俱舍論疏 2.99

2.99

論「若爾身受至便違正理」，有人云：論主破初師者。謬也。《正理》云「何緣聲界非異熟生？數數間斷復還生故，異熟生色無如是事。非隨欲樂異熟果生，聲隨欲生，故非異熟。豈不如彼《施設論》言：善修遠離麁惡語故，感得大士梵音聲相。雖由業感，而非異熟，以聲起在第三傳故。謂從彼業生諸大種，從諸大種緣擊發聲。若爾，身受因業所生大種發故，應非異熟。此難不然。非諸身受皆因大種，及因業生大種所發，亦非一切皆是異熟。然諸身受亦因非業所生大種，及非大種而得生故。謂身受起，要假身、解、身識等緣，由此亦緣外大種起，非要待業所感大生。於理無違，故通異熟。若執聲界是異熟生，如是聲界唯因大種，唯因異熟大種而生，不離如前所說過失。若說聲界非異熟生，如是聲界唯因大種，通因異熟及非異熟大種而起，於理無違，亦無如前所說過失。故應如是分別聲界。非諸身受，唯內大種是異熟者，非唯異熟大種為因。又不同彼有違理失，是故所例理極不齊。」今詳《正理》論意，異熟心等定有依、緣方得生起。既緣非異熟大種得起，異熟身受依異熟者，因何不復是異熟耶？若緣異熟亦不得起，即應總無異熟身受。既許有者，豈不依、緣生於身受？「有餘師說：聲非異熟，如何異熟大種所生？故應許聲屬第四傳、或第五傳，故非異熟。謂從業生異熟大種，從此傳生長養大種，此復傳生等流大種。長養大種發長養聲，等流大種發等流聲。此說非理。豈不如從無記大種發善、惡聲，從有執受發無執受，從身境界發耳境界？如是若從異熟大種發非異熟，有何相違？是故彼說定為非理（已上《正理》）。」有人作俱舍師破云：汝若言身受從大種、非大種生，故通異熟；聲唯大種生，不通異熟者。色亦唯從大種生，應不通異熟。汝若言身受從異熟、長養、等流大種生，通異熟者。汝亦許聲從此三生，應通異熟。汝若言身受從異熟大種生者，亦非一切皆是異熟有通善、惡者。我亦非言一切身受從異熟大種生者，皆是異熟亦通善惡。今此中破，且據身受是異熟者，從業所生大種生者為難。汝若言聲屬第三傳故非異熟者。此第三傳非為定證，為如異熟身受屬第三傳故，聲是異熟？為如善、惡身受屬第三傳故，聲非異熟？我以不定出汝過失。汝言身受不定故通異熟，豈不徒言？故聲非屬第三傳也。初師既破，後師還立。詳其此破未得其意。又《正理論》救第三傳云「豈不如從無記大種發善、惡聲，從有執受發無執受，從身境界發耳境界。如是若從異熟大種發非異熟，有何相違？」若作俱舍師破：大種造色理實無定。此異熟大種所發之聲，既非異熟，為是何等？若是長養，理應用彼長養大造；若是等流，理應用彼等流大造。有何所以異熟大造？詳其釋意未為盡理。誰言異熟大種造長養聲作此破耶？又詳論意，《正理》破後師，《俱舍》破兩師。《正理》存前師，故於前師後救。《俱舍》破兩師，故於第二說後破也。及身受之難，正破前師亦兼後師，欲存聲通異熟故。然《正理論》意，異熟、長養、等流大種皆能發聲，非唯異熟。此是擊發生聲，非是造義。諸德多將此論存後師釋，及擊發生以為造者，竝不得論意。若謂後師為正，因何異熟大種相擊不發於聲，唯等流大種擊發生聲？此即違《婆沙》一百二十七云「評曰：總說此聲一切身支大種所造、遍身大種造者，對喉及臍邊大種說遍身大種，非是以造色等遍身內大種造也。」即是遍身更有大種造聲。若此以造色等大種造聲，即是一因造多色過。如《婆沙》說「乃至現見此等舉身掉動故」。准論文，既舉身掉動，因何異熟、長養不掉動耶？若亦掉動，因何相擊不生聲耶，要須傳生等流大種？又《婆沙》九十云「問：聲界云何恒時成就？有作是說：大種合離必生聲界。有情若在欲、色界中，大種恒有，故常發聲。評曰：彼不應作是說。若四大種必恒生聲，此所生聲何大種造？若即此造，應多有對色一四大種生。若說餘造，餘四大種復必生聲。如是展轉有無窮過。應作是說：生欲、色界有情身中，多四大種在一身內有相擊者便發生聲，不相擊者即無聲起。雖一身中必有聲界，非諸身分皆遍發聲（已上論文）。」准此，因何異熟、長養無相擊時，要須傳生等流大種？又證緣擊發聲非是造義，故知第二師義違《婆沙》正義，由此《正理論》破而不立。第一師義不違《婆沙》，論主意不許故，兩師同破，許聲是異熟生故。又諸德多說聲屬第三傳，證異熟大種造長養、等流聲。此亦非理。若以造義名為第三者，造餘異熟色等，亦是從業生大種。大種造色等亦是第三，應非異熟。又若異熟大種能造聲者，此造聲大種，若如餘異熟色相續在身，即聲無而有大種，即違《婆沙》一百三十二云「若成就現在大種，彼現在所造色耶？答：如是。設成就現在所造色，彼現在大種耶？答：如是。以非現在大種無果故（已上論文）。」若聲無而有大種，此即大種無其果也。若此異熟大種隨聲有無，此即如聲間斷，應非異熟。有人引《正理》第二十「成就造色不成大種，成就大種不成造色」，證有一類異熟四大在身而不造色。謬也。此翻證無有造聲異熟大種在身而無所造聲也。彼文引造無表色大種作句，不引此類大種作句數故。問：若成就造無表業大種而不成就無表色者，豈非現在大種無果耶？答：此據無對造色說，不據有對造色說。若不爾者，即違現在大種必有果也。造色必有因，四大必有果，同世者，據有對造色說。准上道理，一切聲皆無異熟大種造也。長養大種造等流色，定共戒定長養大造故。長養四大造長養聲，等流四大造等流聲，無文證二互相造故。一切業聲皆是等流，等流大造非餘造故。

Regarding the text of the treatise: "If that were so, bodily sensations [would likewise be produced from the great elements born of karma, and thus] would run counter to sound reasoning": Some say that the author of the treatise is refuting the first master. This is erroneous. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "For what reason is the sound-element not born of ripening? Because it ceases and arises again repeatedly at intervals; form born of ripening is not like this. Ripened effects do not arise according to desire, whereas sound arises according to desire; therefore, it is not ripening. How is it not as stated in the *Prajñaptiśāstra*: 'Through thoroughly cultivating abstention from harsh speech, one obtains the bodily mark of the Great Man's Brahmā-sound'? Although it is brought about by karma, it is not ripening, because sound arises in the third succession. That is to say, from that karma arise the great elements, and from the percussion of those great elements, sound is generated. 'If that were so, since bodily sensation is generated from the great elements produced by karma, it ought not to be ripening.' This objection is not correct. It is not the case that all bodily sensations are generated from the great elements and from the great elements produced by karma, nor are all of them ripening. Rather, bodily sensations also arise from great elements not produced by karma, as well as from what is not a great element. That is to say, for bodily sensation to arise, it must rely on conditions such as the body, tactile objects, and body-consciousness; hence it also arises in dependence on external great elements, without necessarily having to wait for the great elements brought about by karma. There is no contradiction with reasoning; thus it can be ripening. If one maintains