俱舍論疏 1.31
俱舍論疏 1.31
- Language
- Classical Chinese
1.31
論「由於佛法至由未斷故」,答也。言佛法者,其二義:一功德法、二佛教法。於功德法,根障未盡,不能證得。於佛教法無知覆故,不能證解。「極遠時」,謂觀前後八萬劫外。「極遠處」者,三千界外。二乘宿住不能觀知八萬劫前,死生智通不能觀知八萬劫後。天眼、天耳、神境智通不能見聞往三千外。諸義類者,謂熟、勢等種種義類。不染無知猶未斷者,謂於佛法極遠時等,不染無知未得不生故。此唯顯佛具二德也。問:《正理》文「斷染無知證斷圓滿,不染無知得智圓滿。」何故此論二十七云「斷圓德有四種:一一切煩惱斷、二一切定障斷、三畢竟斷、四并習斷。」准此論文,定障并習非是擇滅,如何斷德准是擇滅?答:此亦不違。前說斷圓德擇滅為體,二乘雖有斷德而不是圓滿,佛兼斷餘方得滅圓。如九遍知,異生位中雖斷下八地煩惱而滅雙因,無無漏得,未缺有頂。見道五心雖有無漏得證其擇滅,由雙因未滅、俱繫未離,斷義未圓,不名遍知。斷德亦爾。二乘雖斷煩惱證於擇滅,由習氣未斷、定障未盡,不名圓滿。如來由具四義,斷德名圓。非無記滅為斷德體。如九遍知,雖賴四緣得遍知名,非此四緣即遍知體。如無師義以成智圓,非彼無師即是智體。有人雖有三解,竝非應理。第一解云:斷德從強,擇滅為體。若據其兼,通非擇滅,故不相違者。不然。更無有文許無記滅為斷德體,是故無記而名為德,理不應然。第二解云:斷德唯以擇滅為體,然有定障等,擇滅不顯。定障等若無,擇滅即顯。能顯斷故,名斷圓德者。有其二過:一即非斷亦名斷德,所顯是斷,能顯非斷故。如九遍知能顯,非遍知故。二即無記滅顯擇滅名斷德者,與前斷德通無記滅有何差別?此釋雖似是,仍非盡理也。第三釋云:彼文四斷皆通擇滅,若煩惱斷是自性斷、緣縛斷,若定障斷并習斷是緣縛斷。若畢竟斷,通自性、緣縛者。不然。此與不退俱解脫人有何差別?亦具如前四種斷德故,皆於定障、習氣、緣縛斷故,亦有畢竟、自性、緣縛斷故,與佛何別?問:世尊實斷一切煩惱并及習氣,如何但說滅二無知?答:但顯無知即兼顯餘,無知通與一切煩惱習相應故,無知即是一切煩惱習氣本故,無斷無知留餘煩惱及習氣故,所以但說斷二無知。問:此二無知以何為體?答:染污無知,無明為體;不染無知,劣慧為體。今釋不染無知,八門分別:一引文出體、二釋通外難、三對妄通文、四破敘異說、五述體通局、六對染辨異、七明差別、八述斷分位。一、引文出體者,《婆沙》第九云「有有五種:一名有,謂龜毛、兔角、空華、髻等。二實有,謂一切法各住自性。三假有,謂瓶、衣、軍、林。四和合有,謂於諸蘊和合施設補特伽羅。五相對有,謂此彼岸、長短事等。」問:若無有見,於五見何見攝?何所斷?答:此非是見,邪智。問:此邪智是何?