俱舍論疏 19.52

19.52

論「如念種子至功能差別」，論主引二喻破大眾部。此第一也。准《正理論》，兼破有部。大眾部許由煩惱力別有隨眠心不相應名煩惱種，念種即是所證智生，功能差別無別體性，今引共許念種例破隨眠。

Regarding the treatise from "Just as the seed of memory... up to... distinct capability", the treatise author cites two similes to refute the Mahāsāṃghika. This is the first. Following the *Nyāyānusāra*, it also refutes the Sarvāstivādins. The Mahāsāṃghika accepts that through the power of defilements there is separately an anuśaya disassociated from thought called a seed of defilement; but the seed of memory is simply born of realized knowledge, a distinct capability with no separate substance. Now he cites the universally accepted seed of memory as an analogy to refute their anuśaya.