俱舍論疏 16.166

16.166

論「先軌範師至名為所知」，論主敘經部師義也。《正理論》云「今謂經主唯申自執，非我許此經判所言相故。但言經證三根所取名為所覺，起所覺言（告大母經，色名所見、聲名所聞、法名所知復言所覺，故知即是三根）。故我師宗隨此經立所見等相，於理無違（依大母經立所見等相，於理無違也）。雖說為遮於彼增益愛、非愛相，非不應理；言六四別，於理不然，前經、後經義相似故（前經者，佛告大母：汝意云何？諸有色非汝眼見等。後經是復告大母：汝等四中，應知所見唯有所見等。經部釋云：前是六境、後是見等四境。《正理》不許，由經別意）。我見此經所說義者，謂教大母，如於三時色等境中，若不見等、不希求故，欲等不生。如是若知所見等境唯有所見等，欲等亦不生，欲等但由自分別故。我隨經義解此經文，非如經主隨自分別（准經有兩種不生欲等，一不見色等；二知所見色等但有色相，無愛、非愛相。前經明不見故無欲等；後經知所見等無愛、非愛相，故不生欲。兩經前後同明不生欲等，非是前經明六境、後經明四所見等境。廣引大母領解頌證）。」又云「又何意趣朋彼二師違理教釋，而偏憎背毘婆沙者？順理教言，且彼二師所釋違教。所見等相，佛於經中於色等境分明別說，而彼棄捨，異建立故。亦與隨教正理相違（經分明說色名所見、聲名所聞、法名所知，隨教理唯香、味、觸是所覺。二師所立違大母經，無別教證。翻明為正也）。說五境中各具有四，第六境上唯有三等。然法最可立所見名，非聲等中可名所見。如言佛見去、來世等，此皆意識不共境故。曾無聖教言耳見聲、鼻見香等，如何五境皆名所見，唯非第六？又彼自說：若意現證名為所知。法既所知，應名所見，現所證故，猶如色等。此有何理唯五所證立所見名？聲、香、味、觸名為所見，無經妄立。法不名所見，違經說無。又立比量。法定是所見，現所證故，猶如色等。就他宗比量。前師云：五根現所證境名為所見。既許法亦是現所證，如何非見？又後師釋：自內所受及自所證名為所知。若爾，眼見何緣非是自內所受？是則所見應即所知。又所覺、知應無差別，俱是意識自所證故。又諸比量，現量為先，達正理人皆所共許。若比量境方名所覺，不應所覺在所知先，故彼二師義無端緒。」

On the Śāstra's statement: "Former masters... is designated 'what is known'": The author of the Śāstra sets forth the position of the Sautrāntika master. The Nyāyānusāra states: "Now we say that the author of the Śāstra merely puts forth his own clinging, for we do not accept that this sūtra defines the characteristics of the designations in this manner. It is only said that the sūtra proves that what is grasped by the three faculties is called 'what is sensed', giving rise to the designation 'sensed' (in the Sūtra Addressed to Mātṛkā: form is called what is seen, sound is called what is heard, phenomena are called what is known, and it further speaks of what is sensed; therefore we know this refers to the three faculties). Thus our school's establishment of the characteristics of what is seen and so forth in accordance with this sūtra does not contradict reason (establishing the characteristics of what is seen and so forth based on the Sūtra Addressed to Mātṛkā does not contradict reason). Although it is said to ward off the superimposition of attractive and unattractive characteristics onto them, this is not unreasonable; asserting a distinction between six and four is unreasonable, because the meaning of the preceding sūtra and subsequent sūtra are similar (the preceding sūtra is where the Buddha addresses Mātṛkā: 'What do you think? Regarding all forms not seen by your eye...', and the subsequent sūtra is again addressing Mātṛkā: 'Among your four, you should know that in what is seen there is only what is seen...', etc. The Sautrāntika explains: the former refers to the six objects, and the latter refers to the four objects of seen and so forth. The Nyāyānusāra does not accept this, because the sūtra has an alternative intention). As for the meaning spoken in this sūtra as I see it: it teaches Mātṛkā that, just as among the objects of form and so forth across the three times, if one does not see them and so forth and does not crave them, desire and so on do not arise; likewise, if one knows that in the objects of what is seen and so forth there is only what is seen and so forth, desire and so on will also not arise, for desire and so on arise only from one's own conceptual discrimination. I explain this sūtra text according to the meaning of the sūtra, not following one's own conceptual discrimination like the author of the Śāstra (according to the sūtra there are two ways desire and so on do not arise: first, not seeing form and so forth; second, knowing that what is seen in form and so forth has only the characteristic of form, without attractive or unattractive characteristics. The preceding sūtra clarifies that due to not seeing there is no desire and so forth; the subsequent sūtra clarifies that by knowing that in what is seen and so forth there are no attractive or unattractive characteristics, desire does not arise. The two sūtras before and after both equally clarify the non-arising of desire and so on; it is not that the preceding sūtra clarifies six objects and the subsequent sūtra clarifies the four objects of what is seen and so forth. A verse of Mātṛkā's understanding is extensively cited as proof)." It further states: "Moreover, with what purpose does one side with those two masters whose explanations contradict reason and scripture, and show one-sided hatred and opposition against the Vibhāṣā? Speaking in accordance with reason and scripture, first of all, the explanations of those two masters contradict scripture. The characteristics of what is seen and so forth were distinctly and separately spoken by the Buddha in the sūtra with respect to the objects of form and so on, yet they abandon this and establish them differently. It also contradicts valid reasoning that accords with scripture (the sūtra clearly states that form is called what is seen, sound is called what is heard, and phenomena are called what is known; in accordance with scripture and reason, only fragrance, taste, and tangibles are what is sensed. What the two masters establish contradicts the Sūtra Addressed to Mātṛkā and lacks other scriptural proof. Reversing this illuminates what is correct). They say that each of the five objects possesses all four, while the sixth object has only three, and so on. Yet phenomena are the most qualified to be designated 'what is seen', while sound and so forth cannot be designated 'what is seen'. As when it is said that the Buddha 'sees' the past, future, and so on, these are exclusively objects of the mental consciousness. No sacred teaching has ever said that the ear sees sound or the nose sees fragrance, so how could all five objects be called 'what is seen' and only the sixth not be? Furthermore, they themselves say: if directly realized by the mind, it is called 'what is known'. Since phenomena are what is known, they should be called 'what is seen', because they are directly realized, just like form and so forth. What reason is there here that only what is realized by the five [faculties] is designated 'what is seen'? Calling sound, fragrance, taste, and tangibles 'what is seen' is a false establishment without sūtra support. Denying that phenomena are called 'what is seen' contradicts the sūtra's statement that they are not. Furthermore, an inference is established: Phenomena are definitely what is seen, because they are directly realized, just like form and so forth. This is an inference according to the other school. The former master says: the objects directly realized by the five sense faculties are called what is seen. Since it is accepted that phenomena are also directly realized, how are they not seen? Furthermore, the latter master explains: what is internally experienced by oneself and directly realized by oneself is called what is known. If so, for what reason is what is seen by the eye not internally experienced by oneself? If that were so, what is seen would be identical with what is known. Furthermore, there would be no distinction between what is sensed and what is known, because both are directly realized by oneself through the mental consciousness. Furthermore, among all inferences, direct perception precedes them, as is mutually accepted by all who understand right reasoning. If only the object of inference is designated 'what is sensed', 'what is sensed' should not precede 'what is known'. Therefore, the assertions of those two masters have no coherent ground."