答:此是欲界修所斷中無覆無記邪行相智,如於杌起人想,及於人起杌想,於非道起道想,於道起非道想如是等。問:若爾:智蘊所說當云何通?如說:云何邪智?謂染污慧。答:邪智有二:一染污、二不染污,染污者,無明相應;不染污者,無明不相應,如於杌起人想等。染污者,聲聞、獨覺俱能斷盡,亦不現行;不染污者,聲聞、獨覺雖能斷盡而由現行。唯有如來畢竟不起,煩惱、習氣俱永斷故、由此獨稱正等覺者。染污邪智,由勝義故,名為邪智。不染污者,由世俗故,得邪智名。非由勝義,煩惱邪法不相應故。後智蘊中所說邪智是勝義者,今說世俗,故不相違。准上,二種邪智攝一切邪智。世俗邪智即是煩惱習氣,與《正理》同,既云無覆無記,故知不通善性。又《正理論》二十八云「是故即應味、勢、熟等不勤求解,慧與異相法俱為因,引生後同類惠,此慧於解又不勤求,復為因,引生不勤求解慧。如是展轉,無始時來因果相仍習以成性。故即於彼味等境中,數習於解無堪能智。此所引劣智,名不染無知。即此俱生心、心所法總名習氣,理定應然。」又云「或諸有情有煩惱位,所有無染心及相續,由諸煩惱間雜所熏,有能順生煩惱氣分。故諸無染心及眷屬,似彼行相差別而生,由數習力相繼而起故。離過身中仍名有習氣,一切智者永斷不行。然於已斷見所斷位,通染、不染心相續中,有餘順生煩惱習性,是見所斷煩惱氣分。於中染者說名類性,金剛道斷皆不現行。若不染者。名見所斷煩惱習氣。亦彼道斷。由根差別。有行、不行。」准此論文,類性既非是身習氣,故知心所。又云「若於已斷修所斷位。唯於不染心相續中有餘順生煩惱習性,是修所斷煩惱氣分,名修所斷煩惱習氣。是有漏故,無學已斷,隨根勝劣有行、不行。世尊已得法自在故,彼如煩惱畢竟不行,故佛獨稱善淨相續。即由此故行無誤失,得不共法三念住等。」准上二解,其意大同,而因有別。前釋以不勤求慧及異相法俱,展轉為因引生習氣。後釋以無染心及與相續,由諸煩惱間雜所熏,有能順生煩惱氣分。由此為因引生習氣,是心、心所不取於身。元瑜師引此文證兼取其身以為習氣者,誤也。所以定知不通於身,《正理》對辨差別中云「又若於事自共相愚,是名第一染無知相。若於諸法味、勢、熟、德、數、量、處、時、同、異等相不如實覺,是第二不染無知相。」准此故知,《正理》二說,唯心、心所以為習氣。即彼相應慧,名不染無知。准上《正理》二文,既同《婆沙》邪智習氣為體,故知亦同《婆沙》唯無記性。又《正理》云「有劣無知無覆無記性,能障解脫,是解脫障體。」又云「諸大論師咸言:練根皆為遮遣見、修斷惑力所引發無覆無記無知現行。」准知上二文定准無記,准是心所。若兼通善及通身者,有何文證?又違其理。凡言邪智不得名為正智,無知不得名知。善相應慧名為正智,如何名邪智及名無知耶?又如非香嗅物,受香嗅熏有香嗅習氣。香嗅之物即不如是,故知無記受熏,善、惡不爾。准上理教義極分明,定是無記。既無理教,何得通身、通善?
