俱舍論記 2.88

2.88

「若爾身受至便違正理」者，此論雖有兩說，論主意存後師。破初師云：若說此聲從業所生大種生起，屬第三傳故非異熟者，身識相應受從業所生大種生故。謂業為第一傳，異熟大種為第二傳，由此大種生身受為第三傳。身受同聲俱第三傳，應非異熟。若受如聲非異熟者，便違正理，以宗說受通異熟故。《正理》救云「此難不然。非諸身受皆因大種，及因業生大種所發，亦非一切皆是異熟。然諸身受亦因非業所生大種及非大種而得生故。謂身受起，要假身、觸、身識等緣，由此亦緣外大種起，非要待業所感大生。於理無違，故通異熟。」《正理》救意云：謂身受生非皆因大種，亦假非大種身、觸、身識等緣。設有因大種者，又非但因業生大種，謂亦因非業等流、長養大種生。設因業生大種者，又體非唯是異熟，亦通善、惡等。由此三義不定，故通異熟。意救第三傳。若作俱舍師破云：汝若言身受從大種、非大種生故通異熟，聲唯大種生，不通異熟者；色亦唯從大種生，應不通異熟。汝若言身受從異熟、長養、等流大種生，通異熟者；汝亦許聲從此三生，應通異熟。汝若言身受異熟大種生者，亦非一切皆是異熟，有通善、惡者；我亦非言一切身受從異熟大種生者皆是異熟，亦通善、惡。今此中破，且據身受是異熟者、從業所生大種生者為難。汝若言聲屬第三傳非異熟者，此第三傳非為定證。為如異熟身受屬第三傳故聲是異熟？為如善、惡身受屬第三傳故聲非異熟？我以不定出汝過失。言身受不定故通異熟，豈不徒言？竟不救難，故聲非屬第三傳也。初師既破，後師還立。又《正理論》救第三傳云「豈不如從無記大種發善、惡聲，從有執受發無執受，從身境界發耳境界。如是，若從異熟大種發非異熟，有何相違？」若作俱舍師破：大種造色理實無定。此異熟大種所發之聲既非異熟，為是何等？若是長養，理應用彼長養大造；若是等流，理應用彼等流大造。有何所以異熟大造？

"If so, bodily feeling... would contradict correct principle": although this treatise contains two explanations, the author's intention favors the latter master. Refuting the first master, he says: If you say that this sound arises from the great elements produced by karma, and because it belongs to the third remove it is not a fruition, then feeling associated with body-consciousness also arises from the great elements produced by karma. That is: karma is the first remove, the fruition great elements are the second remove, and the bodily feeling produced due to these great elements is the third remove. Bodily feeling, being identical to sound in both being of the third remove, ought not to be a fruition. If feeling, like sound, were not a fruition, that would contradict correct principle, because the school maintains that feeling includes fruition. The *Nyāyānusāra* rescues [this], saying: "This objection is not correct. Not all bodily feelings are caused by the great elements and generated by karma-produced great elements, nor are they all fruitions. Rather, bodily feelings are also able to arise caused by great elements not produced by karma and by non-great elements. That is: when bodily feeling arises, it must rely on conditions such as the body, contact, and body-consciousness; through this it also arises taking external great elements as an object, and does not necessarily depend on the arising of great elements brought about by karma. There is no contradiction with principle, so it includes fruition." The intention of the *Nyāyānusāra*'s rescue is: the arising of bodily feeling is not entirely caused by great elements; it also relies on non-great elements such as the body, contact, and body-consciousness as conditions. Even where caused by great elements, it is moreover not caused solely by karma-produced great elements, meaning it also arises caused by non-karma homogeneously-flowing and nutriment-increased great elements. Even where caused by karma-produced great elements, its intrinsic nature is moreover not exclusively a fruition, but also includes the wholesome, unwholesome, and so forth. Due to these three aspects being indefinite, it therefore includes fruition. This aims to rescue the third remove. If a Kośa scholar were to refute this, he would say: If you say that because bodily feeling arises from great elements and non-great elements it includes fruition, while sound arises solely from great elements and does not include fruition; then visible form also arises solely from great elements, and ought not to include fruition. If you say that because bodily feeling arises from fruition, nutriment-increased, and homogeneously-flowing great elements it includes fruition; then since you also accept that sound arises from these three, it ought to include fruition. If you say that of bodily feelings arising from fruition great elements, not all are fruitions, but include the wholesome and unwholesome; I also do not say that all bodily feelings arising from fruition great elements are fruitions, for they also include the wholesome and unwholesome. The refutation here is raised provisionally taking bodily feeling that is a fruition and arises from karma-produced great elements as the objection. If you say that sound belongs to the third remove and is not a fruition, this third remove is not a definitive proof. Is sound a fruition like fruition bodily feeling because it belongs to the third remove? Or is sound not a fruition like wholesome and unwholesome bodily feeling because it belongs to the third remove? I point out your error by means of this indefiniteness. To say that bodily feeling is indefinite and therefore includes fruition—is that not spoken in vain? Ultimately it does not rescue the objection; therefore sound does not belong to the third remove. The first master being refuted, the latter master is established in turn. Furthermore, the *Nyāyānusāra* rescues the third remove, saying: "Is it not just as wholesome and unwholesome sound is generated from morally neutral great elements, unappropriated [sound] is generated from appropriated [elements], and the sphere of the ear is generated from the sphere of the body? In the same way, if non-fruition is generated from fruition great elements, what contradiction is there?" If a Kośa scholar were to refute this: in principle, the production of secondary matter by great elements is indeed indefinite. Since this sound generated by fruition great elements is not a fruition, what is it? If it is nutriment-increased, in principle it should be produced by those nutriment-increased great elements; if it is homogeneously-flowing, in principle it should be produced by those homogeneously-flowing great elements. What reason is there for it to be produced by fruition great elements?