that the sound-element is born of ripening, such a sound-element would be born solely from the great elements, and solely from the ripened great elements, which does not escape the fault stated before. If one says that the sound-element is not born of ripening, such a sound-element is born solely from the great elements, arising both from ripened and non-ripened great elements; there is no contradiction with reasoning, nor is there the fault stated before. Therefore, one should make this distinction regarding the sound-element. It is not the case that all bodily sensations have only the internal great elements as ripening, nor do they have only the ripened great elements as their cause. Furthermore, unlike [sound], they do not have the fault of contradicting reasoning; therefore, the analogy drawn is extremely unequal." Now, examining the intention of the *Nyāyānusāra*, ripened mind and so forth definitely require a basis and an object-condition to arise. Since they can arise by taking non-ripened great elements as an object-condition, why should a ripened bodily sensation that relies on a ripened [basis] not also be ripening? If it could not arise even when taking ripening as an object-condition, then there would be no ripened bodily sensations whatsoever. Since it is admitted that they exist, how could they not arise from a basis and an object-condition? [The *Nyāyānusāra* continues:] "Other masters say: 'Sound is not ripening; how could it be born from ripened great elements? Therefore, one should accept that sound belongs to the fourth or fifth succession, and is thus not ripening. That is to say, from karma arise the ripened great elements; from these are successively produced the nourished great elements; these further successively produce the outflowing great elements. The nourished great elements generate nourished sound, and the outflowing great elements generate outflowing sound.' This statement is irrational. Is it not just as good and bad sounds are generated from neutral great elements, sound devoid of appropriation is generated from that with appropriation, and an object of hearing is generated from an object of the body? In the same way, if what is not ripening is generated from ripened great elements, what contradiction is there? Therefore, what they say is definitely irrational" (thus far the *Nyāyānusāra*). Someone acting as a proponent of the *Kośa* refuted this, saying: If you say that bodily sensation arises from great elements and non-great elements and therefore can be ripening, whereas sound arises solely from great elements and cannot be ripening, then visible form also arises solely from great elements and ought not to be ripening. If you say that bodily sensation arises from ripened, nourished, and outflowing great elements and thus can be ripening, then since you also admit that sound arises from these three, it ought to be ripening. If you say that among the bodily sensations that arise from ripened great elements, not all are ripening and some can be good or bad, I also do not say that all bodily sensations arising from ripened great elements are ripening, since they also can be good or bad. Now, the refutation here merely raises the objection based on bodily sensation that is ripening and arises from great elements produced by karma. If you say that sound is not ripening because it belongs to the third succession, this third succession is not a conclusive proof: does sound become ripening like ripened bodily sensation belonging to the third succession, or is sound not ripening like good and bad bodily sensations belonging to the third succession? I demonstrate your error through this inconclusiveness. When you say that bodily sensation can be ripening because it is inconclusive, are your words not in vain? Therefore, sound does not belong to the third succession. Since the first master is refuted, the later master stands again. Examining this refutation, it has not grasped the intended meaning. Furthermore, when