俱舍論疏 1.242

1.242

「論曰至故名識蘊」，長行釋中有二：一釋識蘊并分處、界；二總結五蘊并分處、界。前文有三：一釋名義；二分為六；三立處、界。此所舉文釋識名義，即六識身各了自境，於自境處總取境相、不別取像，印、持等故名總取也，非是總、別相中取總想也。《正理論》云「識謂了別者，是唯總取境界相義。各各總取彼彼境相，各各了別。謂彼眼識，雖有色等多境現前，然唯取色，不取聲等。」釋各別取境義。唯取青等，非謂青等（論既言唯，故知不通取別，簡勝解也）。亦非可意不可意等，簡觸、受所取也。非男女等、非人杌等、非得失等（隨其所應，簡心所也）。如彼眼識，於其自境唯總取相。如是餘識，隨應當知（准上言唯，定不取別）。又《顯宗》云「識謂了者，是唯總取境界相義。各各總取彼彼境相，名各了別。謂識唯能總取境相，非能取別。」《入阿毘達磨》第二云「唯總分別色等境，非彼境相差別事，說名為識。若能分別差別相者，即名受等諸心所法。識無彼用，但作所依。」准上三論有四唯一，但取總之文決定，不可言兼別也。心所法中無一唯別，容作兩釋。有人不得論意，妄為四解，亦不可是非何者為勝，乃疑後學令迷論說。其四解者，第一解云：於境之中有二種相。一者總相，謂色、聲等。二者別相，謂違、順等。心、心所法於所緣境，心取總相不能取別；心所各自取境別相，不能取總。以於一體無多解故，故《入阿毘達磨論》第二云「唯總分別色等境事說名為識。若能分別差別相者，即名受等諸心所法。識無彼用，但作所依。」第二解云：心王正取總相，兼取別相。諸心所法，各自取別相，非能取總相。此義意說：心王力強，能取總別。心所力劣，取別非總。破曰：違文無教，不可依據。第三解云：諸心所法，各各正能取自別相，兼取總相。心王但取總相非別。此義意說：王所作處，心所必隨，故心所法兼能取總。王非隨所，故不取別。破曰：喻不相似。王能總領，臣豈遍攝？無文違喻，不可依也。第四解云：心、心所法一一皆能取總別相。然彼心王，正取總相，兼取別相。諸心所法，各各正能取自別相，兼能取他別相及與總相。所以得知諸心、心所皆能取境總別相者，如《婆沙》第三十四無慚納息中，解無慚行相云「有餘師說：此顯無慚行相。此行相對餘應作四句：有無慚非無慚行相轉，謂無慚作餘行相轉。有無慚行相轉非無慚，謂無慚相應法作無慚行相轉。有無慚亦無慚行相轉，謂無慚作無慚行相轉。有非無慚亦非無慚行相轉，謂若取此種類應說無慚相應法作餘行相轉。若不爾者，應說除前相。」解無愧中亦有四句，不能具引。以此准知，皆取總、別。破曰：有人雖引文證，不知正不。且如受領隨觸、想取境像，豈可亦說想領隨觸、受取境像？理必不然。諸心、心所同一行相者，謂取青等諸法自共相等，非是心、心所法各別取像等也。《婆沙》三十四云「云何無慚？答：諸無慚無所慚、無羞無所羞，乃至無敬性等。乃至問：此中所說差別名言，為顯自性？為顯行相？為顯所緣？一說顯自性、二說顯行相、三說顯所緣。」准三十八云「云何不共無明隨眠？答：諸無明於苦不了，於集、滅、道不了。此中不了者，顯不欲忍義，謂由無明迷覆心故，於四聖諦不欲不忍，故名不了，非但不明。如貧賤人惡食在腹，雖遇好食不欲食之。異生亦爾，無明覆心，聞四聖諦，不欲不忍。問：此中所說不了名言，為顯自性？為顯行相？為顯所緣。有作是說：此顯無明自性。有餘師說：此顯無明行相。復有說者，此顯無明所緣。評曰：應作是說。如是無明於四聖諦，乃至不決擇以為自性。」准此評文，故知初師為正。無慚亦爾，所作四句非是正義，故不成證。今詳論意，心、心所法，雖同取青等總、別相等，然於此相有即印持、取像等多種不同，名為取別。心王總取境相，別相難知。如臺六司同理一國，然所理事各各不同。王則總理，別相難了。

Regarding the commentary statement from "The text says" up to "therefore it is called the consciousness skandha": within the prose commentary there are two parts: first, explaining the consciousness skandha and classifying [it into] the āyatanas and dhātus; second, summarizing the five skandhas and classifying [them into] the āyatanas and dhātus. The earlier text has three parts: first, explaining the meaning of the name; second, dividing it into six; third, establishing [it as] āyatanas and dhātus. This cited text explains the meaning of the name "consciousness": namely, the six bodies of consciousness each cognize their own object, generally grasping the general characteristics of the object at their own objective domain without specifically grasping its image, determining, maintaining, and so forth; thus it is called "generally grasping," not grasping the general mental conception among general and specific characteristics. The Nyāyānusāra states: "Consciousness being 'cognition' means exclusively grasping the general characteristics of the objective domain. Each [consciousness] generally grasps its respective objective characteristics, and each cognizes them. That is to say, although many objects such as visible forms are present before that eye-consciousness, it grasps only visible forms and does not grasp sounds, and so forth." This explains the meaning of each separately grasping its object. Grasping only blue and the like does not mean [grasping] the specific blue and the like. (Since the treatise says "only," we know it does not extend to grasping specific particulars, thereby excluding resolve.) Nor is it agreeable, disagreeable, and the like, thereby excluding what is grasped by contact and feeling. Nor is it male, female, and the like, human, stump, and the like, gain, loss, and the like (excluding the mental factors as appropriate). Just as that eye-consciousness exclusively and generally grasps the characteristic of its own object, so should the other consciousnesses be known accordingly. (Following the word "only" above, it definitely does not grasp specific particulars.) Furthermore, the Samayapradīpikā states: "Consciousness being 'cognition' means exclusively grasping the general characteristics of the objective domain. Each [consciousness] generally grasping its respective objective characteristics is called 'each cognizing.' That is, consciousness can only generally grasp the characteristics of the object; it cannot grasp