俱舍論疏 3.90

3.90

論「云何苾芻至富異熟果」，此釋捨壽行。准捨壽行，欲捨壽行皆行施等，定知不是轉現施業招壽之力令招富也。本欲轉捨壽業令招富果，欲令壽短，今更造壽業轉令招富，於捨壽行有何用耶？故知留壽行中所有布施但為轉力，不招現果。問：若爾，何故布施？答：《婆沙》云「問：所留壽行正由誰引？為由布施？為定力耶？若由施力，不應入定；若由定力，不應行施。有說由施，有說由定，如是說者俱由二種。雖多行施，若不入定，彼終不能引壽果故。雖數入定，若不行施，彼終不能引壽果故。然施力能引，定令決定，由此故言俱由二種。」准上論文，由施命緣能引過去招富之業感壽果也。《婆沙》釋捨壽行有六師釋。問：理無壽異熟果可成富異熟果，何故乃說壽異熟業即轉能招富異熟果？答：有三師如前留壽，唯改壽、富有異，皆言由施、定力。第四師云：有業先招富異熟果麁而非妙，由今布施、邊際定力，令滅麁業轉招妙果。謂彼先引長時麁果，今由布施、定、願力故，令彼轉招促時妙果。第五釋云：復有欲令引殘富異熟業，如留壽第四釋。《婆沙論》云「問：若諸有情壽果富果不決定者，可有留捨；若俱決定，如何留捨？答：但作分限，無留捨事。譬如良醫所記分限無能過者，此亦應然。」准此論文，留壽行者，富、壽二業俱不定者可有留捨；若決定者，但為分限不能增減。又准此文，增壽行者，非是現施能感，文極分明。第六尊者妙音釋，如此論。《正理論》云「且無分別。此諸根中唯一命根定是異熟，如何此命可無分別？定果命根非異熟故。如是命根亦是異熟，得邊際定應果苾芻，於僧眾中或別人所施思果故，諸我能感富異熟業，願皆轉招壽異熟果，本論說故。」此當《婆沙》初解。准《婆沙》四釋中，初釋及後立由施能引、定能決定，即是現施之思，引舊業起故，名施思果也。若作此釋，即與《婆沙》初釋相扶。《婆沙》復三師釋，皆違本論，不可依也。若不爾者，即與婆沙所解相違，又違本論捨壽行文。《正理》第二解同《婆沙》第三解，第三解同《婆沙》第四解。瑜師《正理抄》中云「《俱舍》所釋并非薩婆多正義，應以此引不定業為正。由不許命根是現業果。引無邊胄造《婆沙決擇》云『如說一法是業果非現業果，謂命根。又不許一業感多身。』」瑜師自云「然未詳其深趣，應更思之。」今詳有部命根定非現果，不許造一引業引多生果，亦不許造多引業共感一生。今此留壽，若為通釋，若准留壽，定願即轉前富果令續今命，即有多業感一生過。若言令感命不定業延，即有與願不同過。今即以此二義以為兩釋。一解：以定、願及施思力，延不定業留壽得長。問：若爾，豈不與願不同？答：由願富業感壽果故，此願方能延不定業，如以命緣施等方能延等。二釋：即轉富業令招壽果。問：若爾，豈不一生多業引，及非取而與果耶？答：不許二引業共一生受。由施、定力資不思議故轉，其非取滿業令招壽果，然不是一生多引業果。如色是礙，通力不思議故，而能令無礙。若不爾者，因何本論云「富異熟業則皆轉招壽異熟果」。若言施思為引招現果者，此即有多過失，違《婆沙》增、捨文故，一生多業引故，違捨壽行文。違無邊胄《決擇》云「一法是業果非現業果，謂命根。又不許一業感多身。」若引感富業感此身者，此非多引感一生過。然兩釋中，應取後釋，順本論故，尊者法勝說此命根亦非異熟故。彼論說「有十三根皆通二種」，此違本論一根非業是異熟，九根非業非異熟，十二不定。有人釋論第一引本論意云：此家意說，以布施時無貪相應思，正能感現異熟命根。以邊際定等為緣，轉富業令感壽果。此即現業能感現命果，此釋為定。問：同分亦現感不？命與同分誰總、誰別？第一解云：同分是總，命根是別。同分非現感，命根容現感。由有總、別不同，現、非現異故。有同分長、命根短者可延，若同分亦短者命不可延。此論既云轉招壽果，以此故知現容感命。又下論云「四業容俱作」，引同分唯三等（云云）。又引《婆沙》一百十四三說（云云），通《婆沙》三十一云「命根、眾同分是牽引果。」解云：引業非唯感總同分，亦能兼感別命根故。彈曰：舊翻名總、今譯為引，舊翻為別、今譯為滿。引滿總別眼目異名，如何引業兼感別命，豈非引、滿雜亂過耶？第二解云：同分是總、命根是別，同第一解。言差別者，俱容現感，由業力故。引《婆沙》第三師四業容感眾同分證。第三解云：同分是總、命根是別，同第一解。俱容現感，同第二解。言差別者，雖總、別不同，由彼俱容現業感故，長即齊長、短即齊短，延即同延、促則同促。第四解云：同分非現感，命根容現感，同第一解。言差別者，二俱是總。引《婆沙》三十一證。第五解云：俱容現感，同第二解。二俱是總，同第四解。言差別者，或延同分、或延命根。第六解云：俱容現感，同第二解。二俱是總，同第四解。云差別者，既俱容現感又同是總，長即齊長、短即同短，延即同延、促則同促。雖作六解，初解稍勝，非但順多論文，亦乃於理為善。今詳光師所引。論云「時彼能感富異熟業，則皆轉招壽異熟果。」謂是轉現施思之業為所轉業招現命根，違《婆沙》四釋及能轉所轉義也。及違捨壽行文，如前已述。亦違自釋。施思既已招命，何更用定、願轉？言命是滿，復違《婆沙》三十一文，及《正理》十六文，如後當述。又云命根及同分俱能令六處住時長、短。不得論意，如前已述。問：命及同分誰是引果？答：《婆沙》三十一云「復次命根、眾同分是牽引果。」又《正理》十六云「要意業牽引命、眾同分。」又云「身、語二業定不能引命、眾同分。不爾，便違契經正理。經言：劣界思所引故，此說欲有命、眾同分。又云：又非次第一一極微牽引命根及眾同分，一心起故。」《正理》此文與《婆沙》三十一同。既有正文說命是引、無文說命是滿，不可准義云命滿而違正文。問：若爾，何故《婆沙》一百一十四解四業三說，一云：生、後二業感眾同分及滿，現及不定感滿，非眾同分。二云：三感眾同分及滿除現，現能感滿，非眾同分。三云：四能感眾同分及滿。《婆沙》既對滿說眾同分，不言命根，故知命唯是滿。答：彼文明四業感果引、滿差別，引中舉眾同分，命可例同。《婆沙》三十一正明眾同分、命根是何果故，具說二種牽引果也。四業中是准義，三十一及《正理》是正文，不可釋正文從准義也。此論云「引同分唯三」，即是第二師義，由引有命及同分故。言引同分，欲簡命根。若唯同分是引，但應言引，何用同分之言？問？命及同分俱是引果，何故唯說留捨命行，不說留捨同分？答：二用別故。故論云「一趣生等諸有情類，所有身形諸根業用，及飲食等互相似因，并其展轉相樂欲因，名眾同分。故有別法能轉煖、識相續住因、說名為壽。又命根增上用、謂能令眾同分相續住等。」准此故知延、促是命，非是眾同分也。

The treatise says: "How does a monk [cast off life-formations] up to [the vipāka-fruit of wealth]?" This explains casting off life-formations. According to [the procedure for] casting off life-formations, those who wish to cast off life-formations all perform giving and the like; therefore, one definitely knows that this is not converting the power of present karma of giving that produces life so as to produce wealth. Originally, one wishes to convert and cast off karma for life so that it produces the fruit of wealth, wishing to make life short; if one were now to further create karma for life and convert it to produce wealth, what purpose would that serve in casting off life-formations? Therefore, one knows that all giving in [the process of] retaining life-formations functions only as a converting force and does not produce a present fruit. Question: If so, why give gifts? Answer: The *Vibhāṣā* says: "Question: By what is the life-formation retained primarily projected? Is it by giving? Or by the power of samādhi? If by the power of giving, one should not enter samādhi; if by the power of samādhi, one should not perform giving. Some say by giving; some say by samādhi. The correct view is that it is by both. For although one performs much giving, if one does not enter samādhi, one can never project the fruit of life. And although one frequently enters