俱舍論疏 1.288

1.288

論「心、心所法生之本故」，答也。《正理》云「若爾，處、界義應相濫，俱心、心所生本義故。由此別應釋種族義。如雄黃等展轉相望，體類不同，故名種族。如是眼等展轉相望，體類不同，故名種族。若爾，意界望於六識，無別體類，應非別界。此難不然。所依、能依體類別故。有說：安立時分異故。復有說者：六是意先，意非六先，故知有異。雖諸界體竝通三世，然就位別安立異名。由此故言六先意後。」有人作俱舍師釋處、界相濫難云：一同類因名生之本，十七界全、一少分。二境界緣名生之本，謂無為法，一界少分。從多分說處義不同，少分相濫亦無有失者。今詳此解，未為釋難。三科名義既許不同，不可處義復是界義。若許無為一分與處義同，無別界義，理合無為唯處非界，如無蘊義非蘊所攝。欲救《俱舍》應求別理。

The treatise says: "Because they are the root of the arising of mind and mental factors." This is the answer. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "If so, the meanings of base and realm would be confounded, because both would have the meaning of being the root of the arising of mind and mental factors. Therefore, the meaning of clan should be explained differently. Just as realgar and the like, when viewed in relation to one another, have different substantial kinds and are thus called 'clans', so the eye and the like, when viewed in relation to one another, have different substantial kinds and are thus called 'clans'. If so, the mind realm, viewed in relation to the six consciousnesses, has no distinct substantial kind, and thus should not be a distinct realm. This objection is incorrect, because the supported and the supporting have different substantial kinds. Some say: Because the time periods of their establishment are different. Still others say: The six precede the mind, and the mind does not precede the six, so we know there is a difference. Although the essences of all realms generally pervade the three times, nevertheless different designations are established based on distinct states. It is due to this that they say the six are prior and the mind is posterior." Someone, acting as a Kośa master, resolved the difficulty of bases and realms being confounded by saying: "First, similar-class causes are called the root of arising: this applies to seventeen full realms and a small portion of one realm. Second, objective conditions are called the root of arising, which refers to unconditioned dharmas, a small portion of one realm. Speaking from the majority, the meaning of base is different, and that there is a slight confounding does not constitute a flaw." Now, examining this explanation, it has not yet resolved the objection. Since the names and meanings of the three classifications are admitted to be different, the meaning of base cannot again be the meaning of realm. If it is admitted that a portion of the unconditioned shares the meaning of base and has no distinct meaning of realm, then logically the unconditioned should be only a base and not a realm, just as, lacking the meaning of aggregate, it is not subsumed under the aggregates. If one wishes to rescue the *Kośa*, one should seek another rationale.