俱舍論疏 21.86

21.86

論「有餘別說至唯有此五」，述有餘師立五因也。《正理》破此師云「乍可枉謗當聖慈尊。以聖慈尊猶一生隔，未證無等大乘智故，寧可枉謗現能寂尊？彼說何緣名枉謗佛？以彼所說前後相違，及與契經理相違故。如何彼說前後相違？謂若欲貪、瞋恚二蓋現起能障將入定心，障既現前何能入定？若別修治伏已入者，則不應言正入定位。於止及觀不能正習，又不能習止及觀者，云何名為正入定位？又彼所說正入定言，為聞、思所成？為修所成定？若言我說聞、思所成名正入定，則不應說後出定位思擇法時，聞、思所成有分別故即思擇法，何待出時？若說我言修所成定名正入定，理亦不然，修所成心正現前位，惛眠、掉悔何容現前？若不現前。寧障止觀？如何彼說經、理相違？謂彼所言惛、眠、掉、悔，如其次第障奢摩他、毘鉢舍那，違前教、理。故彼所說唯立五因，無有功能證蓋唯五。由此前說，理善可依。何故無明不立為蓋？不說成故。如契經說：無明所覆。覆即是蓋。有餘師說：等荷擔者立諸蓋中，無明於中所荷偏重，是故不說。若立無明為一蓋者，一切煩惱所荷障能，合比無明猶不能及，故不立在諸蓋聚中。慢復何緣不立為蓋？以有由慢能修勝法，為蓋義劣，不立蓋中。有餘師言：夫為蓋者令心趣下，慢則不然，以能令心趣上法故。非慢有力能壓伏心令其趣下，故不立蓋。諸見何故不立蓋中？見諸有情闕無我見者，雖執有我而能離染故。有說：諸見慧為體故、性捷利故，不順蓋義。為蓋必與此義相違。隨煩惱中餘不立蓋，准前所說應如理思。上二界惑不立蓋者，離三界染初非障故。初為障故，建立蓋名。又上界惑唯無記故，蓋唯不善，如前已說。」

The treatise recounts another master's grounds for establishing five: "Some other [masters] explain otherwise […] there are only these five." The Nyāyānusāra refutes this master, saying: "Better to falsely slander the future Holy Maitreya! For the Holy Maitreya is still separated [from buddhahood] by a single rebirth and has not yet realized the peerless wisdom of the Great Vehicle; how could one rather falsely slander the present Śākyamuni? On what grounds is what he said called a false slander of the Buddha? Because what he stated is mutually contradictory between earlier and later parts, and contradicts both the sūtras and reason. How is what he said mutually contradictory? Namely, if the two hindrances of sensual desire and ill-will, when actively arising, can obstruct the mind about to enter absorption, once the obstruction has appeared, how could one enter absorption? If one enters it only after having suppressed it by practicing a separate antidote, then one should not say that at the very time of entering absorption one cannot properly cultivate calming (śamatha) and insight (vipaśyanā); moreover, if one cannot cultivate calming and insight, how can it be called the time of properly entering absorption? Furthermore, does his statement 'properly entering absorption' refer to absorption accomplished through hearing and thinking, or absorption accomplished through cultivation? If he says, 'I speak of what is accomplished through hearing and thinking as properly entering absorption,' then one should not say that later, when emerging from absorption to discern phenomena, one does so; for what is accomplished through hearing and thinking involves conceptualization and is itself the discerning of phenomena—why wait for the time of emergence? If he says, 'I speak of absorption accomplished through cultivation as properly entering absorption,' this is also unreasonable in principle, for at the time when a mind accomplished through cultivation is directly manifest, how could lethargy, drowsiness, restlessness, and regret possibly be manifest? If they are not manifest, how could they obstruct calming and insight? How does what he said contradict the sūtras and reason? Namely, what he stated—that lethargy, drowsiness, restlessness, and regret respectively obstruct calming and insight—contradicts the previous teaching and reason. Therefore, the reason he stated for establishing only five lacks the capacity to prove that there are only five hindrances. For this reason, what was stated earlier is well-reasoned and to be relied upon. Why is ignorance (avidyā) not established as a hindrance? Because it is established without being stated; as a sūtra says: 'covered by ignorance'—'covering' is precisely 'hindrance'. Other masters say: Those that bear an equal burden are established among the hindrances, whereas among them ignorance bears a disproportionately heavy burden; therefore it is not stated. If ignorance were established as one hindrance, the obstructive capacity borne by all other afflictions combined still could not equal that of ignorance, so it is not established within the group of hindrances. Again, for what reason is pride (māna) not established as a hindrance? Because there are those who, by virtue of pride, are able to cultivate superior qualities; as its function as a hindrance is inferior, it is not established among the hindrances. Other masters say: Generally, that which is a hindrance causes the mind to turn downward, but pride is not like that, because it can cause the mind to aspire to higher qualities. Pride does not have the power to suppress the mind and make it turn downward; therefore it is not established as a hindrance. Why are the various views (dṛṣṭi) not established among the hindrances? Because it is seen that those sentient beings who lack the view of non-self (anātman), although grasping at a self, are nevertheless able to abandon defilement. Some say: Because the various views have wisdom as their nature and are swift and sharp, they do not accord with the meaning of a hindrance; being a hindrance must be contrary to this meaning. Among the secondary afflictions (upakleśa), as for why the rest are not established as hindrances, one should reflect properly in accordance with what was said before. That the afflictions of the upper two realms are not established as hindrances is because they are not an initial obstruction to abandoning defilement of the three realms. Because of being an initial obstruction, the name 'hindrance' is established. Furthermore, the afflictions of the upper realms are exclusively indeterminate (avyākṛta), whereas hindrances are exclusively unwholesome, as has already been stated before."