俱舍論疏 21.90

21.90

論「二由斷彼至彼隨斷故」，明第二斷也。《正理論》云「二由斷彼能緣故斷。謂欲界繫他界緣惑，以欲界繫見苦、集斷自界緣惑，能緣於彼，此惑於彼能作依持，依持斷時彼隨斷故。如羸病者却倚而立，去所倚時彼隨倒故。如何於彼能作依持？由此於彼能為因故。豈不此即說由害因故斷？實爾，此彼但是異名，然為止濫故作是說。謂欲界惑自他界緣，皆有此彼互為因義。然無此彼展轉相緣，故於此中說能緣斷。欲令易了唯他界緣，由斷此因彼便隨斷。」

The treatise says, "Second, because when that which can cognize them is abandoned […] they are abandoned along with it," which clarifies the second kind of abandonment. The Nyāyānusāra states: "Second, abandonment through the abandonment of that which can cognize them: namely, the afflictions bound to the desire realm that take another realm as object. Since the afflictions bound to the desire realm abandoned upon seeing suffering and origin that take their own realm as object can cognize them, they serve as a support for them; when that support is abandoned, they are abandoned along with it. Just as when a sick and weak person stands leaning [against a wall], when that upon which they lean is removed, they collapse along with it. How do they serve as a support for them? Because they can serve as a cause for them. Does this not simply say that they are abandoned through the destruction of their cause? Indeed it is so; these are merely different designations. However, in order to prevent confusion, it is stated in this manner. That is, the afflictions of the desire realm taking their own or another realm as object both have the property of serving as cause for one another; yet they do not mutually cognize one another in turn. Therefore, here it is called the abandonment of that which can cognize them. This is to make it easy to understand that those exclusively taking another realm as object are abandoned along with it through the abandonment of this cause."