samādhi, if one does not perform giving, one can never project the fruit of life. However, the power of giving can project, while samādhi makes it determined; therefore it is said to be by both." According to the above treatise passage, giving the requisites of life can project past karma producing wealth to actuate the fruit of life. In the *Vibhāṣā*, six masters explain casting off life-formations. Question: In principle, it is impossible for the vipāka-fruit of life to become the vipāka-fruit of wealth; why then say that karma [producing] the vipāka of life is converted so that it can produce the vipāka-fruit of wealth? Answer: Three masters explain it as in the retention of life earlier, merely transposing "life" and "wealth", all stating that it is by the power of giving and samādhi. The fourth master says: There is karma that originally projected a coarse and not sublime vipāka-fruit of wealth; through present giving and the power of borderline samādhi, that coarse karma is made to cease and is converted to produce a sublime fruit. That is, it originally projected a coarse fruit over a long time, but now, by the power of giving, samādhi, and aspiration, it is converted to produce a sublime fruit over a shortened time. The fifth explanation says: There are others who maintain that it projects residual karma [producing] the vipāka of wealth, like the fourth explanation of retaining life. The *Vibhāṣā-śāstra* says: "Question: If the life-fruit and wealth-fruit of sentient beings are indeterminate, there may be retaining and casting off; but if both are determinate, how can there be retaining and casting off? Answer: It merely sets a limit; there is no actual retaining or casting off. Just as no one can exceed the limit marked by an expert physician, this too should be understood in the same way." According to this treatise passage, for one who retains life-formations, if both the karmas of wealth and life are indeterminate, there can be retaining and casting off; if they are determinate, it merely constitutes a limit and cannot increase or decrease. Furthermore, according to this text, that which extends life-formations is not produced by present giving; the text is extremely clear. The sixth master, Venerable Ghoṣaka, explains it as does this treatise. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Moreover, without distinction: among these faculties, the life-faculty alone is definitely vipāka; how could this life be without distinction? Because the life-faculty that is a fruit of samādhi is not vipāka. This kind of life-faculty is also vipāka, because an arhat bhikṣu who has attained borderline samādhi, in the monastic community or toward an individual, [generates] the fruit of intention in giving, [wishing:] 'May all my karmas capable of producing the vipāka of wealth be converted so that they all produce the vipāka-fruit of life', because the fundamental treatise says so." This corresponds to the first explanation in the *Vibhāṣā*. According to the four explanations in the *Vibhāṣā*, the first explanation and the subsequent thesis that it is projected by giving and determined by samādhi mean that the intention of present giving projects old karma to arise, and hence it is called "the fruit of the intention in giving". If one explains it in this way, it accords with the first explanation of the *Vibhāṣā*. The other three explanations in the *Vibhāṣā* all contradict the fundamental treatise and cannot be relied upon. Otherwise, it would contradict what the *Vibhāṣā* explains and also contradict the passage on casting off life-formations in the fundamental treatise. The second explanation of the *Nyāyānusāra* is identical to the third explanation of the *Vibhāṣā*; its third explanation is identical to the fourth explanation of the *Vibhāṣā*. Master Yu in his *Notes on the Nyāyānusāra* says: "The explanation in the *Kośa* is not the orthodox Sarvāstivāda doctrine at all; one should take this projection of indeterminate karma as orthodox, because it does