俱舍論疏 10.94

10.94

論「謂或有時至同緣一境」，有部出違理也。謂或有時違、順二觸不同，前後復色、聲境別。因前違境，受位緣色觸；生後順境，緣聲觸位受。此即違順不同，色、聲境別。欣、戚性殊，如何相生？「或應許受此心相應非與此心同緣一境」者，從前違境及緣色境觸，生後順境及緣聲境觸位受時，心既三和名後位觸，應同後念受境不與前念受同一境。若許此理，壞相應義。

On the Śāstra's statement: "That is, there are times ... cognizing the same one object": the Sarvāstivādin points out the contradiction with reason. That is, there are times when the two contacts—adverse and harmonious—differ, and successively visible form and sound objects also differ. Conditioned by the preceding adverse object, at the stage of feeling, contact cognizes form; producing the subsequent harmonious object, feeling occurs at the stage of contact cognizing sound. Here adverse and harmonious are different, and visible form and sound objects differ. Since pleasure and distress differ in nature, how could they produce one another? 'Or one must accept that this feeling associated with this mind does not cognize the same single object with this mind': when, from the contact of the preceding adverse object and cognizing visible form, feeling arises at the stage of the contact of the subsequent harmonious object and cognizing sound, since the mind's union of the three is named the contact of the subsequent stage, it should share the subsequent moment's object of feeling and not share the same object with the preceding moment's feeling. If one accepts this principle, the meaning of mental association is ruined.