the *Nyāyānusāra* rescues the third succession, saying: "Is it not just as good and bad sounds are generated from neutral great elements, sound devoid of appropriation is generated from that with appropriation, and an object of hearing is generated from an object of the body? In the same way, if what is not ripening is generated from ripened great elements, what contradiction is there?" If one refutes this as a proponent of the *Kośa*: The derivation of secondary matter from the great elements is in reality not fixed. Since this sound generated by the ripened great elements is not ripening, what kind is it? If it is nourished, it should properly be derived from those nourished great elements; if it is outflowing, it should properly be derived from those outflowing great elements. For what reason would it be derived from ripened great elements? Examining the meaning of this explanation, it is not completely reasonable. Who said that the ripened great elements derive nourished sound, that one would raise such a refutation? Furthermore, examining the intent of the treatises: the *Nyāyānusāra* refutes the later master, while the *Kośa* refutes both masters. The *Nyāyānusāra* preserves the former master, and therefore rescues him after the former master's [statement]. The *Kośa* refutes both masters, and therefore refutes after the second explanation. And the objection concerning bodily sensation directly refutes the former master while also encompassing the later master, because it wishes to maintain that sound can be ripening. However, the intent of the *Nyāyānusāra* is that ripened, nourished, and outflowing great elements are all able to generate sound, not ripened alone. This is generation through percussion, not the meaning of derivation. Many virtuous scholars take this treatise as preserving the later master's explanation, and take generation through percussion to be derivation; both fail to grasp the treatise's intent. If one considers the later master to be correct, why would the collision of ripened great elements not generate sound, such that only the collision of outflowing great elements generates sound? This would contradict fascicle 127 of the *Vibhāṣā*, which says: "Evaluation: Stating generally that this sound is derived from the great elements of all bodily limbs, or derived from the great elements of the entire body, is said in contrast to the great elements of the throat and the region of the navel as being the great elements of the entire body; it is not that it is derived from the internal great elements of the entire body that derive visible form and so forth." That is to say, throughout the body there are further great elements that derive sound. If this sound were derived from the great elements that derive visible form and so forth, that would entail the fault of one cause deriving multiple forms. As the *Vibhāṣā* says: "...even unto seeing directly that these [beings] shake their entire bodies." According to the treatise text, since they shake their entire bodies, why would the ripened and nourished [great elements] not shake? If they also shake, why would their mutual percussion not produce sound, such that they must necessarily successively produce outflowing great elements? Furthermore, fascicle 90 of the *Vibhāṣā* says: "Question: How is the sound-element constantly possessed? Some say: The conjunction and disjunction of the great elements definitely produces the sound-element. If a sentient being is in the desire or form realm, the great elements are constant, and therefore they constantly emit sound. Evaluation: One should not state this. If the four great elements definitely and constantly produce sound, by what great elements is this produced sound derived? If it is derived from these very ones, multiple resistant forms would be produced by one set of four great elements. If it is said to be derived from others, those other four great elements would again definitely produce sound. In this