The treatise says, "Because with respect to the Buddha's dharmas… because they have not yet been abandoned": this is the reply. Regarding "the Buddha's dharmas", there are two meanings: first, the dharmas of quality; second, the dharmas of the Buddha's teachings. With respect to the dharmas of quality, because their obstacles in the faculties have not been exhausted, they cannot realize them. With respect to the dharmas of the Buddha's teachings, because they are covered by unknowing, they cannot realize or understand them. "Extremely remote times" refers to discerning beyond eighty thousand kalpas before and after. "Extremely remote places" refers to beyond the trisahasra realm. The recollection of past lives of the two vehicles cannot discern or know prior to eighty thousand kalpas; their supernormal knowledge of death and rebirth cannot discern or know after eighty thousand kalpas. Their divine eye, divine ear, and supernormal knowledge of psychic power cannot see or hear, or travel, beyond the trisahasra realm. "Various categories of meaning" refers to various categories such as maturation, potency, and so forth. "Non-defiled unknowing has not yet been abandoned" means that, with respect to the Buddha's dharmas, extremely remote times, and so forth, non-defiled unknowing has not yet attained non-arising. This only shows that the Buddha possesses both of the two qualities. Question: A passage in the Nyāyānusāra states: "By abandoning defiled unknowing, one realizes the perfection of abandonment; by [abandoning] non-defiled unknowing, one obtains the perfection of cognition." Why does fascicle twenty-seven of this treatise say: "The quality of the perfection of abandonment has four kinds: 1. the abandonment of all afflictions; 2. the abandonment of all obstacles to meditative concentration; 3. ultimate abandonment; 4. abandonment together with traces"? According to this passage of the treatise, the obstacles to meditative concentration and the traces are not analytical cessation (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha); how then can the quality of abandonment be taken as analytical cessation? Answer: This is also not contradictory. Earlier it was said that the nature of the quality of the perfection of abandonment is analytical cessation; although the two vehicles possess the quality of abandonment, it is not perfected, whereas only when the Buddha additionally abandons the remainder does he attain perfection of cessation. Just as with the nine comprehensive knowledges (parijñā): although in the stage of an ordinary person (pṛthagjana) one abandons the afflictions of the lower eight stages and cuts off the dual causes, without anāsrava possession and without having broken the peak of existence (bhavāgra); and although the five minds of the path of vision (darśana-mārga) possess anāsrava attainment and realize their analytical cessation, because the dual causes have not been cut off and co-existing bonds have not been released, the meaning of abandonment is not perfected, and it is not called comprehensive knowledge. The quality of abandonment is also like this: although the two vehicles abandon afflictions and realize analytical cessation, because habit-energy (vāsanā) has not been abandoned and obstacles to meditative concentration have not been exhausted, it is not called perfected. Because the Tathāgata possesses the four meanings, his quality of abandonment is called perfected. It is not that non-defined (avyākṛta) cessation is the nature of the quality of abandonment. Just as with the nine comprehensive knowledges: although they rely on four conditions to obtain the name "comprehensive knowledge", these four conditions are not themselves the nature of comprehensive knowledge. Just as the meaning of "having no teacher" establishes the perfection of cognition, yet that absence of a teacher is not itself the nature of cognition. Although someone offers three interpretations, none of them accords with principle. The first interpretation says: "The quality of abandonment follows the predominant, taking analytical cessation as its nature. If based on its concomitant, it includes non-analytical cessation; therefore they do not contradict each other." This is not so. There is no other text that accepts non-defined cessation as the nature of the quality of abandonment; therefore, for the non-defined to be called a quality is logically unacceptable. The second interpretation says: "The quality of abandonment takes only analytical cessation as its nature; however, when there are obstacles to meditative concentration and so forth, analytical cessation is not manifested. If obstacles to meditative concentration and so forth are absent, analytical cessation is manifested. Because it can manifest abandonment, it is called the quality of the perfection of abandonment." This has two faults: first, that which is not abandonment would also be called the quality of abandonment, because that which is manifested is abandonment, while that which manifests is not abandonment, just as that which manifests the nine comprehensive knowledges is not itself comprehensive knowledge; second, if non-defined cessation manifesting analytical cessation is called the quality of abandonment, what difference is there from the previous [claim] that the quality of abandonment includes non-defined cessation? Although this explanation seems correct, it still does not completely exhaust principle. The third explanation says: "The four abandonments in that text all include analytical cessation: