutation is that even if it were conceded to be the support, the meaning differs. The Nyāyānusāra defends [the position], stating: "These words intend to indicate that the great elements of the shadow and the like have the great elements of the tree and the like as their support. Why is this so? Because when the great elements of the shadow and the like are produced, abide, or undergo change, they all follow the other. These words 'shadow' and 'light' intend to denote aggregates as wholes, not merely visible colors, just as do the words 'tree' and 'jewel'. Therefore, the atoms of visible color such as shadow proceed relying upon the great elements of the shadow and the like, while the great elements of the shadow and the like further arise relying upon the great elements of the tree and the like; hence, herein there is no fault of contradiction." The Nyāyānusāra further defends by granting: "This objection does not pertain to the meaning of the Vibhāṣā, because that which relies and that which is relied upon are conceded to perish together. If the great elements that are the support of unmanifest form perish, that which relies—the unmanifest form—never fails to perish. [An opponent might say:] The unmanifest form of the first moment may perish together with its supporting great elements, but what about the unmanifest form of the second moment and so on? If the great elements of the second moment and so on do not exist, how could their unmanifest form exist in the present? Although great elements are not absent at this stage, those great elements are not the support of this [unmanifest form], because they are not its cause of generation (janana-hetu). [To this we reply:] How marvelous! Such a fine understanding of the Abhidharma! How could it not be that not only the great elements acting as the cause of generation can serve as the support with respect to derived form, but rather the great elements of the remaining four causes are also conceded to serve as supports with respect to derived form? If, when those supporting great elements have already perished, the reliant unmanifest form still did not perish, then when an ārya is born in the formless realm, since they are conceded to possess (samanvāgama) uncontaminated unmanifest form, it should become actualized. Once the great elements of the two causes—generation and support—have perished, the uncontaminated unmanifest form, though possessed, does not occur. Therefore one knows that the occurrence of unmanifest form in the desire realm is definitely due to the supporting great elements not perishing. If this were not so, how could that be the case? For this reason, the masters all speak thus: All derived forms have two kinds of supports: first, the support for arising (samutthāna-āśraya); second, the support for functioning through power (pravṛtti-āśraya). When an ārya is born in the formless realm, because the great elements that serve as the support for functioning through power are absent, uncontaminated unmanifest form, although possessed, does not become actualized." The above is the explanation citing parallels from the Nyāyānusāra. Now, refuting the Nyāyānusāra: the reason why one born in the formless realm, though possessing unmanifest form of the lower spheres, does not have it occur, is because they definitely do not produce dhyāna of a lower sphere. If you claim that it is because of the absence of great elements as supporting cause—if one produces the fourth dhyāna, one possesses the uncontaminated unmanifest form of the lower five spheres and there are great elements acting as supporting cause: how could one, born in a higher [stage], produce an unmanifest form of a lower [stage]? Furthermore, although the five faculties that are the supports of visual consciousness and the rest have obstruction (pratigha), they do not become form, because their species is distinct: there are species of consciousness that do not rely on form, and only the five consciousness-bodies arise relying on form. All six consciousnesses employ the mind (manas) as their support; in the formless realm, mind is also to be found. And furthermore, it is unreasonable that the intrinsic nature of the six consciousnesses, as one single species of phenomena, should be both form and non-form. There is no unmanifest form that does not arise relying on form; therefore, because its support has obstruction, the reliant unmanifest form also receives the designation 'form'. Commentary: All consciousnesses rely on the mind; although one part of consciousness also relies on form, [consciousness as a whole] is not designated as form. All unmanifest forms rely on form, and therefore they are designated as form. Furthermore, as for the designation 'form', just as with 'ox' or 'peacock', the conceptual designation is established based on a minor feature of its kind, not that there is no distinction; this should not be raised as an objection. Commentary: A buffalo is called 'earth-sleeper' and a peacock is called 'earth-crier', but they do not sleep or cry at all times. Again, just as worldly convention calls something a 'horse' because it eats quickly and walks quickly, yet it does not do so in every respect. Although it lacks those virtues [constantly], because it resembles them, the sense of its kind is established, and the conceptual designation is established merely following a partial feature. This