俱舍論記 1.185

1.185

「設許」以下縱破。假設許汝影、光依止樹、寶，而無表色不同彼影、光依止樹、寶。彼宗許所依大種雖滅，而無表色常相續生不隨滅故，是故此師未為釋難。《正理》救云「此言意顯影等大種，樹等大種為所依故。所以者何？影等大種生、住、變時皆隨彼故。此影、光言，意表總聚，非唯顯色，如樹寶言。是故影等顯色極微，依止影等大種而轉，影等大種復依樹等大種而生，故於此中無不順過。」《正理》救縱破云「此難不關毘婆沙義，能依所依許俱滅故。無表所依大種若滅，能依無表未甞不滅。初念無表，可與所依大種俱滅。第二念等無表云何？第二念等大種若無，其無表色豈得現有？雖此位中非無大種，而彼大種非此所依，非生因故。奇哉如是，善解對法。豈不非唯生因大種望所造色能為所依，然更有餘四因大種望所造色許為依故。」俱舍師破云：汝言影等大種，樹等大種為所依者，何異影等依於樹等？樹等望彼皆是疎依，竝非親生，等非能造。汝說影等大種依樹等大種，還是違宗，故救非理。又破救縱云：汝意云初念生因大種，望第二念等無表能為所依。第二念等四因大種，望第二念等同時無表亦為所依。故說能依、所依俱滅，同樹等滅，影等隨即滅。言初念大種為生因，第二念大種為依等四因者，豈有別世兩具四大共為五因，生一所造？諸論皆說：一切四大望所造色皆具五因。故《婆沙》一百三十二云「過去大種與未來所造色為幾緣？答：因、增上。因者五因，謂生等五。增上者，如前說。」又云「過去大種與現在所造色為幾緣？答：因、增上。因者五因，謂生等五。增上者，如前說。」又云「現在大種與未來所造色為幾緣？答：因、增上。因者五因，謂生等五。增上者，如前說。」准彼論文，初念大種望第二念所造色具五因，云何乃言但作生因？若轉救言初念大種為生因者，即五因皆名生因，以親能生造色故。第二念四因大種名依等四因。雖初念大種得具五因，第二念大種即闕生因，還有別世兩具四大共造色過。若轉救言第二四念因大種者，非是依等四因，即四大種各為一因名為四因，總是依因。故諸論說初念大種能為生因，現身大種能為依因。若作此救，雖無闕因之過，既言第二念大種為所依，為別起大種？為即造身根等大種？為是親所依？為是疎依？若言即是身根等大種，望無表色但為疎依者，我亦許此同時疎依非親所依，無表不由同時依力而得色名，但由初念所依力故而得色名。由此理故，初念大種為親所依，可得同彼影、光二種，親依樹、寶故。我約此說所依滅無表不滅，不可說彼疎依為所依，但應言依，彼說所依言中有過。若言無表亦望同時疎依得名色者，眼等五根望眼等識亦是疎依，應眼識等亦名為色。又由彼力得名色者，應是能造。若是能造，還應具有生等五因。故為非理。

"Even granting..." and so forth is a concession followed by a refutation. Even grant you that shadow and light rely upon tree and jewel; non-revelatory form nonetheless is unlike shadow and light relying upon tree and jewel. For that school allows that although the foundational great elements perish, non-revelatory form continuously arises in succession and does not perish along with [them]; therefore, this master has not resolved the objection.

*Nyāyānusāra* rescues it, saying: "The intention of these words is to show that the great elements of the shadow, etc., have the great elements of the tree, etc., as their basis. Why is this so? Because when the great elements of the shadow, etc., arise, abide, and alter, they all follow them. These words 'shadow' and 'light' are intended to express the composite aggregate, not solely the visible color, just as with the words 'tree' and 'jewel'. Therefore, the subtle atoms of visible color such as shadow operate relying upon the great elements of the shadow, etc., and the great elements of the shadow, etc., in turn arise relying upon the great elements of the tree, etc.; hence, there is no error of incongruity here."