not accept that the life-faculty is the fruit of present karma. Citing Anantavarman's *Vibhāṣā-viniścaya*: 'As it is said: One dharma is a fruit of karma but not a fruit of present karma, namely the life-faculty. Furthermore, it does not accept that one karma actuates multiple bodies.'" Master Yu himself says: "However, without examining its deep import, one should reflect on it further." Now, when examining the Vaibhāṣika view, the life-faculty is definitely not a present fruit; they do not accept that creating a single projecting karma projects fruits over multiple lives, nor do they accept that creating multiple projecting karmas jointly actuates a single life. Now, regarding this retention of life, if one seeks a comprehensive explanation: if, following the retention of life, samādhi and aspiration directly convert the previous fruit of wealth to prolong the present life, there would be the fault of multiple karmas actuating a single life. If one says that it prolongs the indeterminate karma actuating life, there would be the fault of differing from one's aspiration. Now we take these two meanings as two explanations. The first explanation: by the power of samādhi, aspiration, and the intention of giving, one prolongs indeterminate karma so that life is retained and becomes long. Question: If so, does this not differ from the aspiration? Answer: Because one aspires for wealth-karma to actuate the fruit of life, this aspiration is then able to prolong indeterminate karma, just as giving the requisites of life and the like enables prolongation. The second explanation: one directly converts wealth-karma so that it produces the fruit of life. Question: If so, would this not mean that one life is projected by multiple karmas, and that karma gives fruit without having been grasped? Answer: It is not accepted that two projecting karmas are experienced together in a single life. Because the power of giving and samādhi provides an inconceivable support, it converts completing karma that was not grasped so that it produces the fruit of life, yet it is not the fruit of multiple projecting karmas in a single life. Just as matter is obstructive, yet through the inconceivable power of supernatural faculties it can be made unobstructive. If it were not so, why would the fundamental treatise say: "The karma [producing] the vipāka of wealth is entirely converted so that it produces the vipāka-fruit of life"? If one says that the intention of giving acts as a projector that actuates a present fruit, this would entail multiple faults, because it would contradict the texts on extending and casting off in the *Vibhāṣā*, because a single life would be projected by multiple karmas, and because it would contradict the passage on casting off life-formations. It would also contradict Anantavarman's *Viniścaya*: "One dharma is a fruit of karma but not a fruit of present karma, namely the life-faculty. Furthermore, it does not accept that one karma actuates multiple bodies." If projecting the karma that produces wealth produces this body, this does not have the fault of multiple projecting karmas actuating a single life. However, between the two explanations, one should adopt the latter explanation, because it accords with the fundamental treatise, and because the venerable Dharmatrāta states that this life-faculty is also not vipāka. That treatise says: "Thirteen faculties are common to both kinds [vipāka and non-vipāka]", which contradicts the fundamental treatise's [teaching that] one faculty is non-karma and is vipāka, nine faculties are non-karma and non-vipāka, and twelve are indeterminate. Someone, in explaining the treatise's first citation of the fundamental treatise's intent, said: This master's intention is that the intention associated with non-greed at the time of giving directly actuates the present vipāka life-faculty; taking borderline samādhi and the like as conditions, it converts wealth-karma to actuate the fruit of life. This means present karma can actuate the present