specific particulars." The Abhidharmāvatāra, fascicle two, states: "Exclusively and generally discerning objects such as visible forms, not the specific particulars of those objective characteristics, is called 'consciousness.' If one can discern the specific characteristics, that is precisely the mental factors such as feeling. Consciousness does not have that function; it merely serves as the basis." Basing ourselves on the three treatises above, there are four occurrences of "exclusively"; the text indicating that it grasps only the general is definitive, and it cannot be said to concurrently grasp the specific. Among mental factors, none is "exclusively specific," allowing for two interpretations. There are some who, failing to grasp the treatise's meaning, fabricate four explanations, yet one cannot tell which is superior, only causing later students to doubt and confuse the treatise's teachings. As for the four explanations: The first explanation states: within an object there are two kinds of characteristics. First, the general characteristics, namely visible forms, sounds, and so forth. Second, the specific characteristics, namely discordant, concordant, and so forth. Mind and mental factors regarding the object: the mind grasps the general characteristics and cannot grasp the specific; the mental factors each grasp their own specific characteristics of the object and cannot grasp the general. Because on a single entity there cannot be multiple understandings. Therefore the Abhidharmāvatāra, fascicle two, states: "Exclusively and generally discerning objective things such as visible forms is called 'consciousness.' If one can discern the specific characteristics, that is precisely the mental factors such as feeling. Consciousness does not have that function; it merely serves as the basis." The second explanation states: the primary mind directly grasps the general characteristics and concurrently grasps the specific characteristics. The various mental factors each grasp their own specific characteristics and cannot grasp the general characteristics. The idea of this view is: the primary mind has great strength, so it can grasp both the general and the specific. The mental factors have inferior strength, so they grasp the specific and not the general. Refutation: this contradicts the texts and lacks doctrinal support; it cannot be relied upon. The third explanation states: the various mental factors each directly grasp their own specific characteristics and concurrently grasp the general characteristics. The primary mind only grasps the general characteristics and not the specific. The idea of this view is: wherever the king acts, the ministers must follow, so mental factors can concurrently grasp the general. The king does not follow the ministers, so he does not grasp the specific. Refutation: the metaphor is inapt. A king can govern in general, but how could a minister subsume everything? Lacking textual support and contradicting the metaphor, it cannot be relied upon. The fourth explanation states: mind and mental factors can each and every one grasp both general and specific characteristics. However, that primary mind directly grasps the general characteristics and concurrently grasps the specific characteristics. The various mental factors each directly grasp their own specific characteristics and can concurrently grasp the specific characteristics of others as well as the general characteristics. How is it known that all minds and mental factors can grasp both the general and specific characteristics of the object? As in the Vibhāṣā, fascicle thirty-four, in the section on shamelessness, explaining the mode of activity of shamelessness: "Other masters say: this reveals the mode of activity of shamelessness. Regarding this mode of activity in relation to the rest, four alternatives should be made: there is shamelessness that does not operate with the mode of activity of shamelessness, namely shamelessness operating with