if it is the abandonment of afflictions, it is abandonment of intrinsic nature and abandonment of objective fettering; if it is the abandonment of obstacles to meditative concentration together with the abandonment of traces, it is abandonment of objective fettering; if it is ultimate abandonment, it includes both intrinsic nature and objective fettering." This is not so. What difference would there be between this and a person of simultaneous liberation who does not retrogress? For they would also possess the four kinds of qualities of abandonment as described above: because in both cases they abandon obstacles to meditative concentration and habit-energy through the abandonment of objective fettering, and also have ultimate, intrinsic-nature, and objective-fettering abandonment, what distinction would there be from a Buddha? Question: The World-Honoured One actually abandons all afflictions together with habit-energy; why then does it only speak of extinguishing the two unknowings? Answer: Merely showing unknowing also concomitantly shows the rest: because unknowing is universally associated with all afflictions and traces; because unknowing is the root of all afflictions and habit-energy; and because there is no such thing as abandoning unknowing while leaving behind the remaining afflictions and habit-energy. Therefore, it only speaks of abandoning the two unknowings. Question: What is the nature of these two unknowings? Answer: Defiled unknowing has ignorance (avidyā) as its nature; non-defiled unknowing has inferior wisdom as its nature. Now, in explaining non-defiled unknowing, there are eight distinctions: 1. citing texts to reveal its nature; 2. explaining and resolving external objections; 3. resolving texts in relation to delusion; 4. refuting and presenting divergent theories; 5. setting forth the scope of its nature; 6. distinguishing differences in contrast to defilement; 7. clarifying distinctions; 8. setting forth the stages of its abandonment. First, regarding citing texts to reveal its nature: Fascicle nine of the Vibhāṣā says: "There are five kinds of existence: 1. nominal existence, namely tortoise-hair, rabbit-horns, sky-flowers, topknots, and so forth; 2. real existence, namely all dharmas each abiding in their own nature; 3. provisional existence, namely pots, clothes, armies, forests; 4. composite existence, namely the designation of a person (pudgala) upon the aggregation of the skandhas; 5. relative existence, namely this and that shore, long and short matters, and so forth." Question: If there is a view of non-existence, under which of the five views is it subsumed? By what is it abandoned? Answer: This is not a view; it is false cognition. Question: What is this false cognition? Answer: This is cognition of false mental aspects that is non-obscured non-defined (anivṛtāvyākṛta) within the domain of abandonment by cultivation (bhāvanā-prahāṇa) of the desire realm, such as giving rise to the conception of a person regarding a tree stump, giving rise to the conception of a tree stump regarding a person, giving rise to the conception of the path regarding what is not the path, giving rise to the conception of what is not the path regarding the path, and so on. Question: If so, how should what is said in the Aggregate of Cognition (Jñānaskandha) be resolved? As it says: "What is false cognition? It means defiled wisdom." Answer: There are two kinds of false cognition: 1. defiled; 2. non-defiled. The defiled is associated with ignorance; the non-defiled is not associated with ignorance, such as giving rise to the conception of a person regarding a tree stump and so on. As for the defiled, both śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas can completely abandon it, and it also does not actively arise; as for the non-defiled, although śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas can completely abandon it, it still actively arises. Only the Tathāgata never gives rise to it at all, because both afflictions and habit-energy are forever abandoned; for this reason, he alone is called the Sambuddha. Defiled false cognition is called false cognition by virtue of ultimate truth; non-defiled [false cognition] receives the name false cognition by virtue of worldly convention, not by virtue of ultimate truth, because it is not associated with afflictive, false dharmas. The false cognition spoken of later in the Aggregate of Cognition is the ultimate one; what is spoken of here is conventional; thus they do not contradict each other. According to the above, the two kinds of false cognition subsume all false cognition. Conventional false cognition is precisely the habit-energy of afflictions, which agrees with the Nyāyānusāra; since it says "non-obscured non-defined", we know it does not extend to the wholesome nature. Furthermore, fascicle twenty-eight of the Nyāyānusāra states: "Therefore, one does not strive to seek understanding regarding taste, potency, maturation, and so forth; wisdom occurring together with dharmas of divergent characteristics serves as a cause to induce subsequent wisdom of the same type. With respect to understanding, this wisdom again does not strive to seek, and in turn serves as a cause to induce wisdom that does not strive to seek understanding. Thus turning sequentially, from beginningless time cause and effect have succeeded one another, habituating into a disposition. Therefore, toward those objects such as taste, one repeatedly habituates a cognition incapable of understanding. The inferior cognition