fruit of life; this explanation is definitive. Question: Is the generic similarity also actuated in the present? Between life and generic similarity, which is general and which is particular? The first explanation says: Generic similarity is general, and the life-faculty is particular. Generic similarity is not actuated in the present; the life-faculty may be actuated in the present. Because there is a difference between general and particular, there is a difference between present and non-present actuation. Where generic similarity is long and the life-faculty is short, life can be prolonged; if generic similarity is also short, life cannot be prolonged. Since this treatise says "it is converted to produce the fruit of life", by this we know that present actuation of life is possible. Furthermore, the lower treatise says: "Four karmas may be performed simultaneously", and projecting generic similarity involves only three, and so on. It also cites the three views in *Vibhāṣā* 114, and harmonizes with *Vibhāṣā* 31, which states: "The life-faculty and generic similarity are projected fruits." The explanation says: Projecting karma not only actuates the general generic similarity, but can also concurrently actuate the particular life-faculty. Critique: The old translation termed it "general", while the new translation renders it "projecting"; the old translation termed it "particular", while the new translation renders it "completing". Projecting and completing, general and particular, are merely different designations for the same thing; how could projecting karma concurrently actuate the particular life? Would that not entail the fault of confusing projecting and completing? The second explanation says: Generic similarity is general and the life-faculty is particular, identical to the first explanation. The difference is: both may be actuated in the present, through the power of karma. It cites the third master in the *Vibhāṣā* that four karmas may actuate generic similarity as proof. The third explanation says: Generic similarity is general and the life-faculty is particular, identical to the first explanation. That both may be actuated in the present is identical to the second explanation. The difference is: although general and particular differ, because both may be actuated by present karma, when one is long both are equally long, and when one is short both are equally short; when prolonged they are prolonged together, and when shortened they are shortened together. The fourth explanation says: Generic similarity is not actuated in the present, whereas the life-faculty may be actuated in the present, identical to the first explanation. The difference is: both are general. It cites *Vibhāṣā* 31 as proof. The fifth explanation says: Both may be actuated in the present, identical to the second explanation. Both are general, identical to the fourth explanation. The difference is: either generic similarity is prolonged, or the life-faculty is prolonged. The sixth explanation says: Both may be actuated in the present, identical to the second explanation. Both are general, identical to the fourth explanation. The difference is: since both may be actuated in the present and both are general, when one is long both are equally long, and when one is short both are equally short; when prolonged they are prolonged together, and when shortened they are shortened together. Although six explanations are made, the first explanation is somewhat superior: not only does it accord with multiple treatise passages, it is also logically sound. Now, examining what Master Guang cites: The treatise says: "At that time, those karmas capable of producing the vipāka of wealth are entirely converted so that they produce the vipāka-fruit of life." This claims that the karma of the present intention of giving is converted as the converted karma to actuate the present life-faculty, which contradicts the four explanations in the *Vibhāṣā* and the meaning of that which converts and that which is