俱舍論疏 3.33

3.33

論「等言為顯至解脫喜樂故」，釋頌「等」字。「等言為顯更有異門」，釋增上也。《正理論》云「此說非理。彼同分根應非根故（以非識依，應非根故）。豈不斯過汝亦有耶（經部却難：汝不共事等以見、聞等為增上，彼同分眼更不見色，應非是根）？我無此失，說於嚴身有增上故（彼同分眼雖無餘三增上，有嚴身等增上用也）。又非一切與能了別一切色識為通因性，以諸眼根剎那滅故，了諸色識不俱生故。若言眼類無差別者，色亦應同，類無異故。若謂青、黃種類別者，眼亦應爾，有異熟生，及所長養類不同故（准此見青、黃色眼根不別）。識但隨根有明昧者，此亦非因，識體生已方可得有隨根明昧（未生不可說隨根也）。未生令生增上力等，隨闕一種即不生故（未生令生，若色若根隨闕一種識即不生。此說根與境等）。」若作俱舍師彈：只由未生令生之根有明昧故，識隨眼根有明昧生，誰言識獨至現已方說隨耶？又現在世唯一剎那，如何得有轉明作昧、移昧作明耶？或識隨根有明昧故，導養身義應許在根。眼用若增，隨發勝識，能避險難導養於身。眼用若微，隨發劣識，不了險難令身顛墜。故導養身在根非識。彈曰：避險導身親由識濟，今既廢親立遠，一何誤耶？《正理》又云「又於此中有何少異？前門已顯眼等諸根發眼等識及相應法，今此門中略彼一分，非己所見何足生欣？既無別義，不應重說。」即是於我前說中減却一分，所不略者還說我說，何足生喜？已下諸根言同我說。

The Śāstra states: "The word 'and so forth' is to show ... because they are the bliss of liberation." This explains the word "and so forth" in the verse. "The word 'and so forth' is to show that there is yet another manner of exposition" explains the sovereign function. The Nyāyānusāra states: "This statement is unreasonable. For the sabhāga-faculties [in their inactive phase, i.e., tatsabhāga] would not be faculties (because they are not bases of consciousness, they would not be faculties). Might it not be that you too incur this fault? (The Sautrāntika objects in turn: 'You hold that uncommon functions and the like have seeing, hearing, and so forth as their sovereign function; when the tatsabhāga eye no longer sees visible forms, it should not be a faculty.') We do not incur this fault, because we explain that it has a sovereign function in adorning the body (though the tatsabhāga eye lacks the other three sovereign functions, it possesses the sovereign efficacy of adorning the body and so forth). Furthermore, not all [eye faculties] are a universal cause for the consciousnesses that cognize all visible forms, because eye faculties perish from moment to moment, and consciousnesses cognizing visible forms do not arise simultaneously [with them]. If you say that the category of the eye has no distinctions, visible forms should also be the same, for their category is not different. If you claim that blue and yellow belong to distinct categories, the eye should also be likewise, because there are different kinds arising from maturation and produced by nourishment (according to this, the eye faculties that see blue and yellow forms are not distinct). As for consciousness merely having clarity or dullness depending on the faculty, this too is not the reason, for only after the essence of consciousness has arisen can it be clear or dull in accordance with the faculty (before it has arisen, it cannot be said to follow the faculty). As for the sovereign power to cause what has not yet arisen to arise, if either one is lacking, it does not arise (in causing what has not yet arisen to arise, if either visible form or the faculty is lacking, consciousness does not arise; this refers to the faculty and the object being equal)." If a master of the Kośa were to refute this: It is precisely because the faculty that causes what has not yet arisen to arise is clear or dull that consciousness arises as clear or dull following the eye faculty; who says that consciousness must first reach the present before being said to follow it? Moreover, the present period is only a single moment; how could it transform clarity into dullness, or shift dullness into clarity? Or, since consciousness has clarity or dullness in accordance with the faculty, the meaning of guiding and sustaining the body should be acknowledged to reside in the faculty. If the function of the eye increases, it gives rise to a superior consciousness, which can avoid dangers and guide and sustain the body. If the function of the eye is weak, it gives rise to an inferior consciousness, which cannot discern dangers and causes the body to stumble and fall. Therefore, guiding and sustaining the body resides in the faculty, not in consciousness. To refute this: avoiding danger and guiding the body is directly accomplished by consciousness; now to cast aside the direct and establish the remote, how mistaken is that! The Nyāyānusāra further states: "Furthermore, what slight difference is there in this? The previous approach already showed that the faculties such as the eye give rise to consciousnesses such as the eye-consciousness and associated mental factors; now in this approach, a portion of that is omitted—since it is not one's own insight, how could it be worthy of joy? Since there is no distinct meaning, it should not be stated again." That is, it merely reduces a portion from what we previously explained, and what is not omitted still repeats our explanation; how could this give rise to joy? The faculties mentioned below are likewise said to agree with our explanation.