*Nyāyānusāra* rescues [it from] the concession-refutation, saying: "This objection does not pertain to the tenets of the Vibhāṣā, for it is accepted that the supported and the supporting perish together. If the great elements that are the support of the non-revelatory [form] perish, the supported non-revelatory [form] has never failed to perish. The non-revelatory [form] of the initial moment may indeed perish together with its supporting great elements. What of the non-revelatory [form] of the second moment and onward? If the great elements of the second moment and onward were absent, how could their non-revelatory form exist in the present? Although great elements are not absent in this state, those great elements are not its support, because they are not its generating cause (janana-hetu). How wondrous is such an understanding of the Abhidharma! Is it not the case that it is not merely the great elements that are the generating cause that are capable of serving as the support with respect to the derived form, but rather the great elements of the remaining four causes are also accepted as the support with respect to the derived form?"

The Kośa master refutes this, saying: When you say that the great elements of the shadow, etc., have the great elements of the tree, etc., as their support, how is this different from the shadow, etc., relying on the tree, etc.? With respect to them, the tree, etc., are all remote supports; neither directly generates [them], and equally neither is the producing cause. Your statement that the great elements of the shadow, etc., rely upon the great elements of the tree, etc., still contradicts the school's tenets; therefore, the rescue is unreasonable.

Moreover, refuting the rescue of the concession: Your intention is that the generating-cause great elements of the first moment can serve as the support with respect to the non-revelatory [form] of the second moment onward, while the four-cause great elements of the second moment onward also serve as the support with respect to the simultaneous non-revelatory [form] of the second moment onward; hence you state that the supported and the supporting perish together, just as when a tree, etc., perishes, the shadow, etc., immediately perishes along with it. To say that the great elements of the first moment are the generating cause and the great elements of the second moment are the four causes of reliance, etc.—how could two sets of the four great elements belonging to distinct temporal periods together serve as the five causes to produce a single derived form? The treatises all state: All four great elements, with respect to derived form, are fully possessed of the five causes. Thus the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, fascicle 132, states: "As how many conditions do past great elements serve for future derived form? Answer: As cause and sovereign [conditions]. Cause means the five causes, namely the five beginning with generation. Sovereign is as explained before." It also states: "As how many conditions do past great elements serve for present derived form? Answer: As cause and sovereign [conditions]. Cause means the five causes, namely the five beginning with generation. Sovereign is as explained before." It also states: "As how many conditions do present great elements serve for future derived form? Answer: As cause and sovereign [conditions]. Cause means the five causes, namely the five beginning with generation. Sovereign is as explained before." Based on the text of that treatise, the great elements of the first moment are possessed of the five causes with respect to the derived form of the second moment; why then do you say that they only serve as the generating cause?

If one turns to rescue it by saying that when the great elements of the first moment are called the generating cause, all five causes are called the generating cause because they can directly generate the derived form, whereas the four-cause great elements of the second moment are called the four causes of reliance, etc.: although the great elements of the first moment would then be possessed of the five causes, the great elements of the second moment would lack the generating cause, and there would still be the flaw of two sets of the four great elements from distinct temporal periods co-producing the form.

If one turns to rescue it by saying that the four-cause great elements of the second moment are not the four causes of reliance, etc., but rather the four great elements each serve as one cause and are thus called the four causes, all together being the cause of reliance: therefore the treatises say that the great elements of the first moment can serve as the generating cause, while the great elements of the present body serve as the cause of reliance. If one offers this rescue, although there is no flaw of lacking a cause, since it is said that the great elements of the second moment are the support, do they arise as distinct great elements, or are they the very great elements that produce the bodily faculty, etc.? Are they the direct support, or a remote support? If you say they are the very great elements of the bodily faculty, etc., and are only a remote support with respect to non-revelatory form, I also accept that this simultaneous remote support is not the direct support; non-revelatory form does not obtain the name 'form' through the power of a simultaneous support, but obtains the name 'form' solely through the power of the support of the initial moment. By this principle, because the great elements of the initial moment are the direct support, they may be likened to those two kinds—shadow and light—which directly rely upon tree and jewel. Grounded on this, I state that when the support perishes, the non-revelatory [form] does not perish; one cannot call that remote support 'the support' (āśraya), but should only call it a 'reliance' (āśrita); his statement concerning 'the support' contains a flaw. If you say that non-revelatory form also obtains the name 'form' with respect to the simultaneous remote support, then the five faculties such as the eye are also remote supports with respect to the consciousnesses such as the eye-consciousness, and the eye-consciousness, etc., ought also to be named 'form'. Furthermore, if it obtains the name 'form' by their power, they ought to be the producing [elements]. If they are the producing [elements], they should still possess the five causes beginning with generation. Therefore, [the rescue] is unreasonable.