俱舍論疏 19.235

19.235

論「如有請言至豈非記道」，答也。《正理論》云「如是分別至究竟時，便令問者了所問義，故此分別記相即成。由此已遮有作是難於分別後，既更無容有餘記言不應成記，以即分別說為記故。謂分別時，問者自了所欲問義。分別終時，已能影顯所記義故。由是分別記相得成。未分別時彼未能解，分別已解，故名為記。此於能記立以記名。反詰終時，已能影顯所記義故，由是亦應許此反詰即名為記，由反詰言記彼問故。有作是難：此記亦不成，記後無容有餘記言故。問俱不與問相相應，請言：願尊為我說法。此不成問，但應名請。此中所難，應准前遮。然此與前有差別者，謂若反詰令彼自然有正解生，方得名記。如契經說：我還問汝！如汝所忍，應如實答。又如經說：汝意云何？色為無常、為是常等？非佛於此自為分別，但由反詰令彼自解，豈不此中名佛為記？若能記者默無所言令他解生，名最勝記。」

The Śāstra says: "As when someone makes a request, saying [...] how could this not be explaining the path?" This is the answer. The Nyāyānusāra states: "When one analyses in this way [...] until the conclusion, it causes the questioner to comprehend the meaning of what was asked; therefore, the characteristic of this analytical explanation is established. By this, an objection has already been refuted which claimed: 'After the analysis, since there is no room for any further explanatory statement, it should not constitute an explanation,' because the analysis itself is stated to be the explanation. That is to say, during the analysis, the questioner spontaneously comprehends the meaning he wished to ask about. When the analysis concludes, it has already foreshadowed the meaning of what was explained. For this reason, the characteristic of analytical explanation is successfully established. Before the analysis, the other person was not yet able to understand; after the analysis, they have understood—hence it is called an 'explanation'. Here, the designation of 'explanation' is applied to that which can explain. When the cross-examination concludes, it has already foreshadowed the meaning of what was explained; therefore, it should also be accepted that this cross-examination is termed an 'explanation', because the words of the cross-examination explain their question. Some raise this objection: 'This explanation is also not established, because after the explanation there is no room for any further explanatory statement.' Furthermore, neither of the questions corresponds to the characteristics of a question: a request says, 'May the Venerable One teach the Dharma for me.' This does not constitute a question; it should only be called a request. The objection raised here should be refuted in the same manner as before. However, the difference between this and the preceding is that: if by cross-examination one causes correct understanding to arise spontaneously in the other, only then does it warrant the name of an 'explanation'. As the sūtra states: 'I shall question you in turn! According to how it seems to you, you should answer truthfully.' And as another sūtra states: 'What do you think? Is form impermanent, or is it permanent, and so forth?' It is not that the Buddha here provided an analysis himself; rather, merely by cross-examining, he caused the other to understand on his own. In this case, how could it not be called an explanation by the Buddha? If one who can explain remains silent and utters no words, thereby causing understanding to arise in another, this is called the supreme explanation."