converted. It also contradicts the text on casting off life-formations, as discussed earlier. It likewise contradicts his own explanation: if the intention of giving already actuates life, why further use samādhi and aspiration to convert it? To say that life is completing karma further contradicts the text of *Vibhāṣā* 31 and *Nyāyānusāra* 16, as will be explained later. Moreover, he says that both the life-faculty and generic similarity can make the six sense-bases endure for a long or short time. He misses the point of the treatise, as discussed earlier. Question: Between life and generic similarity, which is a projected fruit? Answer: *Vibhāṣā* 31 says: "Furthermore, the life-faculty and generic similarity are projected fruits." And *Nyāyānusāra* 16 says: "It is essential that mental karma projects life and generic similarity." It also says: "Bodily and vocal karma are definitely unable to project life and generic similarity. Otherwise, this would contradict the sūtras and correct reasoning. The sūtra says: 'Because they are projected by the intention of an inferior realm', which refers to the life and generic similarity of the desire realm. It also says: 'Moreover, it is not that each minute particle successively projects the life-faculty and generic similarity, because they arise from a single thought.'" This text of the *Nyāyānusāra* is identical to *Vibhāṣā* 31. Since there is explicit text stating that life is projected, and no text stating that life is completing, one cannot infer by reasoning that life is completing and thereby contradict the explicit text. Question: If so, why does *Vibhāṣā* 114, explaining four karmas, provide three views? First: karma experienced in the next life and karma experienced in subsequent lives actuate generic similarity and completion; karma experienced in the present life and indeterminate karma actuate completion, not generic similarity. Second: three [karmas] actuate generic similarity and completion, excluding the present; the present can actuate completion, not generic similarity. Third: all four can actuate generic similarity and completion. Since the *Vibhāṣā* speaks of generic similarity in contrast to completion and does not mention the life-faculty, one knows that life is exclusively completion. Answer: That text explains the distinction between projecting and completing in the fruit-actuation of the four karmas; in [discussing] projecting, it brings up generic similarity, and life can be understood by analogy. *Vibhāṣā* 31 directly clarifies what fruits generic similarity and the life-faculty are; hence it fully explains both as projected fruits. Among the four karmas, it is an inferred meaning, whereas chapter 31 and the *Nyāyānusāra* are explicit texts; one cannot interpret explicit texts in accordance with an inferred meaning. This treatise states: "Only three project generic similarity", which is the opinion of the second master, because that which projects includes both life and generic similarity. Stating "projects generic similarity" is intended to exclude the life-faculty. If generic similarity alone were projected, it should merely say "projects"; why use the words "generic similarity"? Question: Since life and generic similarity are both projected fruits, why does it only speak of retaining and casting off life-formations, and not retaining and casting off generic similarity? Answer: Because their two functions differ. Thus the treatise says: "The cause for mutual resemblance in physical form, sense faculties, actions, food, and drink, as well as the cause for mutual desire among sentient beings of the same destiny and birth, is called generic similarity. Therefore, there is a distinct dharma that causes warmth and consciousness to endure in continuity, which is called life. Furthermore, the sovereign function of the life-faculty is said to cause generic similarity to endure in continuity, and so forth." According to this, one knows that prolongation and shortening pertain to life, not to generic similarity.