induced by this is called non-defiled unknowing. These co-arising minds and mental factors (caitasika) are collectively called habit-energy; this must definitely be so according to principle." It also says: "Or, in the stage where sentient beings have afflictions, all non-defiled minds and their mental continua, through being perfumed by the intermingling of afflictions, have the capacity to generate the trace-components of affliction. Therefore, all non-defiled minds and their retinues arise resembling those distinctive aspects. Because they arise in succession through the power of repeated habituation, habit-energy is still said to exist in a body freed from faults; the Omniscient One abandons it forever so that it does not operate. However, in the stage where what is abandoned by vision has already been abandoned, in the mental continuum that encompasses both the defiled and the non-defiled, there remains a habitual nature that accords with the arising of afflictions; this is the trace-component of the afflictions abandoned by vision. Among them, the defiled is called homologous nature (sabhāgatā); abandoned by the vajra-like path (vajropama-mārga), none of it actively arises. As for the non-defiled, it is called the habit-energy of afflictions abandoned by vision; it is also abandoned by that path; depending on the differences in faculties, it may operate or not operate." According to this passage of the treatise, since homologous nature is not the habit-energy of the body, we know it is a mental factor. It also says: "If in the stage where what is abandoned by cultivation has already been abandoned, only in the non-defiled mental continuum is there a remaining habitual nature that accords with the arising of afflictions; this is the trace-component of the afflictions abandoned by cultivation, called the habit-energy of afflictions abandoned by cultivation. Because it is contaminated (sāsrava), an aśaikha has already abandoned it; according to whether their faculties are superior or inferior, it may operate or not operate. Because the World-Honoured One has already attained mastery over dharmas, it never operates at all, just like afflictions; therefore the Buddha alone is called one of purely purified continuum. Precisely because of this, his actions are without fault or error, and he attains the unshared dharmas, the three applications of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna), and so forth." According to the above two explanations, their intention is largely the same, but the cause differs. The former explanation takes wisdom that does not strive to seek occurring together with dharmas of divergent characteristics as turning sequentially as cause to induce habit-energy. The latter explanation takes non-defiled mind and its continuum, through being perfumed by the intermingling of afflictions, having the capacity to generate the trace-components of affliction; using this as cause, it induces habit-energy. These are minds and mental factors, not taking the physical body. Master Yuanyu cited this text as proof that it concomitantly takes the physical body as habit-energy, which is mistaken. As for why it is definitely known not to extend to the physical body, the Nyāyānusāra states in distinguishing differences: "Furthermore, if one is deluded about the specific and general characteristics of things, this is called the mark of the first, defiled unknowing. If one does not truly perceive the characteristics of all dharmas such as taste, potency, maturation, quality, quantity, measure, place, time, sameness, and difference, this is the mark of the second, non-defiled unknowing." According to this, we know that both explanations of the Nyāyānusāra take only minds and mental factors as habit-energy. Precisely the wisdom associated with them is called non-defiled unknowing. According to the above two passages of the Nyāyānusāra, since it agrees with the Vibhāṣā in taking false cognition and habit-energy as its nature, we know that it also agrees with the Vibhāṣā in being only of non-defined nature. Furthermore, the Nyāyānusāra states: "There is an inferior unknowing of non-obscured non-defined nature that can obstruct liberation; it is the entity of the obstacle to liberation." It also says: "All the great treatise-masters say: refining the faculties is entirely to ward off the active arising of non-obscured non-defined unknowing induced by the power of the delusions abandoned by vision and cultivation." From this we know that the above two passages definitely consider it non-defined, and consider it a mental factor. If it concomitantly extended to the wholesome and extended to the physical body, what textual evidence would there be? Moreover, it contradicts principle. In general, what is called false cognition cannot be called right cognition; unknowing cannot be called knowing. Wisdom associated with the wholesome is called right cognition; how could it be called false cognition or unknowing? Furthermore, just as non-fragrant, odoriferous substances, when perfumed by fragrance, take on the habit-energy of fragrance, whereas fragrant substances do not do so, we know that the non-defined receives perfuming, while the wholesome and unwholesome do not. According to the above principle and teaching, the meaning is extremely clear: it is definitely non-defined. Since there is neither principle nor teaching [for it], how could it extend to the physical body or extend to the wholesome?
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- 俱舍論記 — Classical Chinese