俱舍論疏 1.53

1.53

「論曰至阿毘達磨」，長行釋也。就中有二：一出對法體、二釋對法名。就出體中有二：一出勝義對法體、二出世俗對法體。此文出勝義也。文中有二：一自性、二眷屬。「慧謂擇法」者，出惠體也。惠能簡擇，故名擇法。是即簡擇四聖諦，故釋擇法名，此以擇法出慧體也。「淨謂無漏」者，釋淨名也。以無漏故，名之為淨。無漏即是離垢為義。諸漏名垢，擇法能離，故名淨慧。問：何緣唯無漏慧名勝義對法？答：由此現觀諸法相已不重迷故。問：既諸心、心所總名對法，何故說慧為自性、受等隨行，不說受等為自性、慧等隨行？答：慧於見等三現觀中皆有能故，生等及色有事非餘。受等唯通緣、事現觀。問：受等各有領納等用，如慧能見，應與慧同，皆應得名自性對法。答：受等如盲，豈得名為自性對法？不能簡擇四聖諦故。以於現觀苦等相中，其見現觀最為殊勝，於諸諦中簡擇轉故。受等雖與淨慧俱行，而慧力持趣彼彼境，故於現觀非為最勝。是故唯無漏慧得自性名，非受等也。問：何故不說忍智及見，唯立慧名？答：忍唯見道一分，智非忍故，智不遍見道；忍非智故，見不遍無學，盡、無生非見故。慧遍一切，對法亦爾，故以淨慧出對法體。淨簡有漏。故知即是一切無漏慧名勝義對法。「淨慧眷屬名曰隨行」者，出隨行對法體也。《正理論》云「何謂隨行？謂慧隨轉色，受、想等諸心所法生等及心名為隨轉。」問：隨轉行為同為異？答：隨即是隨行，故《正理》釋眷屬對法云「何謂隨行？謂慧隨轉。」既以隨轉釋於隨行，明知二義亦無差別。問：若爾，即慧不應名轉，但有隨轉。所以知然？釋俱有因中，《正理》、《顯宗》皆云四句「有轉非隨轉，謂心王。有隨轉非轉，謂心王上生等。有亦轉亦隨轉，謂心相應法。第四句可知。」准此，慧非是王如何名轉？答：若舉心為所隨，即唯心為轉。若舉慧為所隨，即唯慧為轉。俱有因中釋心為所隨故，唯心為轉。此中以慧為所隨故，唯慧為轉。問：得為隨行不？答：得非隨行。故《正理》出眷屬對法體中，不言得故。《婆沙》第三解得非世第一法中云「何與彼法不相隨行。」又俱有因中云「以得或前或後，所以非俱有因。」故知雖有得起與法俱時，非隨行、隨轉也。有人云：隨轉有二，一俱有因故名隨轉、二相隨順故名隨轉。隨行亦有二：一俱有因故名隨行、二相隨順故名隨行。若諸論中說得為隨行、隨轉，據相隨順說。若諸論中說得非隨行隨轉，據非俱有因說。彈云：既不見文，豈得斟酌？有何文證而為此釋？詳其言義，得非隨行，亦非隨轉。隨轉、隨行皆是定俱起義，非不定偏俱起名曰隨行。如欲界心起時無隨轉色，起彼心時雖定有色，非心隨轉。得既或前或後非俱有因，有何文證云定是隨轉？雖許得與所得名為隨順，義亦無違，隨順非是行轉義也，無文說相隨順名隨行故。問，隨行為攝慧不？答：慧為自性，受等隨行，由此分其自性、眷屬。若謂受等與慧互相隨者，亦應展轉名為自性；自性既唯獨慧，故知隨行亦唯受等。故《正理》云「受等雖與淨慧俱行，而慧力持趣彼彼境。」亦不可說慧隨慧行。准下文云「染心眷屬少，三蘊隨從故。善心眷屬多，四蘊隨從故。」既心非心隨轉、心非心眷屬，故知慧不隨慧行，亦非慧眷屬。有人引《婆沙》八十一出喜無量體云「喜者以喜根為自性，若兼眷屬相應隨轉。欲界者四蘊為自性。色界者五蘊為自性。」引此論文證慧為隨行。今詳此文，慧非隨行。何者？彼文以喜根為自性。如此論，對法以淨慧為自性。若兼取相應隨轉即四蘊五蘊性者，如此論。若兼隨轉即五蘊性，彼文出喜無量體，隨轉非喜根。准知此論隨轉亦非取慧。又引《正理》、《顯宗》，三念住中相雜念住皆攝於慧，證慧為隨行者。彼論兩文名義不同，此云隨行，能隨所隨別；彼云相雜，互相雜也。因何將相雜文證隨行耶？有人雖有兩解，然自評取慧為隨行為勝。未知憑何理、教？「如是總說無漏五蘊名為對法」者，結隨行對法體也。此即勝義阿毘達磨者，結勝義對法體也。言勝義者，真實之異名。

The prose commentary beginning, 'The Śāstra says: […] [is] abhidharma,' provides the prose exposition. Within this there are two parts: first, identifying the real entity (svabhāva) of abhidharma; second, explaining the name 'abhidharma'. Within identifying the entity, there are two parts: first, identifying the entity of ultimate abhidharma; second, identifying the entity of conventional abhidharma. This passage identifies the ultimate. Within the text there are two parts: first, the intrinsic nature (svabhāva); second, its retinue (parivāra). 'Wisdom means discernment of dharmas (dharmapravicaya)' identifies the entity of wisdom. Wisdom is capable of selection and discernment, hence it is called 'discernment of dharmas'. That is, it discerns the four noble truths; hence, in explaining the name 'discernment of dharmas', it uses 'discernment of dharmas' to identify the entity of wisdom. 'Pure means uncontaminated (anāsrava)' explains the designation 'pure'. Because it is uncontaminated, it is named 'pure'. 'Uncontaminated' has the meaning of being free from defilement. The contaminations (āsravas) are called defilement; discernment of dharmas is capable of abandoning them, hence it is called pure wisdom. Question: For what reason is only uncontaminated wisdom named ultimate abhidharma? Answer: Because having directly realized (abhisam-√i) the characteristics of dharmas through this, one does not fall back into confusion. Question: Given that all minds and mental factors together are called abhidharma, why is wisdom alone said to be the intrinsic nature, with feeling and the rest being its concomitants (anucara / pṛṣṭhadharma), rather than feeling and the rest being said to be the intrinsic nature, with wisdom and the rest being concomitants? Answer: Because wisdom possesses capability across all three direct realizations—vision and the rest—whereas arising and so forth as well as form possess only the direct realization of function, not the others. Feeling and the rest only extend to the direct realizations of object and function. Question: Feeling and the rest each have their own functions such as receiving, just as wisdom is capable of seeing; they should be the same as wisdom, and should all obtain the name of intrinsic-nature abhidharma. Answer: Feeling and the rest are like the blind; how could they obtain the name of intrinsic-nature abhidharma? Because they cannot discern the four noble truths. For among the direct realizations of the marks of suffering and the rest, the direct realization of vision is the most supreme, because it functions discerningly with respect to the truths. Although feeling and the rest operate concurrently with