俱舍論疏 16.165

16.165

論「於五境中至亦為無理」，五根證五境，總名所見。若他傳說五境等，名為所聞。若內心以種種理比度所許，名所覺。若意現證，名為所知（准此，意識比知名覺，證知名知，由此五境皆容具四）。第六法境非五根現證故，不得名所見。有餘三也，可傳聞、比知、證知故。由此覺名目意比知，非無所目。香、味等三既許有四言說，非無言說。經有別意，經非證也。覺名有所目、三境有言說，理非證也。

On the Śāstra's statement: "Among the five objects... is also without reason": The five sense organs directly realizing their five objects is collectively designated "what is seen" (dṛṣṭa). If reported by another as the five objects and so on, it is designated "what is heard" (śruta). If inferred and accepted by the internal mind through various forms of reasoning, it is designated "what is sensed" (mata). If directly realized by the mental consciousness, it is designated "what is known" (jñāta). (According to this, the mental consciousness inferring is "sensed", and directly realizing is "known"; thus, each of the five objects can admit of all four.) Because the sixth object, the mental object (dharmāyatana), is not directly realized by the five sense faculties, it cannot be designated "what is seen". It possesses the remaining three, because it can be heard by transmission, known by inference, and known by direct realization. Therefore, the designation "sensed" refers to inference by the mental consciousness and is not without referent. Since the three objects of fragrance, taste, and [touch] are admitted to possess the four types of verbal expression, they are not without verbal expression. The sūtra has an alternative intention, so the sūtra is not a proof. That the designation "sensed" has a referent, and that the three objects have verbal expressions, are not proven by reasoning.