way, there would be an infinite regress. One should say instead: In the body of a sentient being born in the desire or form realm, there are multiple sets of four great elements in a single body; when there are those that collide with one another, they generate sound, and when they do not collide, no sound arises. Although there is definitely a sound-element in a single body, not all parts of the body universally emit sound" (thus far the text of the treatise). According to this, why would there be no collision among the ripened and nourished [great elements], such that they must necessarily successively produce outflowing great elements? Furthermore, this proves that generation through percussion is not the meaning of derivation; hence we know that the second master's position contradicts the correct doctrine of the *Vibhāṣā*, which is why the *Nyāyānusāra* refutes it and does not uphold it. The first master's position does not contradict the *Vibhāṣā*; but because the author of the treatise does not accept it, both masters are refuted together, since he allows that sound is born of ripening. Furthermore, many virtuous scholars say that sound belongs to the third succession, using this to prove that ripened great elements derive nourished and outflowing sound. This too is irrational. If one calls it the third in the sense of derivation, the derivation of other ripened matter and so forth also involves great elements born from karma. Since the derivation of form and so forth by the great elements would also be the third, they ought not to be ripening. Furthermore, if ripened great elements could derive sound, then if these sound-deriving great elements continued in the body like other ripened forms, the great elements would exist while sound did not, which would contradict fascicle 132 of the *Vibhāṣā*, which says: "If one possesses present great elements, does one possess their present derived matter? Answer: Yes. Supposing one possesses present derived matter, does one possess its present great elements? Answer: Yes. Because present great elements are not without fruit" (thus far the text of the treatise). If sound did not exist while the great elements existed, the great elements would lack their fruit. If these ripened great elements existed or did not exist in accordance with sound, then like sound they would be intermittent, and ought not to be ripening. Someone cited fascicle 20 of the *Nyāyānusāra*: "possessing derived matter without possessing the great elements; possessing the great elements without possessing derived matter," to prove that there is a class of ripened four great elements in the body that do not derive matter. This is erroneous. This conversely proves that there are no sound-deriving ripened great elements in the body that lack derived sound, because that text cites the great elements that derive unmanifest matter to form the permutations, not this kind of great elements. Question: If one possesses the great elements that derive unmanifest karma without possessing unmanifest matter, would not the present great elements be without fruit? Answer: This is said based on non-resistant derived matter, not based on resistant derived matter. If it were not so, it would contradict the principle that present great elements definitely have fruit. That derived matter definitely has a cause, and the four great elements definitely have a fruit in the same temporal period, is said based on resistant derived matter. Following the reasoning above, no sound is derived from ripened great elements. Nourished great elements derive outflowing matter, because the samādhi-discipline is derived from nourished great elements of concentration. Nourished four great elements derive nourished sound, and outflowing four great elements derive outflowing sound, since there is no textual proof that the two derive each other. All sound born of karma is outflowing, because it is derived from outflowing great elements and not derived from others.