俱舍論疏 2.123

2.123

論「與此相違至名彼同分」，釋彼同分。《正理》云「云何與彼種類分同？謂此與彼同見等相、同處、同界，互為因故、互相屬故、互相引故，種類分同。」准此論意，有用名同分，無用名非同分。此無用非同分，與彼有用同分，同能見相乃至互相引故，是種類分同。即是有用無用雖別，而互相似，名種類分同，同有此分故。即是無用與彼有用分同，名彼同分，是彼同分之同類故。《婆沙》七十一云「問：同分眼能見色，彼同分眼不能見色。云何見色眼是不見色眼之同分，不見色眼是彼見色眼之同分耶？答：彼此二眼互為因故，乃至復次見色眼與不見色眼，俱一界攝、俱一處攝、俱一根攝、同一見性，故見色眼是不見色眼之同分，不見色眼復是彼見色眼之同分。如眼界，耳、鼻、舌、身界亦爾。同分、彼同分，品類差別皆相似故。問：色界云何？答：諸色為眼已、正、當見，及彼同分，是名色界。乃至或有色界一切有情眼所不見，即彼色界於一切時名彼同分，如妙高山中心之色，及大地中、大海下色，一切有情無有見者。問：彼色豈非天眼境界？答：彼色雖是天眼境界，而無用故，此不觀人。復次非一切時天眼現起，故有彼色天眼不見。問：彼色豈非佛眼見？亦同天眼釋。又有無佛時故。」然於此義，或有欲令唯嗅甞覺各自身中諸香、味、觸。彼作是說「香、味、觸界，依世俗理，如色界說。依勝義理，如眼界說。問：若一觸界二有情身，各在一邊共所逼觸，豈非勝義如色界說？答：如是。觸界有多極微和集一處，二身逼觸各得一邊無共得者，故勝義理如眼界說。香、味二界准此應知。」復有欲令亦嗅甞覺他及非情諸香、味、觸。彼作是說「香、味、觸界若已受用及受用時，依世俗理如色界說，謂諸世間說共得故。依勝義理，如眼界說，一所受用餘不得故。若未受用香、味、觸界，依勝義理亦有得義，如色界說義。謂在未來當至現在，有多人等共得義故，乃至是故諸論皆作是說：如色，界聲、香、味、觸界亦爾，以香、味、觸可共得故。」

The Śāstra says: "Contrary to this... is called tat-sabhāga." This explains tat-sabhāga. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "How does it share a category with that? It means that this shares with that the characteristic of seeing and so on, the same āyatana, and the same dhātu, because they are mutually causes, mutually belong to each other, and mutually induce each other; thus they share a category. According to the meaning of this treatise, having a function is called sabhāga, and lacking a function is called non-sabhāga. This non-sabhāga without function, sharing with that sabhāga with function the characteristic of being able to see, up to mutually inducing each other, shares a category. That is, although having a function and lacking a function are different, they resemble each other, which is called sharing a category, because they have this part in common. That is to say, lacking a function shares a part with that which has a function, so it is called tat-sabhāga, because it belongs to the same category as that sabhāga. The *Vibhāṣā*, fascicle 71, says: "Question: A sabhāga eye can see visible forms, but a tat-sabhāga eye cannot see visible forms. How is an eye that sees visible forms the sabhāga of an eye that does not see visible forms, and an eye that does not see visible forms the tat-sabhāga of that eye which sees visible forms? Answer: Because the two eyes are causes of each other; and furthermore, an eye that sees visible forms and an eye that does not see visible forms are both subsumed under one dhātu, both subsumed under one āyatana, both subsumed under one indriya, and have the same nature of seeing; therefore an eye that sees visible forms is the sabhāga of an eye that does not see visible forms, and an eye that does not see visible forms is in turn the tat-sabhāga of that eye which sees visible forms. As with the cakṣurdhātu, so too are the śrotradhatu, ghrāṇadhātu, jihvādhātu, and kāyadhātu. This is because their distinctions into sabhāga and tat-sabhāga categories are all similar. Question: What about the rūpadhātu? Answer: Visible forms that have been seen, are being seen, or will be seen by the eye, as well as their tat-sabhāga, are called the rūpadhātu. Furthermore, there are visible forms that are not seen by the eye of any sentient being, and that rūpadhātu is at all times called tat-sabhāga, such as the color in the center of Mount Sumeru, and the colors within the great earth and beneath the great ocean, which are not seen by any sentient being. Question: Are those visible forms not the sphere of the divine eye? Answer: Although those visible forms are the sphere of the divine eye, because they lack function, this does not consider persons [with divine vision]. Furthermore, the divine eye does not arise manifest at all times, so there are visible forms that the divine eye does not see. Question: Are those visible forms not seen by the Buddha-eye? The explanation is the same as for the divine eye. Moreover, there are times when there is no Buddha." However, with regard to this meaning, some wish to maintain that one smells, tastes, and feels only the smells, tastes, and tangibles within one's own body. They say: "The smell, taste, and tangible dhātus, according to conventional truth, are explained like the rūpadhātu. According to ultimate truth, they are explained like the cakṣurdhātu. Question: If one tangible dhātu is pressed and touched jointly by the bodies of two sentient beings, each on one side, is it not explained according to ultimate truth like the rūpadhātu? Answer: It is like this: the tangible dhātu has many subtle atoms assembled in one place; the two bodies pressing and touching it each obtain one side, and none obtain it jointly; therefore, according to ultimate truth it is explained like the cakṣurdhātu. The smell and taste dhātus should be understood accordingly." Furthermore, others wish to maintain that one also smells, tastes, and feels the smells, tastes, and tangibles of others and of non-sentient things. They say: "If the smell, taste, and tangible dhātus have already been enjoyed or are being enjoyed, according to conventional truth they are explained like the rūpadhātu, meaning that worldly people say they are jointly obtained. According to ultimate truth, they are explained like the cakṣurdhātu, because what is enjoyed by one is not obtained by others. If the smell, taste, and tangible dhātus have not yet been enjoyed, according to ultimate truth they also have the meaning of being obtainable, explained in the sense of the rūpadhātu. That is to say, when being in the future they are about to arrive in the present, there is the meaning that multiple persons and so on can jointly obtain them; up to, therefore, the treatises all state: 'As with the rūpadhātu, the śabda-, gandha-, rasa-, and spraṣṭavyadhātus are also like this, because smell, taste, and tangibles can be jointly obtained.'"