俱舍論疏 1.34

1.34

四、破異說者，准《正理》、《婆沙》不染無知唯慧為體，文極分明，何得有人執通餘法？若有此釋，不堪載文，何得謬敘十一師釋總違論文？第一師云：不染無知，以未成佛來鈍異熟心、心所為體。第二師云：以未成佛來，鈍四無記心、心所法為體。第三西方德光論師云：以未成佛來，鈍自性無記心、心所法為體。第四師云：以未成佛來，鈍眾同分為體，依此同分所起慧等觀境不明。已上四師若不錯敘，即是無記。此釋薄有所知，即合依於經論。《正理》、《婆沙》分明唯無記慧為體性，因何前三師說兼心、心所？第四師取眾同分耶？應言前三雖說無記，通局不同，皆慧為體。第四應云鈍眾同分所生劣慧為體。第五師以不自在為體，引《正理》七十出解脫障體證此師釋。第六師云：以不得為體。第七師云：以不勤求等為體。此二亦引《正理》出解脫障為證。准正理師出解脫障體有四師說：一師以無記劣慧為體，此是以不染無知為體。《正理》評為正義；後三皆不用不染無知為體，《正理》廣破此之三師。是出解脫障體不同，非是說不染無知體性有異。《正理》七十破皆云「不許是障」，不言不許是不染無知。將此三師說障不同說為不染無知者，誤之甚也。如出教體，或說音聲、或云名句，復出聲體，豈得云聲或以名句為體？後四師說，論自立破，非宗所許，不繁敘。

4. Refuting dissenting views. Relying on the *Nyāyānusāra* and the *Vibhāṣā*, the essence of un-defiled ignorance is solely prajñā; the texts are exceedingly clear. How could someone claim it extends to other factors? If there are such explanations, they are not worthy of being recorded in the text; why should one erroneously recount the explanations of eleven masters that completely contradict the treatise texts? The first master says: Un-defiled ignorance has as its essence the dull vipāka-born mind and mental factors prior to attaining buddhahood. The second master says: It has as its essence the dull mind and mental factors of the four non-defined types prior to attaining buddhahood. The third master, the Western treatise master Guṇaprabha (Deguang), says: It has as its essence the dull mind and mental factors that are intrinsically non-defined prior to attaining buddhahood. The fourth master says: It has as its essence the dull generic similarity (sabhāgatā) prior to attaining buddhahood, based on which dull similarity prajñā and other factors arise to view cognitive objects indistinctly. If the above four masters are not misreported, then their views are non-defined. This explanation has a slight degree of knowledge, but it should still conform to the sūtras and treatises. The *Nyāyānusāra* and the *Vibhāṣā* clearly take only non-defined prajñā as its essential nature. Why do the first three masters say it encompasses mind and mental factors, and why does the fourth master take generic similarity? One should say: although the first three speak of non-defined, with different extents of scope, their essence is always prajñā; and the fourth should say that its essence is the inferior prajñā generated by the dull generic similarity. The fifth master takes non-mastery (avaśavartitā) as its essence, citing fascicle seventy of the *Nyāyānusāra* where it identifies the essence of the hindrance to vimokṣa to substantiate this master's explanation. The sixth master says it takes non-possession (aprāpti) as its essence. The seventh master says it takes lack of diligent seeking and so forth as its essence. These two also cite the *Nyāyānusāra*'s identification of the hindrance to vimokṣa as evidence. According to the master of the *Nyāyānusāra*, there are four masters' explanations when identifying the essence of the hindrance to vimokṣa: one master takes non-defined, inferior prajñā as its essence, which means taking un-defiled ignorance as its essence, and the *Nyāyānusāra* evaluates this as the correct view; the latter three masters do not take un-defiled ignorance as its essence, and the *Nyāyānusāra* extensively refutes these three masters. These are differences in identifying the essence of the hindrance to vimokṣa, not claims that the essential nature of un-defiled ignorance is different. When the *Nyāyānusāra* refutes them in fascicle seventy, it consistently says "we do not accept that this is the hindrance"; it does not say "we do not accept that this is un-defiled ignorance." Taking these three masters' different accounts of the hindrance as accounts of un-defiled ignorance is a grave error. For instance, when identifying the essence of the teaching, some say it is sound, while others say it is name and phrase; but when identifying the essence of sound, how could one say that sound takes name and phrase as its essence? As for the explanations of the remaining four masters, the treatise itself establishes and refutes them, and they are not accepted by our school, so we shall not recount them at length.