俱舍論疏 1.33

1.33

三、對妄通文者，妄通論云：《婆沙》但解邪行相智非實知故，名之為邪，故云無記。《正理》出解脫障體及根障體，故言無記。今者總出一切不染無知體故，亦通善性。今詳此釋全無理趣。《婆沙》但解邪行相智非如實知名之為邪，故云無記者，今說一切不染無知，豈亦通取如實知者？若如實知，即非無知。故《正理》辨差別云「若於味、熟、勢等不能如實覺，是不染無知相。」准此，豈取如實知耶？又妄通云：無知有二，一者是善，障法力劣；二者無記，障法力勝。《婆沙》、《正理》據勝而說，故言無記。今言通善，亦據劣明者。難曰：《正理》說根障等，可言無記。《婆沙》不明根障，因何不說於劣？又釋義法，兩俱有文，可就理長，從一文正釋，通一文說通善性。既無文、理，何得執通善性通無記文？

3. Refuting false interpretations of the text. A false interpreter of the treatise says: "The *Vibhāṣā* explains only intelligence having an incorrect cognitive aspect; because it is not knowing reality as it is, it is called 'incorrect', and therefore it is called non-defined. The *Nyāyānusāra* identifies the essence of the hindrance to vimokṣa and the essence of the hindrance of the faculties, and therefore calls them non-defined. Now, because [this text] collectively identifies the essence of all un-defiled ignorance, it also extends to being wholesome." Now, examining this explanation in detail, it has no rational ground at all. If one says that the *Vibhāṣā* explains only intelligence having an incorrect cognitive aspect, calling it 'incorrect' because it does not know in accordance with reality, and therefore says it is non-defined—in now speaking of all un-defiled ignorance, could it also encompass knowing in accordance with reality? If it knows in accordance with reality, then it is not ignorance. Thus the *Nyāyānusāra* distinguishes the difference: "If one cannot understand in accordance with reality with regard to taste, maturity, potency, and so forth, this is the mark of un-defiled ignorance." According to this, how could it encompass knowing in accordance with reality? Furthermore, the false interpreter says: "There are two kinds of ignorance: the first is wholesome, where the power to obstruct phenomena is weak; the second is non-defined, where the power to obstruct phenomena is strong. The *Vibhāṣā* and the *Nyāyānusāra* speak on the basis of what is strong, and therefore say it is non-defined. The present claim that it extends to being wholesome is also clarified on the basis of what is weak." To this we object: the *Nyāyānusāra* speaks of the hindrance of the faculties and so on, which may be said to be non-defined; but why does the *Vibhāṣā*, which does not elucidate the hindrance of the faculties, fail to speak of what is weak? Moreover, in the method of interpreting meaning, where texts exist for both sides, one can follow the superior reasoning, relying on one text for the correct interpretation and harmonizing the other text that speaks of extending to being wholesome. Since there is neither text nor reason [for this view], how can one adhere to extending it to wholesome nature in order to explain away the texts that state it is non-defined?