another mode of activity. There is operating with the mode of activity of shamelessness that is not shamelessness, namely factors associated with shamelessness operating with the mode of activity of shamelessness. There is shamelessness that also operates with the mode of activity of shamelessness, namely shamelessness operating with the mode of activity of shamelessness. There is that which is neither shamelessness nor operates with the mode of activity of shamelessness, namely—if one takes this category—one should say factors associated with shamelessness operating with another mode of activity; if not so, one should state excluding the previous characteristics." In the explanation of non-embarrassment there are also four alternatives, which cannot be quoted in full. Deducing from this, all grasp both the general and the specific. Refutation: although someone cites textual proof, one does not know whether it is correct or not. Take feeling which experiences through contact, and conception which grasps the image of the object: how could one also say that conception experiences through contact, or that feeling grasps the image of the object? In principle this is certainly not so. When it is said that the mind and mental factors have the same mode of activity, it means grasping the specific and common characteristics of dharmas such as blue, not that the mind and mental factors each separately grasp the image and so forth. The Vibhāṣā, fascicle thirty-four, states: "What is shamelessness? Answer: all shamelessness is lack of shame, lack of modesty, lack of respect, and so forth, up to: Question: does the distinctive phrasing stated here reveal its intrinsic nature, reveal its mode of activity, or reveal its objective support? One says it reveals its intrinsic nature; a second says it reveals its mode of activity; a third says it reveals its objective support." Based on fascicle thirty-eight: "What is the unshared latent defilement of ignorance? Answer: all ignorance is lack of understanding regarding suffering, lack of understanding regarding arising, cessation, and the path. Here 'lack of understanding' reveals the meaning of lacking desire and receptivity; that is, because ignorance covers and confuses the mind, it has no desire and receptivity toward the four noble truths, hence it is called 'lack of understanding,' not merely lacking clarity. Just as when a poor, base person has bad food in their stomach, even if they encounter good food they do not wish to eat it; ordinary beings are also like this: ignorance covers their mind, so when they hear the four noble truths, they have no desire and receptivity toward them. Question: does the phrase 'lack of understanding' stated here reveal intrinsic nature, reveal mode of activity, or reveal objective support? Some say: this reveals the intrinsic nature of ignorance. Other masters say: this reveals the mode of activity of ignorance. Still others say: this reveals the objective support of ignorance. The evaluation states: one should speak thus: this ignorance toward the four noble truths, up to not discerning, takes intrinsic nature as its essence." Based on this evaluative passage, we know the first master is correct. Shamelessness is also like this; the four alternatives formulated are not the correct view, and therefore do not constitute valid proof. Now investigating the treatise's meaning: although the mind and mental factors together grasp the general and specific characteristics of blue and the like, nevertheless upon this characteristic there are various differences such as determinative judgment and grasping the image, which are called grasping the specific. The primary mind generally grasps the characteristics of the object, while its specific characteristics are difficult to discern. Just as the six ministries of the court together govern a single country, yet the affairs they manage are each distinct. The king governs in general, while the specific details are hard to discern.