俱舍論疏 2.203

2.203

論「由許此理至義善成立」，引《婆沙》文證。論「故彼問言至同類相續」，廣引《婆沙》文。《正理》不許此義，《正理論》云「隣近生時即名為合，豈待相觸方得合名。又汝不應躊躇此義，此彼大種定不相觸。所以者何？是所觸故，非能觸故。諸色蘊中唯有觸界名為所觸，但有身根名為能觸。此外觸義更不應思。若謂所觸亦能觸者，應許身根亦是所觸，則境、有境便應雜亂，然無雜亂立境、有境。若謂此二無雜亂失，身識所緣、所依別故。豈不由此轉成雜亂？謂若身根亦所觸者，何緣不作身識所緣？若許觸界亦能觸者，何緣不作身識所依？若諸極微定不相觸，《毘婆沙論》則不應言『非觸為因生於是觸，謂離散物正和合時。是觸為因生於非觸，謂和合物正離散時。是觸為因生於是觸，謂和合物復和合時。非觸為因生於非觸，謂向遊塵同類相續。』毘婆沙宗決定不許極微展轉更相觸義。應知彼言有別意趣，且向遊塵多極微集，而彼論說非觸為因生於非觸，故知彼言定有別意。有何別意？謂於和合說是觸言。」准此論文，和合聚色假名相觸。豈不一切鼻、舌、身根皆取至境無差別故，則應能觸通鼻、舌根，所觸亦應兼於香、味？此亦非理。隣近雖同，而於其中有品別故。又如眼等取非至同，非至境中非無品別。鼻等亦爾，取至境同，於至境中應有品別。又滑、澁等世間共起所觸想名，對彼身根說名能觸，故無有過。准此，《正理》有其兩釋：一以近故、二以順世間故。有餘師說：雖諸極微互不相觸，而和合色相觸無過，由此撫擊得發音聲。如諸極微雖無變礙，而和合色變礙非無。此不應理。非離極微有和合色，若觸和合應觸極微，彼即應許極微相觸。是故前說於理為善。此破與此論同。

On the Śāstra's statement: "Because this principle is accepted [...] the meaning is well-established": this cites the text of the Vibhāṣā as proof. On the Śāstra's statement: "Therefore, that [treatise] asks [...] homogeneous continuity": this cites the Vibhāṣā extensively. The Nyāyānusāra does not accept this meaning; the Nyāyānusāra says: "Arising in close proximity is itself called combination; how could it wait for mutual contact to obtain the name 'combination'? Moreover, you should not hesitate over this matter: these and those great elements definitely do not touch one another. Why is that? Because they are what is touched (tangible), not what touches. Among the aggregates of matter, only the tangible element (spraṣṭavyadhātu) is called what is touched, and only the body-faculty is called what touches. Beyond this, the meaning of touch should not be considered. If one claims that what is touched can also touch, one should accept that the body-faculty is also what is touched, in which case object and subject possessing the object would become conflated; yet without conflation we establish object and subject possessing the object. If you say that these two do not have the fault of conflation because the object of observation and the basis of body-consciousness are different, does this not, on the contrary, make the conflation even greater? For if the body-faculty were also what is touched, why would it not serve as the object of observation of body-consciousness? If one accepts that the tangible element can also touch, why would it not serve as the basis of body-consciousness? If atoms definitely do not touch, the Vibhāṣā-śāstra should not have said: 'A non-contact serves as cause to produce this contact, which refers to when dispersed things are just combining. This contact serves as cause to produce a non-contact, which refers to when combined things are just dispersing. This contact serves as cause to produce this contact, which refers to when combined things recombine. A non-contact serves as cause to produce a non-contact, which refers to the homogeneous continuity of motes floating in sunbeams.' The Vaibhāṣika school definitely does not accept that atoms touch one another. It should be known that those words have a different underlying intention. Now, motes floating in sunbeams are an aggregation of many atoms, yet that treatise says that a non-contact serves as cause to produce a non-contact; therefore we know that those words definitely have a different intention. What different intention? It means that 'contact' is spoken of with respect to aggregation." According to this text, aggregated matter is only metaphorically called mutually touching. Would this not imply that, because all nose, tongue, and body faculties grasp contiguous objects without distinction, what touches would extend to the nose and tongue faculties, and what is touched would also encompass fragrance and taste? This too is unreasonable. Although their proximity is the same, among them there are distinct categories. Furthermore, just as the eye and the rest are the same in grasping non-contiguous objects, yet among non-contiguous objects there is no lack of distinct categories; the nose and the rest are likewise: though the same in grasping contiguous objects, among contiguous objects there should be distinct categories. Furthermore, smooth, rough, and the like are what are commonly designated by worldly consensus as 'what is touched', and relative to them the body-faculty is called 'what touches'; therefore there is no fault. According to this, the Nyāyānusāra has two explanations: first, by reason of proximity; second, by conforming to worldly consensus. Other masters say: Although atoms do not touch one another, aggregated matter touching is without fault, and through this, striking can produce sound. Just as atoms, though without obstruction, aggregated matter is not without obstruction. This is unreasonable. Aggregated matter does not exist apart from atoms; if one touches the aggregate, one would be touching the atoms, in which case they would have to accept that atoms touch one another. Therefore, the earlier explanation is logically superior. This refutation is the same as in this Śāstra.