pure wisdom, they are sustained by the power of wisdom to proceed to their respective objects, and therefore in direct realization they are not supreme. For this reason, only uncontaminated wisdom obtains the name of intrinsic nature, not feeling and the rest. Question: Why not speak of patient acceptance (kṣānti), knowledge (jñāna), and vision (dṛṣṭi), but only establish the name 'wisdom' (prajñā)? Answer: Patient acceptance is only a part of the path of vision; knowledge is not patient acceptance, so knowledge does not pervade the path of vision; patient acceptance is not knowledge, so vision does not pervade the state of the non-learner (aśaikha), because [knowledge of] destruction (kṣayajñāna) and [knowledge of] non-arising (anutpādajñāna) are not vision. Wisdom pervades everything, and abhidharma does likewise; hence it identifies the entity of abhidharma through pure wisdom. 'Pure' excludes the contaminated. Therefore we know that it is precisely all uncontaminated wisdom that is named ultimate abhidharma. 'The retinue of pure wisdom is called its concomitants (anucara)' identifies the entity of concomitant abhidharma. The Nyāyānusāra says: 'What are called concomitants? They refer to form that conforms to the movement of wisdom (prajñānuvartin), and the mental factors such as feeling and ideation, arising and so forth, as well as the mind itself—these are called conforming to movement.' Question: Are 'conforming to movement' (anuvartin) and 'concomitant' (anucara) the same or different? Answer: 'Anu' ('following') is precisely 'anucara' ('concomitant'). Therefore, the Nyāyānusāra explains the retinue-abhidharma by saying: 'What are called concomitants? They refer to what conforms to the movement of wisdom.' Since it explains 'concomitant' by 'conforming to movement', it is clearly known that between the two meanings there is no difference. Question: If so, then wisdom itself should not be named 'movement' (pravartin), but only 'conforming to movement' (anuvartin). How is this known to be so? In explaining simultaneous cause (sahabhūhetu), both the Nyāyānusāra and the Samayapradīpikā speak of four alternatives: 'There is that which moves but does not conform to movement, namely primary consciousness (cittamātra / cittarāja). There is that which conforms to movement but does not move, namely arising and so forth upon primary consciousness. There is that which both moves and conforms to movement, namely mental factors associated with the mind. The fourth alternative is inferable.' According to this, wisdom is not primary consciousness; how can it be called 'movement'? Answer: If one posits the mind as that which is followed, then only the mind is the mover. If one posits wisdom as that which is followed, then only wisdom is the mover. In the context of simultaneous cause, because it explains the mind as that which is followed, only the mind is the mover. Here, because it takes wisdom as that which is followed, only wisdom is the mover. Question: Is acquisition (prāpti) a concomitant or not? Answer: Acquisition is not a concomitant. Hence when the Nyāyānusāra identifies the entity of retinue-abhidharma, it does not mention acquisition. Fascicle 3 of the Vibhāṣā, in explaining that acquisition is not the highest mundane dharma, says: 'How could it fail to be concomitant with that dharma?' Moreover, in the context of simultaneous cause, it says: 'Because acquisition occurs either before or after, it is not a simultaneous cause.' Hence we know that although there are acquisitions that arise at the same time as the dharma, they are neither concomitants nor do they conform to movement. Some say: 'Conforming to movement is twofold: first, being called conforming to movement because of being a simultaneous cause; second, being called conforming to movement because of being accordant with the characteristics. Concomitance is also twofold: first, being called concomitant because of being a simultaneous cause; second, being called concomitant because of being accordant with the characteristics. If treatises say that acquisition is a concomitant or conforms to movement, they speak based on its being accordant. If treatises say that acquisition is not a concomitant or does not conform to