is likewise so; by this, it is explained that phenomena which definitely do not arise also receive the designation 'form' because they abide in the characteristics of form. Commentary: As with 'ox' and 'peacock', this can also be used to explain unmanifest form. The Kośa masters refute this, saying: When you say that the great elements of shadow and the like have the great elements of the tree and the like as their support, how does this differ from the shadow and the like relying on the tree and the like? The tree and the like, with respect to the other, are all indirect supports (dūrata-āśraya) and are not directly generative; being equally not the creators (upādātr), your statement that the great elements of shadow and the like rely on the great elements of the tree and the like still contradicts your own school's tenet, and therefore the defense is illogical. Furthermore, refuting the defense granting the premise: Your intention is to establish that the great elements of the cause of generation in the first moment can serve as the support with respect to the unmanifest form of the second moment and so on, and that the four-cause great elements of the second moment and so on also serve as the support with respect to the simultaneous unmanifest form of the second moment and so on. Therefore you say that that which relies and that which is relied upon perish together, just as when a tree or the like perishes, its shadow or the like perishes along with it. If you say that the great elements of the first moment are the cause of generation and the great elements of the second moment are the four causes such as support, how could there be two sets of the four great elements belonging to different time periods acting together as five causes to produce a single derived form? All treatises state: With respect to derived form, all four great elements are completely endowed with five causes. Thus, the Vibhāṣā, fascicle 132, states: 'How many conditions do past great elements serve for future derived form? Answer: Causal condition and dominant condition. As for causal condition, it is the five causes, namely the five beginning with generation. As for dominant condition, it is as explained before. Present great elements with respect to future [derived form] are also like this; present with respect to present are also like this.' According to this text, the great elements of the first moment possess the five causes with respect to the derived form of the second moment; how can you claim that they only serve as the cause of generation? If you modify your defense, saying: When the great elements of the first moment are the cause of generation, all five causes are called the cause of generation because they are directly able to generate the derived form; and the four-cause great elements of the second moment are called the four causes such as support—then although the great elements of the first moment would be endowed with all five causes, the great elements of the second moment would lack the cause of generation, and there would still be the fault of two sets of the four great elements in different time periods jointly creating a derived form. If you modify your defense, saying: The four-cause great elements of the second moment are not the four causes such as support, but rather each of the four great elements serves as one cause, and these are called four causes, which altogether constitute the cause of support; thus the treatises say that the great elements of the first moment are the cause capable of generation, and the present great elements are able to serve as the cause of support—if you make this defense, although it avoids the fault of lacking causes, since you state that the great elements of the second moment are the support, are they a distinct set of great elements that have arisen, or are they the very great elements that create the physical bodily faculty and so forth? Are they a direct support (sākṣād-āśraya), or an indirect support? If you say they are the very great elements of the bodily faculty and so forth, serving only as an indirect support with respect to unmanifest form, I also concede this simultaneous indirect support, but not a direct support. Unmanifest form does not obtain the name 'form' through the power of a simultaneous support, but only obtains the name 'form' through the power of the support in the first moment. Due to this reasoning, the great elements of the first moment are the direct support, and can be compared to shadow and light directly relying on the tree and the jewel. Therefore, regarding this, I maintain that when the support perishes, the unmanifest form does not perish; you cannot speak of that indirect [condition] as the support (āśraya)—you should only speak of it as a reliance (āśrita/pratyaya); there is a fault in their use of the word 'support'. If you say that unmanifest form also obtains the name 'form' with respect to a simultaneous indirect support, then the five faculties such as the eye are also indirect supports with respect to the consciousnesses such as visual consciousness, and visual consciousness and the rest should also be named 'form'. Furthermore, if it obtains the name 'form' through their power, they ought to be the creators; and if they are creators, they should still possess the five causes beginning with generation. Therefore, [your defense] is illogical.