俱舍論疏 21.151

21.151

論「若聖位中至未滅雙因」，第二位也。苦類忍現行以前，雖得無漏得得無為，爾時非想五部惑俱成就故，不名為缺。言「雙因」者，謂自部自品因名自因，自部他品及他部全名為他因。聖斷見惑九品，同一品斷故。若斷自部自品即斷自部他品，不由自部他品不成遍知，但由他部不成遍知。修道所斷但由自部他品不成遍知，不由他部不成遍知，以必先斷他部因故。由此《婆沙》見道以他部為一因，修道以他品為一因也。所以但立雙因不立俱繫者，《正理論》云「雙因、俱繫雖依一物，一物者俱是據斷立也。而繫與因其義各異，謂於五部令起名因，即於其中能縛名繫（繫因義別也）。且苦智生、集智未生，二部雖無互令起力，而有展轉能為因性。見集斷惑縛義如本，見苦所斷縛義都無，故非滅雙因即是離俱繫。又不可說因義即繫，以無漏緣惑不繫他聚故。由此我宗二種俱說。今不說者，但可說言說此彼自成，不可言無異，體、義寬故，且說雙因（體寬者，謂相應、俱有法等。義寬者，謂同類、遍行。相應、俱有義皆是因也）。」

The Śāstra says: "If in the state of an ārya, down to: both causes have not yet been extinguished." This is the second state. Prior to the actual presence of the patience of the category of suffering, although one obtains untainted acquisition and obtains the unconditioned, at that time because all five categories of afflictions of Neither-Conceptual-nor-Non-Conceptual are possessed, it is not called broken. Regarding "both causes": a cause of one's own category and one's own grade is called one's own cause; [a cause of] one's own category and other grades, as well as the entirety of other categories, is called an other cause. When an ārya abandons the defilements of view of the nine grades, they are abandoned in a single grade; therefore, if one abandons one's own category and one's own grade, one immediately abandons one's own category and other grades. Parijñā fails to be established not because of other grades of one's own category, but only because of other categories. What is abandoned by the path of cultivation fails to be established as parijñā only because of other grades of one's own category, not because of other categories, since the causes of other categories must have already been abandoned beforehand. On account of this, the *Vibhāṣā* takes other categories as one cause in the path of seeing, and other grades as one cause in the path of cultivation. As for why only both causes are established and conjoined bondage is not established: the *Nyāyānusāra* says, "Although both causes and conjoined bondage rely on a single entity—'a single entity' means both are established based on cessation—yet bondage and cause differ in their meaning. Causing [defilements] to arise among the five categories is called a cause, whereas being able to bind within them is called bondage (the meanings of bondage and cause are distinct). Now, when the knowledge of suffering has arisen but the knowledge of origin has not arisen, although the two categories lack the power to cause each other to arise, they possess the nature of being causes for each other reciprocally. The binding function of the defilements abandoned by seeing origin remains as before, while the binding function of what is abandoned by seeing suffering is completely gone; hence extinguishing both causes is not identical to release from conjoined bondage. Furthermore, one cannot say that the meaning of cause is itself bondage, because afflictions that take the untainted as object do not bind other aggregates. On account of this, our school states both. Now, in not stating it here, one can only say that stating this implies that that is naturally accomplished; one cannot say they are not different. Because entity and meaning are broad, it only mentions both causes (an entity being broad refers to associated and coexistent dharmas, etc.; meaning being broad refers to of-the-same-category, omnipresent, associated, and coexistent meanings all being causes)."