movement, they speak based on its not being a simultaneous cause.' A critique says: Since no textual passage is seen for this, how can one make such speculations? What textual evidence is there to produce this explanation? Examining its statement and meaning, acquisition is neither a concomitant nor does it conform to movement. Conforming to movement and concomitance both carry the sense of definitely arising together; an indeterminate, isolated arising-together is not termed a concomitant. Just as when a mind of the desire realm arises, there is no form that conforms to movement; although when arising with that mind there is definitely form, it does not conform to the movement of the mind. Since acquisition occurs either before or after and is not a simultaneous cause, what textual evidence says that it definitely conforms to movement? Although it is granted that acquisition and the acquired are termed 'accordant' without contradiction in meaning, accordance is not the meaning of concomitance or conforming to movement, because there is no text stating that mutual accordance is named concomitance. Question: Does concomitance subsume wisdom or not? Answer: Wisdom is the intrinsic nature, and feeling and the rest are the concomitants; by this, its intrinsic nature and retinue are distinguished. If one were to claim that feeling and the rest and wisdom are mutually following each other, they would also reciprocally be named the intrinsic nature; but since the intrinsic nature is solely wisdom alone, we know that the concomitants are also solely feeling and the rest. Therefore the Nyāyānusāra says: 'Although feeling and the rest operate concurrently with pure wisdom, they are sustained by the power of wisdom to proceed to their respective objects.' One also cannot say that wisdom follows the movement of wisdom. According to a later text, which says: 'The retinue of a defiled mind is small, because three aggregates follow it. The retinue of a wholesome mind is large, because four aggregates follow it.' Since the mind does not conform to the movement of the mind, and the mind is not the retinue of the mind, we know that wisdom does not follow the movement of wisdom, nor is it the retinue of wisdom. Some cite fascicle 81 of the Vibhāṣā identifying the entity of the immeasurable of joy: 'Joy takes the faculty of joy as its intrinsic nature; if including its retinue, it comprises those associated and conforming to movement. In the desire realm, it takes four aggregates as its intrinsic nature; in the form realm, it takes five aggregates as its intrinsic nature.' They cite this treatise passage to prove that wisdom is a concomitant. Now examining this text, wisdom is not a concomitant. Why? That text takes the faculty of joy as intrinsic nature, just as in this treatise, abhidharma takes pure wisdom as intrinsic nature. If taking both the associated and those conforming to movement, it is by nature four aggregates or five aggregates, just as in this treatise. If including what conforms to movement, it is by nature five aggregates; in that text identifying the entity of the immeasurable of joy, what conforms to movement is not the faculty of joy. Correspondingly, we know that what conforms to movement in this treatise also does not take wisdom. Furthermore, they cite the Nyāyānusāra and Samayapradīpikā, where among the three applications of mindfulness, the mixed applications of mindfulness all subsume wisdom, to prove that wisdom is a concomitant. But the two passages in those treatises differ in name and meaning: here it speaks of 'concomitant', where that which follows and that which is followed are distinct; there it speaks of 'mixed', meaning mutually intermixed. For what reason would one use a text on being 'mixed' to prove 'concomitance'? Although someone has two explanations, he himself evaluated and chose taking wisdom as a concomitant as superior. It is not known upon what reason or scripture he relies. 'Thus, speaking comprehensively, the five uncontaminated aggregates are named abhidharma' concludes the entity of concomitant abhidharma. 'This precisely is the ultimate abhidharma' concludes the entity of ultimate abhidharma. Speaking of 'ultimate' (paramārtha), it is a synonym for truth.